Earlier quoted context omitted.
I did this once too and it worked. The targeting is much less specific than it was years ago though.
Useful to gives dates. Swichkow's prank ad mentioned above was back in 2014. I think you're referring to Facebook/Meta removing many detailed PII-specific targeting options, 1/2022.
How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets
131–139 of 139 posts
Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets
#132One thing I've always been curious about, and have never been able to find a solid answer too, is what data is available to the various companies whose software I have on my phone? What can AT&T/TMobile/etc... learn from my device as my carrier? What can the apps I have installed decern from my device if I allow no access to anything settings? How does this change if I use a vpn? I have an idea of whats possible base…
> but I'd love a more solid answer Unfortunately that isn't a question you'll get an answer to. Anyone who actually knows and has access to sensitive sources and methods is under an obligation not to disclose them. Further nobody in the know wants to burn these sources - because it makes their job harder. The general advice I can give is use an iPhone (turn on Lock Down mode if you believe you might be the target of…
Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets
#133Earlier quoted context omitted.
it looks like you stay with "no id". There is just an option "get a new advertising id" Here how to delete it in Android and Apple: https://www.eff.org/pt-br/deeplinks/2022/05/how-disable-ad-i...
If you have Android 12+, well that's another reason for me to replace my fairly old phone.
Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets
#134Earlier quoted context omitted.
I did this once too and it worked. The targeting is much less specific than it was years ago though.
Indeed I remember back then one could target somebody by his email. I would guess the agencies still get extended targeting access.
I believe it's not direct targeting and there are limits to stop targeting like we're discussing.
Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets
#135Earlier quoted context omitted.
Supposedly a Ukrainian agent was able to assassinate a Russian military officer by tracking his regular running route on Strava. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66162502 Strava actually has extensive privacy controls that work well. Users can keep activities private by default and hide their tracks near sensitive locations. But of course if you don't use the privacy control and make everything public then obvio…
It brought this to mind: Fitness tracking app Strava gives away location of secret US army bases https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracki...
Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets
#136Earlier quoted context omitted.
> but I'd love a more solid answer Unfortunately that isn't a question you'll get an answer to. Anyone who actually knows and has access to sensitive sources and methods is under an obligation not to disclose them. Further nobody in the know wants to burn these sources - because it makes their job harder. The general advice I can give is use an iPhone (turn on Lock Down mode if you believe you might be the target of…
How does it make sense to recommend Google Suite to someone unusually concerned with privacy?
You are more than welcome to try and secure your own stuff against nation state attackers. Or you can outsource that work to a company that has some of the best security minds in the world watching over your account 24/7.
Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets
#137Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets
#138Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets
#139Earlier quoted context omitted.
When we had to go into SCIFs, generally phones went into lockers. At some locations, phones stayed in cars. But that doesn't make it any harder to figure out. But this isn't the first time people are encountering this problem. Strava has given away plenty of US military bases: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracki... Russia has the same problem, VKontakte has given away plenty of secret Russian…
Supposedly a Ukrainian agent was able to assassinate a Russian military officer by tracking his regular running route on Strava. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66162502 Strava actually has extensive privacy controls that work well. Users can keep activities private by default and hide their tracks near sensitive locations. But of course if you don't use the privacy control and make everything public then obvio…