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France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors

mamot.fr

81–90 of 399 posts

Re: France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors

#81
post #46

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Every time I travel internationally I immediately get notifications for Android OS updates. I'm pretty sure they are for satisfying local regulations about the phone's behavior, including the topic at hand.

I am not saying there are no backdoors, but this never happened to me. And I am an Android user since the first G1 phone.

I'm currently abroad with a notification for "November Pixel Drop update available" that appeared the day following my arrival. I believe I had already installed the November update back home earlier in the month. Every time I go back home, a couple of days later I get an update too.

I'm not claiming to know of any foul play, but it has happened several times, enough for me to notice. If it was related to time of the month, it wouldn't be as consistent. It might be that you need specific combination of phone, configuration and network provider for this to happen. Maybe I've been p0wnd, but I've noticed this behavior since at least the Nexus line.

Re: France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors

#82
post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is France. The state is them. Edit: I wonder why this is downvoted. The bureaucratic class holds enormous power in France, and has constantly acted against digital rights and privacy with impunity. The only institution that can somewhat restrain them is ECHR.

Well, other states are not much better. UK, Australia, USA come to my mind. But this is excessive

We indeed seem to be in a race towards the bottom in this regard, but France was always a "forerunner".

Already 15 years ago it was illegal to use Wi-Fi outside buildings in France. I still remember the old Nokias plastered with those warnings.

Re: France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors

#83

There were many decades where phones didn't have back doors. Now, it's the opposite case in the most dystopian way. It's concerning that all phones are required to have back doors for law enforcement and the enforcement is severe. I know several people who have a corrupt "cop they know" that they can regularly contact for favors. Why is it so out of the ordinary to distrust law enforcement when they have these tools?

> There were many decades where phones didn't have back doors. Your cell phone provider almost certainly will respond to a valid warrant and wire tap your non e2e encrypted phone call. I'd be very surprised if the most common mode of remote communication in any time period was not subject to government interception in some format within a short time of becoming such. That includes physical mail, telegrams, landlines,…

Of course they will respond to warrants, they have to, and nowadays they have the infrastructure to forward all traffic to law emforcement's servers in real-time.

Re: France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors

#84

There were many decades where phones didn't have back doors. Now, it's the opposite case in the most dystopian way. It's concerning that all phones are required to have back doors for law enforcement and the enforcement is severe. I know several people who have a corrupt "cop they know" that they can regularly contact for favors. Why is it so out of the ordinary to distrust law enforcement when they have these tools?

Before internet on phone, every communication was in plain text, so no need to have a backdoor in phone if you can tap directly into AT&T or Vodafone.

[deleted]

Re: France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors

#85

There were many decades where phones didn't have back doors. Now, it's the opposite case in the most dystopian way. It's concerning that all phones are required to have back doors for law enforcement and the enforcement is severe. I know several people who have a corrupt "cop they know" that they can regularly contact for favors. Why is it so out of the ordinary to distrust law enforcement when they have these tools?

> There were many decades where phones didn't have back doors. Your cell phone provider almost certainly will respond to a valid warrant and wire tap your non e2e encrypted phone call. I'd be very surprised if the most common mode of remote communication in any time period was not subject to government interception in some format within a short time of becoming such. That includes physical mail, telegrams, landlines,…

I don't think people are arguing against complying with valid warrants. They object to blanket surveillance being done with tools available to any law officer that can be used at any time, warrant or not.

Re: France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors

#86
post #78

The claim in the title of the post is not substantiated in any way. The correct headline here would be ”GrapheneOS worried about France after negative press”

It is in third post in the thread: https://mamot.fr/@LaQuadrature/115581775986937247 > Interviewed, she warns that she will “not stop pursuing publishers if links are discovered with a criminal organization and they [GrapheneOS] do not cooperate with justice.”

Did "links" mean "a criminal organization is involved in the project" or "a criminal organization is using the technology"?

Re: France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors

#89

[flagged]

For contrast, you can imagine how this debate between a private OS developer and the government would go in a non-democratic country. Or, you don't even have to imagine, because examples are not hard to find.

Re: France threatens GrapheneOS with arrests / server seizure for refusing backdoors

#90

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> There were many decades where phones didn't have back doors. Your cell phone provider almost certainly will respond to a valid warrant and wire tap your non e2e encrypted phone call. I'd be very surprised if the most common mode of remote communication in any time period was not subject to government interception in some format within a short time of becoming such. That includes physical mail, telegrams, landlines,…

Of course they will respond to warrants, they have to, and nowadays they have the infrastructure to forward all traffic to law emforcement's servers in real-time.

> and nowadays they have the infrastructure to forward all traffic to law enforcement's servers in real-time.

The goal should be, designing your infrastructure in such a way they simply cannot forward this traffic to law enforcement.

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