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After criticism, Apple to only seek abuse images flagged in multiple nations

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Re: After criticism, Apple to only seek abuse images flagged in multiple nations

#101
post #28

And... Apple misses the point of the criticism completely. This problem is the capability, not what it's used for. Any such capability will be abused by new use cases be it terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking or whatever. Plus there will inevitably be unauthorized access. The only way to prevent all this is for the system not to exist. I don't buy into theories that Apple is being pressured or coerced on a…

> The big question for me is how and why Tim Cook and Apple's board signed off on a plan

"Do us a favor or the AG launches an investigation into your business practices."

Re: After criticism, Apple to only seek abuse images flagged in multiple nations

#102
post #92
post #87

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> This problem is the capability > The only way to prevent all this is for the system not to exist. I've been having trouble following this argument over the last week. Isn't it clear that the capability already exists? Whether or not Apple goes through with its CSAM plan, the capability is evidently there. In other words, since Apple is a closed system, the capability was there before they announced the CSAM plans.…

There shouldn’t be a single line of code, or single binary blob, on my device that can compute these photo DNA hashes. Apple could always go ahead and add that functionality in an update, but then there would be a big backlash and the opportunity to not update or switch providers.

Wouldn't users have the ability to not update or switch providers if Apple expands the scope of its search beyond CSAM?

I guess I don't see the huge difference between the surveillance code existing on the phone but not used for objectionable purposes versus the line of code sitting in a different branch in git and not deployed on actual phones (yet).

I'm completely against this move by the way -- I'm not trying to defend it. But I want to be able to argue effectively against it.

Re: After criticism, Apple to only seek abuse images flagged in multiple nations

#104
post #87
post #28

And... Apple misses the point of the criticism completely. This problem is the capability, not what it's used for. Any such capability will be abused by new use cases be it terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking or whatever. Plus there will inevitably be unauthorized access. The only way to prevent all this is for the system not to exist. I don't buy into theories that Apple is being pressured or coerced on a…

> This problem is the capability > The only way to prevent all this is for the system not to exist. I've been having trouble following this argument over the last week. Isn't it clear that the capability already exists? Whether or not Apple goes through with its CSAM plan, the capability is evidently there. In other words, since Apple is a closed system, the capability was there before they announced the CSAM plans.…

There is a qualitative difference between tweaking an existing code base (expanding the scope of this detector) and coercing a company to dedicate teams of tens to hundreds of engineers over years to create a brand new code base from scratch (writing this detector in the first place.)

Re: After criticism, Apple to only seek abuse images flagged in multiple nations

#107
post #87
post #28

And... Apple misses the point of the criticism completely. This problem is the capability, not what it's used for. Any such capability will be abused by new use cases be it terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking or whatever. Plus there will inevitably be unauthorized access. The only way to prevent all this is for the system not to exist. I don't buy into theories that Apple is being pressured or coerced on a…

> This problem is the capability > The only way to prevent all this is for the system not to exist. I've been having trouble following this argument over the last week. Isn't it clear that the capability already exists? Whether or not Apple goes through with its CSAM plan, the capability is evidently there. In other words, since Apple is a closed system, the capability was there before they announced the CSAM plans.…

It's a very ill-considered argument, because Apple obviously already has the capability of pushing literally any conceivable software update to iPhones. Apple (and thus iPhones) already have the capability to do anything you can conceive of, regardless of how terrible. For instance, iPhones have the capability of activating the cameras at all times, detecting when they capture compromising or embarrassing video, and uploading those videos to a public website along with your name and contact information. The only thing preventing Apple from doing that is their own policies.

If you think it's bad that Apple can push software updates to iPhones, then by all means make that argument. But "the only way to prevent bad changes to this system down the road is for this first version of the system to never exist" is a very poor argument, given that the only "system" that needs to exist is the ability to push software updates, and that system existed long ago.

Re: After criticism, Apple to only seek abuse images flagged in multiple nations

#108
post #92

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There shouldn’t be a single line of code, or single binary blob, on my device that can compute these photo DNA hashes. Apple could always go ahead and add that functionality in an update, but then there would be a big backlash and the opportunity to not update or switch providers.

Wouldn't users have the ability to not update or switch providers if Apple expands the scope of its search beyond CSAM? I guess I don't see the huge difference between the surveillance code existing on the phone but not used for objectionable purposes versus the line of code sitting in a different branch in git and not deployed on actual phones (yet). I'm completely against this move by the way -- I'm not trying to d…

No, because they’re not scanning for CSAM, they’re scanning for hashes. That hash database needs to be updateable for it to be useful at all. A significant part of the policy protections are implemented off device, so those can’t be trusted.

Re: After criticism, Apple to only seek abuse images flagged in multiple nations

#109
This entire project has been a public relations catastrophe not only for Apple, but also for the NCMEC.

Almost no one held the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children in low regard prior to last week. Why would we? It's one of the best, most noble causes that have ever existed.

Then, Marita Rodriguez, an executive director at NCMEC, reassured employees in an internal memo that was unfortunately leaked:[1]

"I know it’s been a long day and that many of you probably haven’t slept in 24 hours. We know that the days to come will be filled with the screeching voices of the minority.

Our voices will be louder."

The "screeching voices of the minority" phrase got picked up and (perhaps unfairly) has become a kind of rallying cry, exposing the arrogance of the NCMEC.

I say "unfairly" because I do believe that their hearts were in the right place with this initiative, although they are desperately naive when it comes to the principles of privacy. "Let's save the children - how can we stop this toxicity of child porn - let's set something up with the cloud providers!"

But the damage has been done. Now the only tenable outcome is for Apple to simply cancel the project.

I, for one, was looking forward to upgrading from an Android to an iPhone 12 Pro Max later this year. That plan is now on hold! I doubt it will affect their sales too badly, at least at first. Maybe it will after the Chinese government starts using the back door to round up dissidents, or some Middle Eastern governments use it to crack down on homosexuality, or... the mind boggles.

[1] https://www.howtogeek.com/746588/apple-discusses-screeching-...

Re: After criticism, Apple to only seek abuse images flagged in multiple nations

#110
post #92
post #87

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> This problem is the capability > The only way to prevent all this is for the system not to exist. I've been having trouble following this argument over the last week. Isn't it clear that the capability already exists? Whether or not Apple goes through with its CSAM plan, the capability is evidently there. In other words, since Apple is a closed system, the capability was there before they announced the CSAM plans.…

There shouldn’t be a single line of code, or single binary blob, on my device that can compute these photo DNA hashes. Apple could always go ahead and add that functionality in an update, but then there would be a big backlash and the opportunity to not update or switch providers.

> Apple could always go ahead and add that functionality in an update, but then there would be a big backlash and the opportunity to not update or switch providers.

Isn't that exactly what is happening now?

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