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The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

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Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#41
post #22

The problem with the Israelification goal is that while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring. The problem of scale is manifested twice: 1. Manpower - Israel has a huge pool of very talented young men and women who already received very good training in the army and the security…

Airport security is indeed considered a good job in Israel, allowing El Al to pick and choose, but not because it is well paid - they probably don't make more than TSA workers. The key is that the job allows employees to be assigned to a station out of the country after a year or so of working TLV. This attracts young people who want to study abroad - it's not uncommon that your El Al screener in JFK would be a grad…

I'm pretty sure they do make more than their TSA equivalents. At the very least, an Israeli student working airport security will be making more than her peers who do regular students jobs.

Another factor is the prestige that comes with passing the tight selection process and working in the security sector, which is considered possibly the most important aspect of the modern incarnation of Zionism, the national ideological school in Israel. Working in airport security is good on your resume, it will impress your friends and family, it will allow you to think good thing about yourself. I'm almost certain that's not the case for working for the TSA.

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#42

The problem with the Israelification goal is that while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring. The problem of scale is manifested twice: 1. Manpower - Israel has a huge pool of very talented young men and women who already received very good training in the army and the security…

while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring.

The restructuring in the article didn't sound massive.

The Israeli methods focus on identifying terrorists by their behavior rather than their methods (box cutters, PETN, etc).

The biggest cost thus seems to be training staff to identify behavior, rather than spending millions on fancy technology that should identify methods but in reality don't work (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003744097...).

Make no mistake, airport security in Israel is no McJob, it is a prestigious, well-paid position, manned by the top classes of society.

source?

America is relying on cheap, unskilled labour for these jobs, and transitioning to an Israeli employment profile will bankrupt the system.

source?

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In 2006, I flew El Al from LA to Toronto (which then went on to Tel Aviv). I've never felt safer on an airplane. The security wasn't theater and, FWIW, our flight left on time.

El Al security at LAX consisted of:

* the El Al check-in area being patrolled by soldiers (thanks to this, i'm told: http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/04/la.airport.shooting/),

* being questioned in line by the types of professional interviewers mentioned in the article,

* LAX (TSA) security, and

* El Al security at the gate (a metal detector and carry-on luggage was checked thoroughly)

I don't see why at least these precautions wouldn't be scalable.

There are 599 airports in the US that are certificated to serve commercial air carrier aircraft with nine or more seats (http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2006-09-26-airport-nu...). 38 of those are international airports: http://www.pacificcoasttravelinfo.com/airports.asp).

The 2009 TSA budpest is $7 billion (http://www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=PressReleases&PressRe...).

Assuming $4B of that goes to airport security, that's $6.7M devoted to securing each airport. The power law dictates that most of those 599 will need a lot less, and a few will need a lot more. But the numbers don't seem crazily out of whack.

I don't believe any of us are airport security experts (would love to hear from one on this). But it's clear the current methods aren't working. If we are to improve, why not take cues from people who are doing better, run some experiments, and see what we can figure out?

It sure beats:

a) the current ridiculous security theater at US airports,

b) relying on passengers to fix flaws with current security by jumping would-be bombers mid-air, and then

c) dealing with the ensuing airport chaos as the TSA decides what regulations to implement to try and prevent the previous bombing attempt from happening again

[edit: fixed list spacing]

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#43

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's a wrong thing to do for two reasons. 1. It's collective punishment. Unethical unless absolutely necessary. 2. It would be ineffective. In most cases in the west the relatives of people who ended up blowing themselves up didn't know about their involvement in terrorist organizations and didn't condone their actions.

Collective punishment with close relatives is better than racial profiling, massive inconvenience for everyone, etc. And it would encourage people to be more alert about suspicious terrorist activity within their family.

>Collective punishment with close relatives is better than racial profiling, massive inconvenience for everyone, etc.

It's also better than a poke in the eye with a sharp stick. So what? We don't have to have any of those things.

Also, collective punishment is not better than massive inconvenience. Convenience is never an excuse for doing something immoral.

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#44
post #42

The problem with the Israelification goal is that while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring. The problem of scale is manifested twice: 1. Manpower - Israel has a huge pool of very talented young men and women who already received very good training in the army and the security…

while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring. The restructuring in the article didn't sound massive. The Israeli methods focus on identifying terrorists by their behavior rather than their methods (box cutters, PETN, etc). The biggest cost thus seems to be training staff to ident…

My source for Israel is my impressions as someone who grew up in Israel, flew through Tel-Aviv many times (last time this morning) and had quite a few friends who worked in airport security. I think it's quite reliable.

My source of the TSA is just my impressions from travelling from the US, so it's probably not that reliable.

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#45
post #38
post #35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If these airports handle so much traffic that these methods won't scale than how in the world is "evacuate the entire airport" even seriously considered as a solution to any problem?

It's much more work to have half hour interviews with every passenger than it is to evacuate a terminal every couple years.

Did you even read the original article? It's a goal to move passengers from parking lot to gate in 25 minutes. Half-hour interviews aren't a part of the process.

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#46
A sensitive subject to say the least.

I find it mind boggling that anyone would want to emulate Israel in any capacity concerning security. They've had suicide bombers in cafes, night clubs, school buses, etc.. and no matter what side of the fence you're on it's pretty obvious that whatever they're doing is not working.

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#47
post #14

Oh, yes, because the Israelis totally have their shit together. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihXtbB-4GWw

This seems like a relevant comment, why is it downmodded? Clearly if Israeli security forces are putting bullet holes through laptops as part of standard procedure, that's not exactly the hassle-free friendly security process the article implies.

I didn't vote either way on it. That said, I can see a few reasons why it might be downmodded.

On the surface side, its use of profanity and the attitude that I read from the comment aren't useful for criticism. A more useful way of phrasing it might have been along the lines of, "Focusing on the intent of the traveler may help sometimes, but it can also lead to events such as this one where an innocent person's laptop is destroyed based on a feeling." NOTE: I can't actually watch the video because my laptop has no sound right now. The way one phrases something matters and, at least to me, it seemed like more of an emotional attack than a response to procedures that may or may not be good.

On the deeper side, one event does not a trend make. The comment author provided a video about an event. It's somewhat like linking to a video of an NFL game where the Chief's won and saying they're a good football team - or linking to a video of the Saint's loss and saying they're a bad team. Sure, it is evidence of badness, but it's one piece among 15 this season and the majority of evidence points the other way. Now, going back to Israel, I'm not making a claim that the majority of evidence goes either way. I am trying to say that Israeli security deals with hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of people every year and to judge whether they have their act together or not cannot hinge on one piece of evidence.

And, to be frank, that's part of the problem with your reading of the comment: it isn't part of Israeli standard procedure. If one has reports of it happening in a systemic way, that's important. Heck, it's important that it happened even once. However, an isolated incident can be tragic without being indicative of anything. It was a bad thing that happened. It was good that it got press (as I heard she got monetary compensation from the government). However, a report from an organization that looks into this stuff and spots trends is a more persuasive thing than one incident.

Although, if it were phrased more pleasantly, the author might not have been downmodded. Then it might be seen as someone offering alternative evidence arguing that the situation isn't as rosy as the original article implied and that it's a more complex situation. However, the phrasing makes it seem like the original author wishes for us to throw out all other evidence because of one piece they have chosen to present and have that one piece preferenced over others.

If I had wanted to bring that video into the discussion, I would have said something like:

"The article paints a rosy picture of the situation, but it's one that turns on human intellect and 'gut feelings' which isn't a great way to run a security system. People sometimes have gut feelings (conscious or not) that are biased on things like race, religion, gender, etc. and might single out people not because of what's in their eyes, but something else. Likewise, it could mean that sometimes people have gut feelings that are wrong - people might be legitimately nervous not because they are planning something bad - and that can lead to situations like [the video]. . ."

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#48
post #46

A sensitive subject to say the least. I find it mind boggling that anyone would want to emulate Israel in any capacity concerning security. They've had suicide bombers in cafes, night clubs, school buses, etc.. and no matter what side of the fence you're on it's pretty obvious that whatever they're doing is not working.

Not I am in favor of emulating the security model for other reasons, but when it comes to air travel security, is there anyone more effective than El Al? According to the timeline on Wikipedia, there hasn't been even a semi-successful terrorist attack on one of their airliners in 40 years.

I really am curious if there is any contrary information out there, as I've been unable to find any.

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#49
Interesting article but it doesn't address the root issue. Israel has real threats to deal with on a weekly if not daily basis. They're forced to take security seriously and it shows in their procedures. Their security employees deal with regular, serious threats and one would assume numerous close calls have made them self-motivated.

On the other hand, North American countries only have one real threat every 10-odd years or so. In fact, the most recent attempt didn't even go through North American screening. Since we don't have real terrorists often enough to matter, I doubt American security will ever come close to the Israeli model.

What if you were building a software package that you knew would never have any users? Could you motivate your team to care enough to make the software great? Could you yourself be motivated to do a good job, or would you just go through the motions?

Re: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother

#50

The problem with the Israelification goal is that while Israel's airport security method is second to none, it is not scalable, and therefore not applicable to the US (or many other countries), at least not without major restructuring. The problem of scale is manifested twice: 1. Manpower - Israel has a huge pool of very talented young men and women who already received very good training in the army and the security…

I don't think america has a shortage of "trained" security people, there is a fairly large pool of former enlisted military personnel who can be transitioned into airport security. From what I understand, the criminal/terrorist probably would draw suspicion even if approached by relatively untrained airport staff "greeter", and draw further attention to themselves. Remember that the Abdulmutallab came from Yemen, Pai…

He only had a one way ticket from Ghana to Nigeria. From Nigeria --> Amsterdam --> Detroit it was a round-trip ticket.
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