while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring.The restructuring in the article didn't sound massive.
The Israeli methods focus on identifying terrorists by their behavior rather than their methods (box cutters, PETN, etc).
The biggest cost thus seems to be training staff to identify behavior, rather than spending millions on fancy technology that should identify methods but in reality don't work (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003744097...).
Make no mistake, airport security in Israel is no McJob, it is a prestigious, well-paid position, manned by the top classes of society.
source?
America is relying on cheap, unskilled labour for these jobs, and transitioning to an Israeli employment profile will bankrupt the system.
source?
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In 2006, I flew El Al from LA to Toronto (which then went on to Tel Aviv). I've never felt safer on an airplane. The security wasn't theater and, FWIW, our flight left on time.
El Al security at LAX consisted of:
* the El Al check-in area being patrolled by soldiers (thanks to this, i'm told: http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/04/la.airport.shooting/),
* being questioned in line by the types of professional interviewers mentioned in the article,
* LAX (TSA) security, and
* El Al security at the gate (a metal detector and carry-on luggage was checked thoroughly)
I don't see why at least these precautions wouldn't be scalable.
There are 599 airports in the US that are certificated to serve commercial air carrier aircraft with nine or more seats (http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2006-09-26-airport-nu...). 38 of those are international airports: http://www.pacificcoasttravelinfo.com/airports.asp).
The 2009 TSA budpest is $7 billion (http://www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=PressReleases&PressRe...).
Assuming $4B of that goes to airport security, that's $6.7M devoted to securing each airport. The power law dictates that most of those 599 will need a lot less, and a few will need a lot more. But the numbers don't seem crazily out of whack.
I don't believe any of us are airport security experts (would love to hear from one on this). But it's clear the current methods aren't working. If we are to improve, why not take cues from people who are doing better, run some experiments, and see what we can figure out?
It sure beats:
a) the current ridiculous security theater at US airports,
b) relying on passengers to fix flaws with current security by jumping would-be bombers mid-air, and then
c) dealing with the ensuing airport chaos as the TSA decides what regulations to implement to try and prevent the previous bombing attempt from happening again
[edit: fixed list spacing]