> It’s plausible that qualia are inner workings in our brain that our brain is itself perceiving, and thus is conscious of.
This seems circular. Why would those inner workings not themselves give rise
to consciousness, in the way you suppose second-order workings of the brain
do?
> we are also conscious of our consciousness. That doesn’t need to mean that the subject and the object of consciousness are the same in that case: it could also mean that the “of”, i.e. the arrow between subject and object, is itself an object of consciousness.
Those are two different things, no? You can think about your consciousness, or
you can think about your ability to think about your consciousness.
> Now, it’s very plausible that this “of” arrow in general is not a simple arrow, but rather a complex graph or network. Given the complexity of the brain, there is certainly ample space for myriads of such arrow-networks.
Meaning what? You're describing a different graph, I don't see how it bears on
the simple one we started with.
> we manifestly can’t get a grasp on the subject without making it an object of consciousness
Again this seems circular. If you think about consciousness, then by
definition the thing you're thinking about is consciousness.
> we would be completely unaware of it if it wasn’t also an object
Same again. If you aren't thinking about consciousness, then consciousness
isn't currently something that you're thinking about. I'm not seeing the point
here.
> what actually exists is only the “of” relation, and that the conscious subject is really just formed out of those
I'm not convinced. Our ability to be conscious of our consciousness is of no
particular relevance to the deeper question of how consciousness arises. Many
animal species clearly have some form of consciousness, but are probably
incapable of the sort of abstract reasoning needed to be conscious of their
consciousness. I'm skeptical of any theory whose starting point is the human
ability to do so.