Earlier quoted context omitted.
The basic perversity is building a gigantic military in peacetime because the arms companies have enormous lobbying power. Everything else flows from and is secondary to that.
We're not talking about scaling out cloud deployments or something here. Building a military takes an incredible amount of lead time. If you don't have a strong standing military force during peacetime, you won't have one during wartime.
The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
61–70 of 233 posts
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#62Earlier quoted context omitted.
> The A10's minigun is ineffective at killing modern main-battle tanks, so I wouldn't say it's a raging sucess. I love those improvised battle tanks by the guerrilas that the US has been encountering in their last 30 years of wars.
Yeah good thing no one we're dropping bombs on today has any armored vehicles. http://defensetech.org/2015/01/07/us-airstrikes-agaisnt-isis...
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#63When the F-4 Phantom was developed, it was decided that air-to-air missiles had obsoleted guns. No guns were put in the F-4. Fast forward to aerial combat in Vietnam, and mechanics were jury-rigging bolt-on machine gun pods under the wings. I fear we're making the same mistake again.
Around 1975-1985, technology advanced and new generation of missiles entered service. They became reliable, and they could be launched successfully from a wider ranger of circumstances.
Around 1995-2005, technology advanced even more, and an even more capable generation of missiles entered service. As well as being reliable, they're now smart enough and have good enough sensors to be immune to decoys, and they're agile enough that no aircraft on earth can out turn them. Some can even be launched against targets which aren't even in front of the launching aircraft.
Guns are obsolete.
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#64Earlier quoted context omitted.
In both cases it was do or die. Right now is do or ... meh.
Do or die? I'm not sure. Neither Apollo nor Manhattan were do-or-die situations (for the US). Maybe "First-system" vs "Second-system syndrome" is the difference? Apollo and Manhattan were definitely "First systems". Bradley APC and F-35 are classic "Second systems", suffering from second-system syndrome [1]. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_system_syndrome#The_sec...
And US urgently needed to catch up in the space race - space is very efficient way to drop nuke on someone.
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#65The author mentions "perverse" incentives in Congress, but what he doesn't mention (because it's a very politically difficult subject) is the perverse incentives afforded military officers. When you have a system in which it's so common as to be expected that the officers who influence your purchasing will in a couple years retire into a job with the private contractor from whom you're purchasing, you have a recipe f…
It's all part of the general pattern of careerism. It's in sharper relief in military contracting because there's simply more & different information about it. It is also damaging in the private sector.
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#66Earlier quoted context omitted.
We're not talking about scaling out cloud deployments or something here. Building a military takes an incredible amount of lead time. If you don't have a strong standing military force during peacetime, you won't have one during wartime.
Utterly false. Prior to involvement in World War 2, the US had hardly any standing army and rather weak tooling industries (being wiped out by the Great Depression) and yet still managed to field like 2 million troops and vast amounts of weapons for allies in a very short period of time.
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#67The author mentions "perverse" incentives in Congress, but what he doesn't mention (because it's a very politically difficult subject) is the perverse incentives afforded military officers. When you have a system in which it's so common as to be expected that the officers who influence your purchasing will in a couple years retire into a job with the private contractor from whom you're purchasing, you have a recipe f…
The basic perversity is building a gigantic military in peacetime because the arms companies have enormous lobbying power. Everything else flows from and is secondary to that.
Today being behind on military technology by as little as 5 years can be decisive in confrontation. The last decade has brought huge changes in military technology including super and hypersonic missile delivery systems (these can defeat the US's current interception capabilities), THAAD technology, directed energy weapons, new reactive armors, satellite bombing systems, startling new radar arrays, hybrid warships, autonomous drones, practical railguns, missile adhoc networks and intelligent interception, material science bringing in new stealth materials and body armor, satellite kill systems, not to mention advancements in electronic warfare. There is constant pressure on the US, because it is the second largest arms dealer around the world, to constantly build better military equipment. And there is constant pressure to do the same because the US's military might has everything to do with the geopolitics that continue to make it rich.
The Washington Consensus chose 25 years ago to continue the investment of military with a pivot in tactics and to uses its military might in tandem with 'soft power', financial leverage, social disruption, culture export, etc in an attempt to fix its success and the success of its allies with "minimal bloodshed" - but a form of colonialism nonetheless. It will continually sell off old equipment to aid in funding new research and development.
The US is a world empire - and while this can be seen by looking at a map of military locale it is better seen as a Capitalistic one. It uses its host of leverage, import-export bank, 'structural adjustment programs', 'value sharing initiatives' and the like. The US's foreign policy is wrapped up intrinsically in providing energy security to the first world, which means constant interventionism in the Middle East. It also has a huge number of security and military obligations around the world - e.g. right now we're promised to go to nuclear war were there to be an attack on Latvia.
The US has many reasons to be militaristic - its waning economic dominance but continued military commitments and global footprint, its obligations and its own incentives to fix its success during continued globalization. Military contractors feed this fire, yes. They benefit from it, yes. But it is not as simple as military contractors lobbying successfully.
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#68It's duplicitous of me to bring this up given all the other problems with this plane, but since it's a favorite topic of argument here, let's not forget the F-35's software is mostly developed in C++, and had been, in the past, touted as a triumph of C++ over Ada.
It is also very strange to me that Bruce Powell Douglass' work has largely gone unlauded. As clunky as UML is, the class of tools there - beginning with ObjecTime - provide considerable value. Of course there are flaws but it nearly seems of no interest at all now.
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#69When the F-4 Phantom was developed, it was decided that air-to-air missiles had obsoleted guns. No guns were put in the F-4. Fast forward to aerial combat in Vietnam, and mechanics were jury-rigging bolt-on machine gun pods under the wings. I fear we're making the same mistake again.
When the F-4 Phantom was developed, missiles were extremely unreliable, only around one in ten hit the target they were launched against, and they could only be launched in a fairly limited circumstances. Around 1975-1985, technology advanced and new generation of missiles entered service. They became reliable, and they could be launched successfully from a wider ranger of circumstances. Around 1995-2005, technology…
While we used to have different planes for different tasks, the staggering costs of current/future models is killing off such things. And as there's no external threat today (for the US military), the enemies are themselves - the different services. Nobody in the Air Force really wants to support those in the mud. But they won't give them fixed wing aircraft (A-10) so they can support themselves.
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#70Earlier quoted context omitted.
Totally agree with you http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_11
Nice rebuttal. The Apollo program was also delivered on time (JFK's "before this decade is out" deadline). I'd also add the Manhattan Project to this list. I wonder: why can the government execute Apollo and Manhattan projects, but botches such simple projects as the Bradley APC carrier?
The software story in "Moon Machines" should be required for anyone who does software. The whole thing should be interesting to anyone; it's a great example of documentary filmmaking.