The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother • Hacker News Board

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#91

Post by encoderer » Fri, Jan 01, 2010, 6:40 PM UTC

tshtf wrote: post #20

intellectronica wrote: post #11

The problem with the Israelification goal is that while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring. The problem of scale is manifested twice: 1. Manpower - Israel has a huge pool of very talented young men and women who already received very good training in the army and the security…

You're entirely correct on scale. If we take a look at passenger movements for the top 30 airports in the world, available at http://www.airports.org/cda/aci_common/display/main/aci_cont... Ben Gurion airport isn't even listed. The US, Asian, and European airports handling this traffic could not possibly scale to handle this Israeli solution. That said, it may (or may not) be beneficial to find components of the Isra…

If, in an alternate reality, Isreal used our current method.. people have to remove their shoes, remove the belts, empty pockets, coats, take out their electronics, have ID's examined twice, etc.. If that was the isreali method, I'd bet my bottom dollar that people would be here saying that such a system wouldn't scale to our busiest airports.

It would seem absurd on its face.

But, it does scale. Not elegantly. But it does. We're capable of amazing things when there's political will.

And I'll tell you this, I fly far more than the average American. And so I chat a lot with other pax. I feel strongly that a headline reading "Airport Security Focus Shifts from baggage to passenger: _Keep your shoes on and answer a few questions_" would be very well received in this country.

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#92

Post by encoderer » Fri, Jan 01, 2010, 6:44 PM UTC

quizbiz wrote: post #52

fjabre wrote: post #46

A sensitive subject to say the least. I find it mind boggling that anyone would want to emulate Israel in any capacity concerning security. They've had suicide bombers in cafes, night clubs, school buses, etc.. and no matter what side of the fence you're on it's pretty obvious that whatever they're doing is not working.

You are wrong, it is working. The controversy is over the cost. There are countless instances of identified and disabled devices. Who knows how many deaths the metal detectors/security check at the entrance to nearly every point of public gathering (malls, movie theaters, parking decks, etc.) have prevented. Their inconvenience would not be acceptable in the US but I'm just saying it does make a difference. Just last…

+1 and that doesn't even touch it's added value as a deterrent.

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#93

Post by [deleted] » Fri, Jan 01, 2010, 6:47 PM UTC

tshtf wrote: post #20

intellectronica wrote: post #11

The problem with the Israelification goal is that while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring. The problem of scale is manifested twice: 1. Manpower - Israel has a huge pool of very talented young men and women who already received very good training in the army and the security…

You're entirely correct on scale. If we take a look at passenger movements for the top 30 airports in the world, available at http://www.airports.org/cda/aci_common/display/main/aci_cont... Ben Gurion airport isn't even listed. The US, Asian, and European airports handling this traffic could not possibly scale to handle this Israeli solution. That said, it may (or may not) be beneficial to find components of the Isra…

[deleted]

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#94

Post by StrawberryFrog » Fri, Jan 01, 2010, 8:34 PM UTC

jacquesm wrote: post #87

dalke wrote: post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"I don't see why at least these precautions wouldn't be scalable" I believe those policies were in place at Amsterdam airport already for US flights. At least, I have memories of being asked behavioral questions at the gate and of another screening of my carry-on luggage and walking through the metal detector. I can't say anything about the process in place last week. If it was in place, and still didn't work, then w…

The problem is not that it wasn't in place and didn't work, it probably works 99.9% of the time. So all you need to do is throw enough people at that crack to become successful. Airport security is after the fact, you need to work to create a world in which would-be-suicide bombers have too much to lose, and are too smart to be brain washed. In the end that's probably cheaper too.

it probably works 99.9% of the time. So all you need to do is throw enough people at that crack to become successful.

That approach doesn't scale. Imaging the organisation needed for sending 1000 suicide bombers. Now imagine keeping it functioning, and avoiding consequences catching up with it as it sends in the first ten or so.

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#95

Post by siculars » Fri, Jan 01, 2010, 8:38 PM UTC

intellectronica wrote: post #11

The problem with the Israelification goal is that while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring. The problem of scale is manifested twice: 1. Manpower - Israel has a huge pool of very talented young men and women who already received very good training in the army and the security…

Regarding "scale":

1. Manpower is an issue which could be readily addressed by increasing the pay and training of the job. Lets say that manpower is a concern. Well here is a novel idea: don't screen everyone. Screen every 5th, every 4th, etc. Mix up your screening. This alone will send the message that we are gearing up towards using this method.

2. Volume is a red herring. Just replicate what works at one airport by the number of airports we have. Yes it will cost and yes it will be hard to staff but just pay more and increase training. What is the alternative? Bottom line is that we can not afford larger holes in the confidence the flying public has in air travel. Not including the actual cost of losing a plane.

To all of those that talk of "profiling" I will ask you to research the Hindawi affair, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindawi_Affair. The bottom line is that profiling is used heavily but nobody gets a free pass. Nobody. I've been flying ElAl for a long time and I always get a through questioning. Fact is is that it doesn't take long for them to establish I am not a threat.

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#96

Post by shmichael » Fri, Jan 01, 2010, 8:44 PM UTC

idan wrote: post #55

intellectronica wrote: post #11

The problem with the Israelification goal is that while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring. The problem of scale is manifested twice: 1. Manpower - Israel has a huge pool of very talented young men and women who already received very good training in the army and the security…

Hi, I'm an Israeli who is at least passably familiar with how the security apparatus works here. A few comments on your comments: 1. Scale Scale is an issue, but nobody in the thread has touched on why. The Israeli security model is (as noted in the article) more about the passenger than their baggage. This approach is both effective, time-consuming, and "racist": the profilers have a conversation with each passenger…

I'm also Israeli. I completely agree, and would like to add another insight:

The Israeli security ring is built around human credibility, while the US focuses on the physical aspect of security.

From the article:

"the security set-up at Israel's largest hub, Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion Airport, has not been breached since 2002, when a passenger mistakenly carried a handgun onto a flight."

The handgun would have been detected on a US flight because screening would be done more thoroughly. The person forgot about the handgun, and thus came out completely credible to Israeli security. This is just like undergoing a polygraph.

And if you think about it, it makes sense in a way. This particular person wouldn't use the handgun, so why bother screening it?

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#97

Post by jacquesm » Fri, Jan 01, 2010, 10:34 PM UTC

StrawberryFrog wrote: post #94

jacquesm wrote: post #87

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The problem is not that it wasn't in place and didn't work, it probably works 99.9% of the time. So all you need to do is throw enough people at that crack to become successful. Airport security is after the fact, you need to work to create a world in which would-be-suicide bombers have too much to lose, and are too smart to be brain washed. In the end that's probably cheaper too.

it probably works 99.9% of the time. So all you need to do is throw enough people at that crack to become successful. That approach doesn't scale. Imaging the organisation needed for sending 1000 suicide bombers. Now imagine keeping it functioning, and avoiding consequences catching up with it as it sends in the first ten or so.

Not for one thing or another, but the 99.9% I quoted is probably a little high. Even after 9/11 there have been at least two that we are all aware made it past security, we're not hearing about those that didn't unless there is no way around it.

So you probably don't need thousands, you probably need on the order of several 10's or so to get through once.

Keep in mind that there is a reservoir of 1000's if not 10's of thousands of people that would gladly give their lives to do damage to others.

They didn't pick a guy from Africa for nothing and a guy from England last time, those are much easier to escape profiling (the first time). I wouldn't be surprised if the next one would be asian, assuming they have such a person in their ranks.

No filter that has to pass the number of passengers that we're looking at here will ever be perfect, and if you study the filter long enough you're going to find holes.

And suppose the filter is perfect, then move on to other, softer targets until through lack of activity the filter loses its effectiveness.

Basically any place where lots of people gather (lots is something larger than 50 or so) is a target for a potential attack.

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#98

Post by sid- » Fri, Jan 01, 2010, 11:54 PM UTC

idan wrote: post #55

intellectronica wrote: post #11

The problem with the Israelification goal is that while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring. The problem of scale is manifested twice: 1. Manpower - Israel has a huge pool of very talented young men and women who already received very good training in the army and the security…

Hi, I'm an Israeli who is at least passably familiar with how the security apparatus works here. A few comments on your comments: 1. Scale Scale is an issue, but nobody in the thread has touched on why. The Israeli security model is (as noted in the article) more about the passenger than their baggage. This approach is both effective, time-consuming, and "racist": the profilers have a conversation with each passenger…

>There just aren't enough smart people with the desire to work a screener's job in the US.

I think this would change quickly if you advertise effectively and increase the pay.

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#99

Post by houseabsolute » Sat, Jan 02, 2010, 1:18 AM UTC

kareemm wrote: post #73

ghshephard wrote: post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

El Al Spends $100M securing 37 Aircraft. Scale that to the 8,225 Aircraft ( http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_stat... ) and you'd need a budget of $20 Billion+ without even taking into account that you have a heterogeneous population that doesn't lend itself to easy profiling (unlike israel). The major vulnerability of the El Al security system is that anybody that isn't considered part of the "…

El Al Spends $100M securing 37 Aircraft That assumes costs scale linearly with aircraft. Do they? The major vulnerability of the El Al security system is that anybody that isn't considered part of the "Risk Profile" (I.E. Muslim) - can walk right through the security system. I doubt this. Muslims are probably subject to higher scrutiny, but that doesn't preclude others from being subject to the same, Jews included. H…

> If current methods were working, neither bomber would've been able to bring fire onto the plane.

What you just said was that in order to meet your standard of working, a security system must produce no false negatives at all. I'm sure you didn't mean that because it's a totally ridiculous position to hold, but I just wanted to point it out in case anyone else took you at your words.

> I'd say a 450% increase in wait times is significant.

Indeed. When I read the grandparent I was unsure whether he was being sarcastic when talking about the jump in wait time. I just flew home from Hong Kong today and the additional screening process probably took an hour or so of full-time effort from ten or fifteen security people. It's hard for me to believe that this system can remain in place permanently.

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#100

Post by houseabsolute » Sat, Jan 02, 2010, 1:20 AM UTC

siculars wrote: post #95

intellectronica wrote: post #11

The problem with the Israelification goal is that while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring. The problem of scale is manifested twice: 1. Manpower - Israel has a huge pool of very talented young men and women who already received very good training in the army and the security…

Regarding "scale": 1. Manpower is an issue which could be readily addressed by increasing the pay and training of the job. Lets say that manpower is a concern. Well here is a novel idea: don't screen everyone. Screen every 5th, every 4th, etc. Mix up your screening. This alone will send the message that we are gearing up towards using this method. 2. Volume is a red herring. Just replicate what works at one airport b…

> Bottom line is that we can not afford larger holes in the confidence the flying public has in air travel.

Why can't we? We survived it before. And I have some bad news for you: it's almost certain we'll have to survive it again some time in the next fifteen to twenty years, if not sooner. Our luck with the missed bombs will not hold out forever. It will be a tragedy. Life will continue (except for those people for whom it does not).