Boeing's upgraded 737 Max completes first flight with media onboard • Hacker News Board

Re: Boeing's upgraded 737 Max completes first flight with media onboard

#251

Post by varispeed » Thu, Dec 03, 2020, 12:48 PM UTC

de_Selby wrote: post #245

bambax wrote: post #237

> In another display of confidence, European budget airline Ryanair was set to place a hefty order for up to 75 additional 737 MAX jets, industry sources said. If one needed another reason not to fly Ryannair, here it is.

I believe they had an order in place already, but I bet they've negotiated a big discount on it now. I think people will fly on the MAX (or 737-8 as it's going to be badged) after a year or two assuming there are no more accidents. Cheaper long haul flights is too tempting. Though I don't think I'd like to be stuck in a Ryanair plane with the temperature notched all the way up so the passengers buy drinks for longer…

Some people also have no choice because of their financial situation. How many people drive in cars that are not road worthy? I can imagine the anxiety going through those souls who have to use Ryanair.

Re: Boeing's upgraded 737 Max completes first flight with media onboard

#252

Post by chrisdhal » Thu, Dec 03, 2020, 12:59 PM UTC

hehetrthrthrjn wrote: post #141

judge2020 wrote: post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think they're obligated, but Delta does provide that information currently.

Probably because they have none of these planes and no plans to add them.

Delta has had it for years though, way before the Max issue came up. When you book a flight it's right there and tells you what model you're getting, which is needed since you can select seats ahead of time.

Admittedly, there are times it gets changed at the last minute for whatever reason, but when you book you see what you're getting, and have for years.

Re: Boeing's upgraded 737 Max completes first flight with media onboard

#253

Post by ClumsyPilot » Thu, Dec 03, 2020, 1:10 PM UTC

dnautics wrote: post #167

pdonis wrote: post #164

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The alternative is obvious - corporate manslaughter charges, aimed at management that knew plane was unsafe and pushed on regardless. And the obvious defense to that is that the FAA certified the plane. Then what?

737 max should be permanently decertified, boeing should take all associated losses. FAA officials should be charged with manslaughter.

FAA officials should face consequences, but boeing purposefully misled the regulator and got away scott-free.

Re: Boeing's upgraded 737 Max completes first flight with media onboard

#254

Post by alavesto » Thu, Dec 03, 2020, 1:12 PM UTC

dotancohen wrote: post #239

scottlocklin wrote: post #234

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>they will slowly be replaced by other businesses headed by ruthless sociopathic maximizers of shareholder value. I dunno man, the culture came from McDonnell-Douglass which was actually purchased by engineer-centric-at-the-time Boeing. How this culture spread in Boeing ought to be some kind of HBS case study, except they wouldn't notice that it should be taken as a cautionary tale.

For those unfamiliar with the case: Boeing and McDonnell-Douglass actually merged, but the name stayed Boeing. It is often said in the industry that McDonnell-Douglass bought Boeing with Boeing's own money. The company that today uses the name Boeing looks, acts, and quacks a lot more like 1970s-1995 MD did, than 1970s-1995 Boeing did.

And McDonnell-Douglass were/are true masters of building deadly aircraft.

Re: Boeing's upgraded 737 Max completes first flight with media onboard

#255

Post by yread » Thu, Dec 03, 2020, 1:32 PM UTC

ogre_codes wrote: post #2

In a weird way, having the Max grounded during 2020 turned out to be lucky timing on Boeing's part. The airlines slowdown due to COVID likely gave them some serious breathing room while they got their shit together. Now hopefully they actually did get their shit together.

MAX is a lot more efficient than the old NGs or classics (and can also do routes of 757s or 767s if they are thin enough). In a time of reduced demand airlines would prefer to park their more fuel-hungry planes and use the more efficient ones. But they can't because it's grounded.

And now there are airlines failing left and right with their planes going on the second hand market, back to lessors or are gutted for parts. That's depressing the price of airplanes and spare parts. That can't be good for Boeing either. Would you buy a 15% more efficient car for twice as much?

Re: Boeing's upgraded 737 Max completes first flight with media onboard

#256

Post by alavesto » Thu, Dec 03, 2020, 1:42 PM UTC

detaro wrote: post #233

J-dawg wrote: post #230

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In the original design, wasn't there an optional safety feature that added a second AoA sensor? It seems unbelievable, and is possibly one of the most ridiculous things about this whole story. Presumably as part of the update, this optional feature has become standard? I'd also like to see a list of all the airlines that chose not to spec the additional sensor in their initial order of the aircraft. It probably says…

From what I understand, the plane always has two sensors and MCAS always only used one of them (with Boing arguing that the pilot was the "redundancy"). The plane was supposed to show an alert when the two sensors disagreed, but Boing made a mistake and that alert only showed when the airline had purchased an additional add-on package to show the sensor value in the pilot display. Boing discovered this in 2017, but d…

Boeing's expectations for pilots recovering from an MCAS error were criminal. With an erroneous AOE reading, MCAS would immediately and repeatedly force the nose down. Pilots, not even told that MCAS existed, would somehow need to quickly recognize it as a powered flight control problem, cut off power to the stabilizer, and use the manual trim wheel to raise the nose - which can be physically impossible at high speeds in a nose-down attitude.

No rational person would think this system wouldn't kill people. The people responsible committed manslaughter.

Re: Boeing's upgraded 737 Max completes first flight with media onboard

#257

Post by J-dawg » Thu, Dec 03, 2020, 1:44 PM UTC

detaro wrote: post #233

J-dawg wrote: post #230

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In the original design, wasn't there an optional safety feature that added a second AoA sensor? It seems unbelievable, and is possibly one of the most ridiculous things about this whole story. Presumably as part of the update, this optional feature has become standard? I'd also like to see a list of all the airlines that chose not to spec the additional sensor in their initial order of the aircraft. It probably says…

From what I understand, the plane always has two sensors and MCAS always only used one of them (with Boing arguing that the pilot was the "redundancy"). The plane was supposed to show an alert when the two sensors disagreed, but Boing made a mistake and that alert only showed when the airline had purchased an additional add-on package to show the sensor value in the pilot display. Boing discovered this in 2017, but d…

Thanks for that explanation. I think this was misreported at the time (or I just wasn't paying attention!).

In a way what you described is worse: a known bug that they decided not to fix.

I'm surprised that displaying the sensor value wouldn't be a standard feature.

Re: Boeing's upgraded 737 Max completes first flight with media onboard

#258

Post by benhurmarcel » Thu, Dec 03, 2020, 1:45 PM UTC

de_Selby wrote: post #245

bambax wrote: post #237

> In another display of confidence, European budget airline Ryanair was set to place a hefty order for up to 75 additional 737 MAX jets, industry sources said. If one needed another reason not to fly Ryannair, here it is.

I believe they had an order in place already, but I bet they've negotiated a big discount on it now. I think people will fly on the MAX (or 737-8 as it's going to be badged) after a year or two assuming there are no more accidents. Cheaper long haul flights is too tempting. Though I don't think I'd like to be stuck in a Ryanair plane with the temperature notched all the way up so the passengers buy drinks for longer…

> Though I don't think I'd like to be stuck in a Ryanair plane with the temperature notched all the way up so the passengers buy drinks for longer than 1/2hrs.

I've never noticed that, and it doesn't really make sense as it costs fuel to heat up the cabin. Are you making that up?

Re: Boeing's upgraded 737 Max completes first flight with media onboard

#259

Post by benhurmarcel » Thu, Dec 03, 2020, 1:48 PM UTC

FeistyOtter wrote: post #197

frogblast wrote: post #175

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Covid’s timing was devastating for Boeing and the 737 Max. When the planes were grounded, Boeing kept producing them assuming the issue would be resolved quickly. As of January 2020, slightly before Covid, they had 400 planes built, but not delivered to customers (and so customers haven’t paid for them). Boeing was funding these aircraft with debt. All of a sudden, demand for air travel drops off a cliff. All those a…

Can an airline really refuse an aircraft without wasting some significant amount of money? I assume the airline or leasing company start paying from the moment they place an order all the way through construction, finished by a final payment at the moment of acceptance? When one orders a building company to build a house, you are given a payment schedule, I assume it is the same with airplanes.

Airliners are paid over a period yes, from the contract signature to several months after delivery. But the biggest chunk of cash changes hands at delivery.

Re: Boeing's upgraded 737 Max completes first flight with media onboard

#260

Post by benhurmarcel » Thu, Dec 03, 2020, 2:09 PM UTC

gsnedders wrote: post #132

p1mrx wrote: post #88

Why do these articles say so little about how Boeing fixed the problem? People are more likely to fly on these if they know what's different from the ones that crashed.

At least insofar as the US is concerned (and note many other regulating bodies are writing their own ADs, certifying the aircraft themselves), the FAA AD is https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf... , where the actual changes operators are required to make start on page 45.

Thanks for the link. The interesting part [with some comments]:

> As proposed in the NPRM [FAA's notice of proposed rulemaking], the corrective actions mandated by this AD [airworthiness directive] include a revision of the airplane's flight control laws (software). The new flight control laws now require inputs from both AOA [angle of attack] sensors in order to activate MCAS [Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System; the system causing the crashes]. They also compare the inputs from the two sensors, and if those inputs differ significantly (greater than 5.5 degrees for a specified period of time), will disable the Speed Trim System (STS), which includes MCAS, for the remainder of the flight and provide a corresponding indication of that deactivation on the flight deck. The new flight control laws now permit only one activation of MCAS per sensed high-AOA event, and limit the magnitude of any MCAS command to move the horizontal stabilizer such that the resulting position of the stabilizer will preserve the flight crew's ability to control the airplane's pitch by using only the control column. This means the pilot will have sufficient control authority without the need to make electric or manual stabilizer trim inputs. The new flight control laws also include FCC [flight control computer] integrity monitoring of each FCC's performance and cross-FCC monitoring, which detects and stops erroneous FCC-generated stabilizer trim commands (including MCAS).

> This AD further mandates changes to the airplane's AFM [airplane flight manual] to add and revise flight crew procedures to facilitate the crew's ability to recognize and respond to undesired horizontal stabilizer movement and the effects of a potential AOA sensor failure.

> This AD also mandates an AOA DISAGREE alert, which indicates certain AOA sensor failures or a significant calibration issue. The alert is implemented by revision of MDS software [MAX display system]; as a result, certain stickers (known as INOP [inoperative] markers) will be removed.

> Additionally, this AD mandates adequately separating certain airplane wiring, and conducting an AOA sensor system test and an operational readiness flight on each airplane before the airplane is reintroduced to service.

> Finally, this AD requires that operators that wish to dispatch airplanes with certain inoperative systems must first have incorporated specific provisions that are more restrictive into their existing FAA-approved MEL [minimum equipment list; defining what can be broken and you can still take-off].

Looks pretty convincing from my point of view.