Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't see it as a general public problem but I actually do see it as an ongoing scientific training problem. Biology PhD programs these days spend a lot more time teaching prior biology results than they do having students engage with what it means to be a scientist, in the limited time that they teach at all. "Students" are then sorted into a lab where they learn the specific scientific cookbook of the subfield an…
> Student experiences of course vary widely, and even for those that do the menial slog version of a bio PhD, the attitude surrounding it varies. Some seem to be happy for the guidance when their advisor is like this while others resent the lack of intellectual freedom. This section I think captures the problem well: most good (future) scientists will recent the lack of intellectual freedom, while the less capable wi…
Ultimately, a cargo cult is a scientifically sound application of empiricism that just happens to completely fail, whereupon it may be rejected. If scientific methodology is evaluated empirically (which I endorse) in terms of enabling scientific progess, you end up with a cargo cult.
For example, why is it a good idea to have falsifiable hypotheses? Most philosophers don't adhere to this standard. You might make a great argument on the grounds of what scientific progress means, how tangible it is and how it prevents discussions that are in some precise sense a waste of time. However, if you ground your epistemology on experience, the best and most convincing reason to adopt falsifiability is that it's historically been enabling science in ways that we like. One non-obvious prerequisite for this is that people seem to more easily agree on whether something is falsifiable than on whether it is true. I think this is an empirical psychological fact.
Concerning what is a good scientist, I consider as the important metric their individual contribution to humanity's knowledge. It may be that the biggest marginal contributions are made by people who identify epistemological deficiencies in their field and initiate paradigm shifts. However, I believe most of the total contributions to scientific knowledge are made in ways that barely benefit from deep epistemological insights.
I think it's very hard to argue "it's not good for results" that we have too many compliant laborers, if "results" is advancing human knowledge. Successfully teaching philosophy of science to people such that they can meaningfully apply it in practice is hard and requires significant investment. I'm not convinced such efforts are the best way to advance science. Rather, I think a more effective measure would be better aligning the incentives of scientists with the goal of advancing humanity's knowledge.