Earlier quoted context omitted.
> UAE and KSA have interests, but insufficient influence to force outcomes 2019 is a good example of UAE using it's heft [0][1]. In a couple years we'll probably see leaks in Bloomberg or AJ about KSA doing something similar rn. > India has less motivation for war. But it’s also done nothing to negotiate a peace. Both have worked on reconciliation immediately before some incident arises that causes talks to collapse.…
> 2019 is a good example of UAE using it's heft This is not projecting power, it's the UAE (and Qatar) playing their aspirational roles as the new Davos/Switzerland for diplomacy. Pakistan is definitely more anti-peace than India. But while Islamabad undermines peace, New Delhi is mostly uninterested in it.
That's a framing I agree with.
> This is not projecting power, it's the UAE (and Qatar) playing their aspirational roles as the new Davos/Switzerland for diplomacy.
Sure, but in India-Pakistan relations, they (UAE and KSA, not Qatar) are increasingly the only mediators with whom both parties can negotiate offramps.
Large pole countries don't have the same heft they may have had 15-20 years ago, and even the Russian-Ukraine War has shown that power differentials are not that significant between major powers and regional powers, and why multilateralism is critical (and a major reason I dislike Trump - I primarily only agree with his tariff policy, nothing else).