231–240 of 290 posts
Do they still have the oversized new engines on an old frame design requiring software aid (MCAS) to mitigate problems at high angles of attack?
The aircraft didn't crash because of oversized engines. It crashed because MCAS was poorly implemented. A properly implemented MCAS system and there is no problem with the aircraft.
Don’t care. Show me real movement on the corporate mindset. The plane is a STEM engineer fixable issue. The corporate mess that pushed this across flying clearance is not. I’ll aim to fly airbus until Boeing understands that difference and fixes the root cause.
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On top of that there was a single angle of attack (AoA) sensor active that was complained about and failed hundreds of times. [1] Not only is that a single point of failure, it is more easily sabotaged or easily damaged. Besides the fact the plane has engines too big for it and needed this MCAS system simply to retrofit and route around regulations and deal with that by constantly checking the AoA to trigger nose dow…
In the original design, wasn't there an optional safety feature that added a second AoA sensor? It seems unbelievable, and is possibly one of the most ridiculous things about this whole story. Presumably as part of the update, this optional feature has become standard? I'd also like to see a list of all the airlines that chose not to spec the additional sensor in their initial order of the aircraft. It probably says…
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That kind of sociopathic behavior is natural outcome of business culture that is solely about maximizing shareholder value. I'm not sure what can be done to fix it.
You can't simply acculturate businesses against it- they will slowly be replaced by other businesses headed by ruthless sociopathic maximizers of shareholder value. This is the guaranteed outcome given this way of organizing commerce. Just as if you organized everyone into medieval guilds, we would replicate the behavior of medieval guilds.
I dunno man, the culture came from McDonnell-Douglass which was actually purchased by engineer-centric-at-the-time Boeing. How this culture spread in Boeing ought to be some kind of HBS case study, except they wouldn't notice that it should be taken as a cautionary tale.
Some will want to avoid flying this aircraft model. Here are some variants > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_MAX#Variants And here are some operators > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Boeing_737_operators
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Do you see lots of pilots or aviation experts saying the opposite? Are there Max pilots that have come out and said "I'm done flying that thing"?
How many airline pilots are in a position to publically say that and still keep their jobs?
If one needed another reason not to fly Ryannair, here it is.
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I think I disagree. If they’d taken the time to scrap the 737 Max and move to a new design, they’d have had the time and the public would have eaten the new product up. Instead, they doubled down and are now going to try to have to sell a product that many will refuse to ever fly on, myself included.
Considering that a new design would take like 10 years to get into production, how would that have been an immediate solution for Boeing? They need to be able to sell more 737 until a new design is ready, and no one wants that to be rushed. While I didn't hear anyting about a new design, I sincerely hope they are at it already though.
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You can't simply acculturate businesses against it- they will slowly be replaced by other businesses headed by ruthless sociopathic maximizers of shareholder value. This is the guaranteed outcome given this way of organizing commerce. Just as if you organized everyone into medieval guilds, we would replicate the behavior of medieval guilds.
>they will slowly be replaced by other businesses headed by ruthless sociopathic maximizers of shareholder value. I dunno man, the culture came from McDonnell-Douglass which was actually purchased by engineer-centric-at-the-time Boeing. How this culture spread in Boeing ought to be some kind of HBS case study, except they wouldn't notice that it should be taken as a cautionary tale.
The company that today uses the name Boeing looks, acts, and quacks a lot more like 1970s-1995 MD did, than 1970s-1995 Boeing did.
Don’t care. Show me real movement on the corporate mindset. The plane is a STEM engineer fixable issue. The corporate mess that pushed this across flying clearance is not. I’ll aim to fly airbus until Boeing understands that difference and fixes the root cause.
There you go: https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2020-11-06-Boeing-Appoints-Jinn... I worked with Jinnah before and he is great at shielding the engineers from executive. If hiring great execs is not movement of corporate mindset I don't know what is.