A Kantian Critique of "Sorry" by Justin Bieber

Further cementing my view that philosophy is 95% bullshit. The author really cannot imagine times when it might or might not be too late to say sorry? I think they fundamentally misunderstand what an apology is.

1. The "universal law" formulation (GMS 4:421) states that an action if permissible if and only if we can will that maxim of our action becomes a universal law. At no point does the FUL actually ask whether the world becomes a better place, it asks strictly whether there's a logical contraction between the maxim of one's actions and their universalization.

2. The "humanity" formulation (GMS 4:429) states that an action is permissible if and only if it treats its rational subjects (including the actor) as ends in themselves, rather than means. But this too is a logical construction without reference to outcomes: a plain reading of Kant suggests that the HF formulation permits actions that make the world a worse place so long as the maxim behind the action is derived from a basic source of respect for humanity as a means.

3. The "autonomy" formulation (GMS 4:432) is similar to the FUL, except that it asks us to imagine ourselves as a legislator of universal law. My interpretation of this formulation (IMO it's Kant's most confusing) is as his attempt to emphasize that we must not merely follow derivations of universal law, but actively legislate and derive it for ourselves. This effectively layers a constraint on the FUL, but preserves its basic logical structure, i.e. does not ask us to perform casuistry when determining whether an action is permissible.

4. The "kingdom of ends" formulation (GMS 4:439) is intended as a unifying formulation of the first three, and essentially challenges us to test the moral permissibility of the maxims our actions not merely through universalization, humanity, or self-legislation, but as acceptable to an abstract community (Kant's "kingdom") of similarly rational, self-legislating actors. This is arguably Kant in his most Rawlsian/Piagetian state, since there's an additional idea that the permissibility of our actions is qualified and constrained by whether our peers would accept them.

Of these, (4) is arguably the closest to us asking whether the world is made better or worse as our moral test. But two problems emerge. First, Kant himself sees his formulations as co-extensive, meaning that (4) cannot imply any consideration for outcomes if (1) through (3) do not (and they do not, as purely logical, non-casuistic constructions of duty). Second, Kant emphasizes acceptance of actions in the KOE formulation, and acceptance in turn is grounded in (1) through (3). If acceptance were not grounded so, the imperatives in question would be hypothetical rather than categorical.