41–50 of 151 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
What I also loved was that the Captain had once been arrested for marijuana trafficking with his airplane. Total bad ass.
Was visualizing the cabin during that last 360 circle, followed by the "slew" maneuver, must have been surreal.
Interesting that they call Lajes a “military airfield”. On the Azorean island of Terceira, Lajes (TER) is a mixed use airfield that is the commercial landing strip of the island since the 1930s, as well as having a multi-national military base on the other side since the 1940s. There is a picture in the story. The NTSB report called it a military airbase, and other reports say “Military air traffic controllers guided…
One of the coolest emergency airfields I can think of is, literally, Uruguay Route 9, along the coast of the country, where a 2-lane highway becomes an enormous runway that you continue driving along. I don't know if there were any famous landings there; I heard it's only used rarely by the Presidential jet. Here's where it is: https://goo.gl/maps/fpwxuPzGVDtDEKmB8 and what it looks like when you drive on it: https:/…
See where the grass divider ends, and gets replaced by a jersey barrier for 2 km? That part is the runway - it would require some hours of preparation before it would be usable, it's not quite "declare mayday and dump the plane there."
I think if you asked the engineers who designed the airbus in question, could you create a "leak" warning, using just the existing sensor suite, they'd say "sure". You know the fuel level in each tank, and have a good estimate or actual flow data on engine fuel usage. Simple math says "leak" or "no leak". If that would work, it is surprising it isn't in the software.
If I recall, one of the duties of the pilots (usually the first officer's) is to keep track of fuel levels and consumption throughout the flight so any anomalies in the engine or fuel system can hopefully be found sooner. If a human can do it, I would imagine a computer could automate the process. Likely wouldn't remove the need for the pilots to do it anyway, though; redundancy and reliability and all that.
For some reason I'm a little obsessed with airline incidents and crashes. Admiral Cloudberg produces outstanding write-ups, and of course the videos of Mentour Pilot on YT are also excellent. While this is in no way scientific, it seems that what most catastrophes have in common are bad CRM (crew intra-communication) and lower-than-average airmanship. In most cases, for a catastrophe to occur there must be an initial…
I consider the lack of respect for experience and skill one of the biggest failures of western culture. It also applies to things like mathematics where nowadays some people are even proud about their lack of skills. But the end result is that most people are amateurs in their own job.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
To cross the Atlantic with a twin-engined plane has that requirement (ETOPS).
This was a fun rabbit hole to go down, with the ETOPS [1] hint. I enjoyed the history of ETOPS-138 [0]. ETOPS-120 leaves some small triangles of the Atlantic inaccessible, particularly if one emergency airfield is unavailable. A 15% increase to 138 minutes covers it. Anecdotally, though, my experience as a commercial passenger feels like airlines fly almost directly over pacific islands rather than within X minutes o…
> pacific islands
Depending on the jet streams, the flight can take the great circle route [0] or taking advantage of the jet stream [1] and flying more southernly
[0] https://flightaware.com/live/flight/JAL6/history/20230108/02... [1] https://flightaware.com/live/flight/JAL6/history/20230105/02...
One of my pet peeves: the first 7 "causes and contributing factors" effectively blames the engine technicians for taking shortcuts. Nowhere does it say anything about the scheduling pressure from management that made the technicians consider shortcuts in the first place. If you have hiring and firing power and you tell someone they need to get the plane back in the air a few days later, they will do things to get the plane back in the air a few days later.
This is considered simply a "risk" by the report, and not a direct cause. As a consequence, the actual actions taken basically all belong to the category of "fix the engineers", "fix the flight crew", or "fix the plane". Not a single "fix the stressful maintenance environment".
I think if you asked the engineers who designed the airbus in question, could you create a "leak" warning, using just the existing sensor suite, they'd say "sure". You know the fuel level in each tank, and have a good estimate or actual flow data on engine fuel usage. Simple math says "leak" or "no leak". If that would work, it is surprising it isn't in the software.
If I recall, one of the duties of the pilots (usually the first officer's) is to keep track of fuel levels and consumption throughout the flight so any anomalies in the engine or fuel system can hopefully be found sooner. If a human can do it, I would imagine a computer could automate the process. Likely wouldn't remove the need for the pilots to do it anyway, though; redundancy and reliability and all that.
FTFY.
It's a common misconception in the general population that the Captain always flies the plane and the FO supports them.
There's always a pilot flying, and pilot monitoring. The roles are usually decided before the flight by the Captain and have nothing to do with who is Captain and who is First Officer.
I really love the straightforward but gripping style of writing here. I read every word! Which is rare for anything submitted to HN (or elsewhere for that matter)
What us failure analysis nerds need, what we deserve, is a 90s era Discovery Channel show written by Cloudberg. Either that or a a United States Chemical Safety Board[1] style series.
For some reason I'm a little obsessed with airline incidents and crashes. Admiral Cloudberg produces outstanding write-ups, and of course the videos of Mentour Pilot on YT are also excellent. While this is in no way scientific, it seems that what most catastrophes have in common are bad CRM (crew intra-communication) and lower-than-average airmanship. In most cases, for a catastrophe to occur there must be an initial…