The author mentions "perverse" incentives in Congress, but what he doesn't mention (because it's a very politically difficult subject) is the perverse incentives afforded military officers. When you have a system in which it's so common as to be expected that the officers who influence your purchasing will in a couple years retire into a job with the private contractor from whom you're purchasing, you have a recipe f…
The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
51–60 of 233 posts
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#52It is just inconceivable that we have a multi-decade program to develop a new fighter to fill all these roles, and what we've produced is either equivalent to or worse than the incumbent in all cases, is not safe to fly in combat situations, and is more expensive to boot. I mean we've seen this sort of thing happen on a smaller scale before, but versions of this plane are supposed to replace, like, everything in mult…
Just a friendly reminder why governments and large corporations can't develop shit: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aXQ2lO3ieBA
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#53It is just inconceivable that we have a multi-decade program to develop a new fighter to fill all these roles, and what we've produced is either equivalent to or worse than the incumbent in all cases, is not safe to fly in combat situations, and is more expensive to boot. I mean we've seen this sort of thing happen on a smaller scale before, but versions of this plane are supposed to replace, like, everything in mult…
My first week at PLC in Quantico another candidate, prior enlisted recon guy, told me... "War is a racket". Later I found out that the quote was attributed to USMC Maj Gen Smedley Butler. Even read the book. It's kind of amazing how little things have changed at heart since he committed his thoughts to paper.
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#54Earlier quoted context omitted.
The A10's minigun is ineffective at killing modern main-battle tanks, so I wouldn't say it's a raging sucess. In addition, it would certainly be blown up immediately if it came within shooting distance of a tank by any number of man-portable anti-air missiles. What it can do is provide reasonable close air support against Toyota pickups and infantry, but replacement parts for the plane or the molds to create them don…
> The A10's minigun is ineffective at killing modern main-battle tanks, so I wouldn't say it's a raging sucess. I love those improvised battle tanks by the guerrilas that the US has been encountering in their last 30 years of wars.
http://defensetech.org/2015/01/07/us-airstrikes-agaisnt-isis...
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#55Earlier quoted context omitted.
The services guard their missions jealously. They don't want competition within their various roles -- those roles are their justifications for budget, status and involvement. There are good reasons for specialization, of course. But the institutional politics can't be ignored. I've heard that the Marines actually have really good air support, because they have their own planes and the generals make damn sure those p…
> I've heard that the Marines actually have really good air support, because they have their own planes Why can't the army buy the same planes, are they not being manufactured any more?
The army isn't allowed to have fixed wing aircraft with combat capabilities.
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#56Earlier quoted context omitted.
Totally agree with you http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_11
Nice rebuttal. The Apollo program was also delivered on time (JFK's "before this decade is out" deadline). I'd also add the Manhattan Project to this list. I wonder: why can the government execute Apollo and Manhattan projects, but botches such simple projects as the Bradley APC carrier?
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#571) Every large, complex program has similar technical teething problems. If you look back at the beginnings of today's well-established systems, including other planes, you'll see similar histories and criticism (though it was less magnified by the echo chamber of the Internet). The existence of all these bugs and problems means nothing, good or bad; they are part of every major project.
This should not surprise HN readers: Imagine an extraordinarily complex project, filled with newly invented technology, with a 20 year development cycle (and using waterfall methodology AFAIK). Add to that the extraordinary pressure on performance and capbilities (i.e., developers can't be conservative): If the project's perf isn't fast/powerful/etc enough then people die, such as the operator or the thousands to millions of others whom we can't protect, and nations might fall. You would expect a very large number of bugs; it's kind of amazing that such projects ever ship!
Perhaps they should use other methodologies to reduce these problems but with fighter planes, due to the cost of building them and of failed experiments (i.e., dead pilots), you can't 'move fast and break things'. Also, you never really can test the system until you fight an actual war against a peer enemy.
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2) The public's conception of figher planes is very outdated. They imagine dogfights in the sky, which might be as outdated as ships shooting banks of cannons at each other (this is my impression based on limited reading of people who know).
For example, a study I read by leading military strategists [1] looked at actual fighter-to-fighter encounters. The last time we saw many of them was in Vietnam (think of it: we haven't had an arial shooting war in 40 years, covering generations of (thankfully) unutilized planes and pilots). In Vietnam 80% of encounters were over before the loser had time to defend themselves, because they were not aware of the attacker.
You can see then why the F-35's design might focus on situational awareness, including: Sensors; building a network where each plane is essentially a node, so all planes all see the entire network's sensor data as well as sharing with ground systems (imagine making a data network reliable in that environment); and the pilot's UI: In prior planes pilots had to read and interpret (6? 12? more?) sensors, each on different interfaces, all while flying and fighting. The F-35's IT systems unify the data on one interface, and the computer does much of the analysis (e.g., object A1 moving at X rate with Y vector and Z characteristics is probably a bird, object A2 is a friendly plane, A3 is a civilian plane, ... and object A53 is an enemy missile).
Also, electronic warfare has become far more important, with hints of F-35's even hacking into enemy systems. To an extent, warfare has become a battle of networks shooting electronic attacks over an air gap.
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Again, none of this means that the F-35 will work out well, but most of the public discussion is misguided.
[1] http://csbaonline.org/publications/2007/03/six-decades-of-gu...
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#58The author mentions "perverse" incentives in Congress, but what he doesn't mention (because it's a very politically difficult subject) is the perverse incentives afforded military officers. When you have a system in which it's so common as to be expected that the officers who influence your purchasing will in a couple years retire into a job with the private contractor from whom you're purchasing, you have a recipe f…
The basic perversity is building a gigantic military in peacetime because the arms companies have enormous lobbying power. Everything else flows from and is secondary to that.
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#59Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nice rebuttal. The Apollo program was also delivered on time (JFK's "before this decade is out" deadline). I'd also add the Manhattan Project to this list. I wonder: why can the government execute Apollo and Manhattan projects, but botches such simple projects as the Bradley APC carrier?
In both cases it was do or die. Right now is do or ... meh.
If that was your goal, it is win-win, no matter if the project fails.
And that's where I'd peg the fundamental problem.
Re: The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35
#60Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nice rebuttal. The Apollo program was also delivered on time (JFK's "before this decade is out" deadline). I'd also add the Manhattan Project to this list. I wonder: why can the government execute Apollo and Manhattan projects, but botches such simple projects as the Bradley APC carrier?
In both cases it was do or die. Right now is do or ... meh.
Maybe "First-system" vs "Second-system syndrome" is the difference?
Apollo and Manhattan were definitely "First systems".
Bradley APC and F-35 are classic "Second systems",
suffering from second-system syndrome [1].
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_system_syndrome#The_sec...