The Little “Fighter” That Couldn’t: Moral Hazard and the F-35

I am still shocked the Navy is ok with a single engine fighter.

It's duplicitous of me to bring this up given all the other problems with this plane, but since it's a favorite topic of argument here, let's not forget the F-35's software is mostly developed in C++, and had been, in the past, touted as a triumph of C++ over Ada.

It is just inconceivable that we have a multi-decade program to develop a new fighter to fill all these roles, and what we've produced is either equivalent to or worse than the incumbent in all cases, is not safe to fly in combat situations, and is more expensive to boot. I mean we've seen this sort of thing happen on a smaller scale before, but versions of this plane are supposed to replace, like, everything in multiple mission classes across multiple services. Again, just inconceivable.

This article didn't present anything that we haven't seen before, though, and the excerpts from the unnamed pilot set off the 'totally out of context' alarms in my head when reading them. Maybe it's because I'm not involved with fighter planes in any capacity; for example, I found myself thinking that maybe the pilot is not supposed to actually be looking behind them in this plane vs. using video on their HUD or something, and that explains why the helmet and seat are not optimized for head movement.

What I don't understand is why the various services care so much about what the other services do or don't do. Why does the AF insist on managing the A-10 when they clearly do not and never have wanted it? The Army wants it, let them have it. We're obviously not that concerned with duplication or waste given how much money we've spent on this and the F-22 for, apparently, no gain.

The author mentions "perverse" incentives in Congress, but what he doesn't mention (because it's a very politically difficult subject) is the perverse incentives afforded military officers. When you have a system in which it's so common as to be expected that the officers who influence your purchasing will in a couple years retire into a job with the private contractor from whom you're purchasing, you have a recipe for bias. Even from really standup people who don't recognize their own vulnerability to influence. It's just such a common thing to work in the private sector for the same office as you did when you were enlisted that nobody blinks an eye. Because it's often really good to still have those people around.

But at the same time, I think that's a pretty untenable situation. The military needs to do something to balance the career mobility of their officers with the ethical hazards of the current system. Without some rules to prevent the scenarios that have the most potential for abuse, the situation is not unlike the flow of Congress members into lobbying. Except we don't elect military officers.

It's a tough balance. Part of the promise of the military's recruiting is that you'll advance your career. They should fulfill that promise. At the same time, they need to make sure that the ways in which they fulfill that promise don't incentivize poor judgment on behalf of the public interest.