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How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets

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Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets

#21
post #17

I don't understand how targeted ads on Grindr can be used to get peoples locations. Does the ad auction tell the users current location? Does grindr let you run your own auction bidder on your own machine?

Ad serves up an image hosted by the advertiser. Phone makes an http get for the image and gives out its IP.

You can also target ads by geography and do a lat/long box over your target area and show a specific ad so you know how many unique users are in that area.

Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets

#22
post #6

>Working with Grindr data, Yeagley began drawing geofences—creating virtual boundaries in geographical data sets—around buildings belonging to government agencies that do national security work. Are you seriously telling me that government phones of national security employees allow for the installation of apps that track your location and/or these employees are allowed to bring personal cell phones into these buildi…

When we had to go into SCIFs, generally phones went into lockers. At some locations, phones stayed in cars. But that doesn't make it any harder to figure out.

But this isn't the first time people are encountering this problem. Strava has given away plenty of US military bases: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracki...

Russia has the same problem, VKontakte has given away plenty of secret Russian military bases and troop positions over the past few decades. I've never read of this on Weibo or WeChat, but my guess is they have the same problem, just English language open source accounts are keeping it more discrete for now.

The WashPost about a week ago had an article about how at a recent NTC rotation out at Fort Irwin the OPFOR was trying to figure out how an Apache had gotten past their air defenses, so they looked up commercial cell phone tracking data and were able to spot how a phone had gone across the desert at 120 mph and plug the hole in their air defenses.[1]

Adtech on the cell phone we all carry in our pocket is better at surveillance than the best tools a military has. And it's one of those things where not being part of the surveillance can make you stand out too. Think about a spy operating under a real cover, how long is their Facebook (or Weibo or VK or TikTok or whatever is appropriate for the person they are trying to be) account history? If you found someone claiming to be a 45 year old woman living in an American suburb and she had a Facebook account that was three months old, wouldn't you investigate further?

1: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/22/...

Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets

#23
post #21
post #17

I don't understand how targeted ads on Grindr can be used to get peoples locations. Does the ad auction tell the users current location? Does grindr let you run your own auction bidder on your own machine?

Ad serves up an image hosted by the advertiser. Phone makes an http get for the image and gives out its IP. You can also target ads by geography and do a lat/long box over your target area and show a specific ad so you know how many unique users are in that area.

> so you know how many unique users are in that area

would you like to know more?

see also: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27862533

Baryshnikov & Ghrist, Target Enumeration Via Euler Characteristic Integrals (2009)

> We solve the problem of counting the total number of observable targets (e.g., persons, vehicles, landmarks) in a region using local counts performed by a network of sensors, each of which measures the number of targets nearby but neither their identities nor any positional information. We formulate and solve several such problems based on the types of sensors and mobility of the targets.

Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets

#25
post #6

>Working with Grindr data, Yeagley began drawing geofences—creating virtual boundaries in geographical data sets—around buildings belonging to government agencies that do national security work. Are you seriously telling me that government phones of national security employees allow for the installation of apps that track your location and/or these employees are allowed to bring personal cell phones into these buildi…

When we had to go into SCIFs, generally phones went into lockers. At some locations, phones stayed in cars. But that doesn't make it any harder to figure out. But this isn't the first time people are encountering this problem. Strava has given away plenty of US military bases: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracki... Russia has the same problem, VKontakte has given away plenty of secret Russian…

Supposedly a Ukrainian agent was able to assassinate a Russian military officer by tracking his regular running route on Strava.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66162502

Strava actually has extensive privacy controls that work well. Users can keep activities private by default and hide their tracks near sensitive locations. But of course if you don't use the privacy control and make everything public then obviously everyone can see exactly where you were.

Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets

#26
post #6

>Working with Grindr data, Yeagley began drawing geofences—creating virtual boundaries in geographical data sets—around buildings belonging to government agencies that do national security work. Are you seriously telling me that government phones of national security employees allow for the installation of apps that track your location and/or these employees are allowed to bring personal cell phones into these buildi…

When we had to go into SCIFs, generally phones went into lockers. At some locations, phones stayed in cars. But that doesn't make it any harder to figure out. But this isn't the first time people are encountering this problem. Strava has given away plenty of US military bases: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracki... Russia has the same problem, VKontakte has given away plenty of secret Russian…

This is a scary thought. Not because I think I'm worthy of being targeted, but because I think in the future there'll be enough compute and incentives to automatically scan everyone for out-of-the-ordinary behavior via neural models.

Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets

#29
post #24

So, what's the best weather app to use that's not going to sell my location?

Why you need an app for the weather, what's wrong with websites?

More convenient, more location-accurate, can integrate with the OS like widgets.

What a terrible take. People like apps, we should make apps private I stead of telling people not to use apps. FWIW, websites can gain access to your location too, so plenty of people will still be tracked.

Re: How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets

#30
post #24

So, what's the best weather app to use that's not going to sell my location?

Apple bought a weather company for this purpose. So probably Apple’s honestly. Everything else needs to make money somehow while freely giving you data.
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