They are not on track.
From https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/World-Nuclear-Industry-St...
> According to the China Nuclear Energy Association, despite higher output, nuclear’s share of China’s total electricity production slightly slipped from 4.9 percent in 2023 to 4.7 percent in 2024, (Energy Institute data indicate a 3.7-percent increase in net production and a drop from 4.7 percent to 4.5 percent of the nuclear share).40 The remarkable share decline occurred because China’s electricity consumption grew by 6.8 percent or 627 TWh—significantly larger than Germany’s total annual demand—to a total of over 9,850 TWh, and the country added a combined 357 GW of solar and wind capacity (278 GW and 79 GW, respectively) in the same year compared to just 3.5 GW of new nuclear.41
And from https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/World-Nuclear-Industry-St...
> Targets vs. Reality
> China has dominated global nuclear power development over the past quarter-century, though its ambitious latest Five-Year Plan targets have proven challenging to meet.
The 10th Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) put forward a policy of “moderate development of nuclear power,” targeting around 8.6 GW gross operating capacity by 2005,61 with 7.1 GW gross achieved in reality. (All Five-Year Plan capacity numbers quoted hereunder are gross gigawatts).
During this period, China connected six new units to the grid—including two French 900-MW reactors at Ling Ao and two Canadian 668-MW CANDU 6 reactors at Qinshan—and completed the development of the CPR-1000, China’s indigenized version of the French M310 900-MW design that would become the workhorse of its early nuclear fleet.
The 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) called on China to pursue “an active development of nuclear power” with a target of 10 GW gross operating by 2010.62 With 10.9 GW gross operating at the end of 2010, that target was slightly over-achieved.
This period saw the construction starts for Westinghouse’s two AP-1000s at Sanmen in 2009 and AREVA’s EPRs at Taishan in 2009–2010, China’s first Gen III projects. Construction commenced on 29 units, most of which were CPR-1000 reactors.
Fukushima’s March 2011 disaster fundamentally reshaped China’s nuclear trajectory during the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015). The government imposed a moratorium on new approvals to conduct comprehensive safety reviews. Existing plants and Gen II reactors under construction had to undergo major upgrades including enhanced flood barriers, backup power system overhauls, and seismic reinforcements.63
When approvals resumed, China adopted a strict “Gen III-only” policy requiring passive safety features and core-catchers. Operational capacity reached just 28.7 GW by 2015 versus a target of 40 GW.64 Nevertheless, the period closed with construction beginning on Fuqing-5 and -6 as well as Fangchenggang-3, China’s first Hualong One reactors, representing its indigenous Gen III technology.
The 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) aimed for 58 GW operational capacity plus 30 GW under construction while establishing the Hualong One as an exportable technology and advancing systems like the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTR-PM) and fast reactors.65
However, domestic capacity reached only 51 GW by 2020 and 17.5 GW under construction constrained by the ongoing inland reactor ban— a controversy unheard of in other nuclear countries limiting nuclear power plant development to the seashore—and extended construction timelines for Generation III units.
In August 2019, the U.S. added CGN to its Entity List,66 citing national security concerns regarding alleged attempts to acquire U.S. technology for military purposes.67 This restricted CGN’s access to certain technologies and affected its international partnerships, including involvement in nuclear projects in the United Kingdom. Later, CNNC was also added to the Entity List.68 The sanctions reinforced China’s focus on self-reliance, accelerating the transition from foreign technologies to the domestically developed Hualong One design.
With an operating capacity of around 61 GW as of mid-2025, the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025)69 target of 70 GW operational capacity is out of reach. According to plans, 4.5 GW are scheduled to come online in 2025, but no new reactor started up in the first half of the year. COVID-19 pandemic disruptions to global supply chains, combined with delays caused by mandatory safety upgrades, have created persistent bottlenecks. First-of-a-kind Hualong One projects saw numerous delays (see Figure 23).
Meanwhile, plans for innovative projects like offshore floating nuclear power platforms appear to have stalled, with 2023 reports suggesting the program may have been suspended over safety and feasibility concerns.70