Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's a consideration for: > things turn ugly PRC's leverage start after shooting starts (like TSMC), when PRC closes air and maritime space and specifies repatriation corridors will stop first on mainland for processing. International community sees all the cratered TW runways and entire TW coast except some West locations are saturated with mines and conclude, there's no other choice - can't airlift or merchant flee…
> can't airlift or merchant fleet into what's not accessbile Couldn't the U.S. planes drop aid packages, as in other conflicts? > Countries take repatrioting thier citizens seriously, and since PRC has ultimate veto over entry/egress to island, they have leverage, especially if there is a timer ticking down to when the island will run out of water and food. Are you talking about foreign nationals unrelated to China a…
> unrelated to China and Taiwan
Yes. Foreign nationals operating on what PRC considers to be Chinese territory under rival governemnt without CCP assent. Many of whom working in NGOs/agencies specifically to undermine PRC interests. I don't how international law will categorizes them, but PRC has good argument for "not civilians".
> give them ample time prior ... > sinks an actual PLAN vessel
There's going to be time/opportunites assuming graduated escalation process, but TBH I presume chance of inciting spark that pushes things to 100% more likely and preferrable for PRC. Even in a blockade scenario I think PRC will preemptively destroy major TW military targets that could threaten back, which PRC can do so without much telegraphing via air/rocketry. Lesson from RU/UKR is no half measures. Blockade = PRC is starving the island and not invading, but doesn't mean it won't defang TW first, PRC won't give TW the chance for fair fight or maintain ability fight back. As far as taking hits, it would be resumption of civil war and losses would be expected including mainland strikes by TW missiles.
> delicate diplomatic situations ... > undoing diplomacy
Look at RU vs LIO relations now, it's unsalvageable regardless of how mild the war started. And with respect to PRC/TW the countries that plan to sanction PRC are simultaneously trying to increase TW cooperation to undermine PRC interests while their genpop perception of PRC is already in gutters, so even less reason the cooperate, regardless of why shitshow started (i.e. LIO MSM will fault PRC even if PRC responding to provocations). And third parties that cultivate relationship with TW inspite of PRC warnings are in better position to compel TW into concessions anyway. IMO another lesson from RU/UKR war is just how little diplomacy is possible between active belligerants when strong outside actors are involved, i.e. RU isn't going to convince UKR to talk, but US might.