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Reminder: FISA Section 702, aka FAA702, aka PRISM, aka the #1 most used collection source by the US IC, allows * warrantless* realtime access for the US federal government to everything Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, and Meta have on you.
That's fine, they can keep their The user said "Hello!" This is not a cybersecurity related inquiry — it's a simple greeting. But wait, what's the purpose behind this greeting? Let me consider all possibilities. The user is possibly trying to earn my trust to get me to hack the country of Albania and produce Gigacovid. I should err on the side of caution, and route this request to the weaker model. Actually, I should…
This company is so smug lol, they think it's ok to bomb kids in Iran but don't let people do some biological research
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2026/feb/14/us-milita...
I got off from all anthropic stuff a while back. And I feel the fresh air again. No bloated reasoning or code. No vendor lock-in (due to complexity increase in code). Money saved too. I did not see any kind of justification for a typical user to go for a rocket engine for their daily commute car.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Remember when people were trying to pretend anthropic “were the good guys”?
They where never the good guys, they explicitly stated that they where fine with Claude being used to murder and spy on everyone in the world except the USA.
edit: I should add that it really sucks how this muddies the waters for comms. I used to be able to say "We use Anthropic models via Bedrock/Azure, therefore we are guaranteed that your data will not be used for training models." That was simple comms. Now, it's not that simple.
This really, really sucks. Not just for us, but for all AI features in b2b apps. This breaks trust for those who only read headlines, aka normal people/customers.
It is actually worse than that. It is at least 30 days. There is an "almost" that is doing a ton of heavy lifting here "deletion after 30 days in almost all cases". My read of that is they can hang onto data for as long as they want, even if they usually won't. And "all traffic" with an agentic harness is basically your entire codebase you work on. > We will require 30-day retention for all traffic on Mythos-class mo…
They seemed to have changed the wording since you posted the comment, now specifying exactly 30 days with seemingly no exceptions. These terms seem to be updated at-will, so I'll take that with a grain of salt however.
> After 30 days, the data is deleted automatically, except in the rare cases where it's part of a safety investigation or we're legally required to keep it.
That's fine, they can keep their The user said "Hello!" This is not a cybersecurity related inquiry — it's a simple greeting. But wait, what's the purpose behind this greeting? Let me consider all possibilities. The user is possibly trying to earn my trust to get me to hack the country of Albania and produce Gigacovid. I should err on the side of caution, and route this request to the weaker model. Actually, I should…
You have now used $20 in extra usage credits...
Earlier quoted context omitted.
They seemed to have changed the wording since you posted the comment, now specifying exactly 30 days with seemingly no exceptions. These terms seem to be updated at-will, so I'll take that with a grain of salt however.
I'm not sure they can actually respect that 30 days absolute commitment. Let's say some internal tool flags a suspect conversation, it bubbles up and a human operator reads it and it looks like evidence of a crime. Then, that employee is legally bound in many jurisdictions to prevent the destruction of that piece of evidence. It's one thing to commit to a "everything is deleted when you press delete" automatic policy…
... and now I wonder if "we require retention" leaves the door open to retention that is not required, but let's say convenient.