The actual report: http://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/dvdfiles/PT/2001-08-24-... One of my pet peeves: the first 7 "causes and contributing factors" effectively blames the engine technicians for taking shortcuts. Nowhere does it say anything about the scheduling pressure from management that made the technicians consider shortcuts in the first place. If you have hiring and firing power and you tell someone they nee…
Also lack of access to documentation: the technician attempted to access the Rolls-Royce EIPC and the SB’s through the computer network, but was also denied access. This should be a major point for a maintenance shop. Documentation should always be available, both online and in offline versions.
TechPubs teams often have no control over the compliance (Optional, Mandatory, etc) of the SBs - that, at least in my experience, always came from way up high in the chain, sometimes from a VP who wasn't even tangentially involved in MRO. The required procedures - MX or ACRW - also are often coming from a costs concern, rather than criticality. The whole process of figuring out what's critical and what's not - that's a problem still being smacked into, every day.
It's not hard to make a Sanity Check for pubs vs ERP/PDM/CMMIS, but often people involved REALLY DON'T WANT TO SEE THAT. Because it's horrifying.
The commenter who mentioned HFACS is right on the money. Unless you implement something equivalent, you're gonna be chasing your own tail.
What a great article.