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Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

arstechnica.com

281–290 of 296 posts

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#281

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Can I just download an IPA from a website and install it on my phone if I have a developer account?

Can you with jailbreaks?

Yes, but Apple doesn't points for those, they actively oppose them.

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#282

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sure. That's why Magisk exists, right? Because OEMs have nothing against you rooting your device. At all. They are perfectly okay with it. Please. Actions speak louder than words, I am sure you would agree with that.

We were discussing Google devices and Apple devices. All Google phones have an unlockable bootloader.

Unlockable bootloader, yes. Officially supported ROM without Google Play Services, absolutely not.

I see you defending Google around here. That's fine but a grand-grand-grand...-parent of yours was saying that AOSP is unusable, and that point still stands and is true.

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#283
post #210

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you're instructed to unlock the phone with your finger, and your "duress fingerprint" unlocks fake data, then you're misrepresenting that fake data as the real data and would presumably be considered to be making a false statement (though this is just speculation on my part). On the other hand, a "duress fingerprint" that locks out TouchID wouldn't be misrepresenting anything. But it wouldn't surprise me if they c…

That would be the technical equivalent to the fifth amendment.

The 5th amendment says you can refuse to incriminate yourself. It does not say you can lie.

Refusing to unlock your phone would be equivalent. Unlocking fake data would not.

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#284

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The number of safeguards they have in place make that a moot point. If it's not discovered in testing, it's sandboxed. If it gets past the sandbox, they have a killswitch that's registered to the app's specific ID. There's very little damage that an app can do if it's gone through the App Store proper.

That could be done for sideloaded apps too.

Sideloaded apps, by definition, are not tracked individually by Apple. You can't make a killswitch for an app if you don't know what the app is.

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#285

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We were discussing Google devices and Apple devices. All Google phones have an unlockable bootloader.

Unlockable bootloader, yes. Officially supported ROM without Google Play Services, absolutely not. I see you defending Google around here. That's fine but a grand-grand-grand...-parent of yours was saying that AOSP is unusable, and that point still stands and is true.

You've confused yourself. The whole point of a device being yours is that you can install not officially supported ROMs.

The officially supported experience with Google Play Services is no more privacy invasive than the officially supported iOS ROM, but in the case of Google devices, the device is yours, and you are not limited to officially supported ROMs.

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#286

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We were discussing Google devices and Apple devices. All Google phones have an unlockable bootloader.

By google devices, do you mean only the Pixel and Nexus phones? Or does that include all android devices? Because for example Sprint Galaxy s5's can't be unlocked.

I mean devices sold by Google, so Nexuses, Pixels, and a few Google experience phones sold from the Google Store.

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#287

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> End-to-end encryption does not guarantee that Apple keeps your data encrypted I'm probably misunderstanding something here but doesn't "end-to-end encryption" mean that A encrypts it with B's key and [whoever is in the middle passing it along] can't decrypt it because they don't have B's key?

Yup, so Apple knows about your data. And according to that slide they are a "provider" for NSA. End-to-end encryption at least maybe guarantees that it is not your ISP that is selling you out to NSA (making it harder for Apple to explain why they are on that list).

How does Apple know about your data unless they have B's key?

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#288

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That could be done for sideloaded apps too.

Sideloaded apps, by definition, are not tracked individually by Apple. You can't make a killswitch for an app if you don't know what the app is.

And yet the Mac has a malware killswitch. Clearly it can be done.

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#289

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Or the proprietary kernel patches and binary blob drivers?

If your point is that there are partially closed source Android distros, I agree with you.

more that there are no open source Android phones. Just "partially open source" Android phones.

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#290

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sideloaded apps, by definition, are not tracked individually by Apple. You can't make a killswitch for an app if you don't know what the app is.

And yet the Mac has a malware killswitch. Clearly it can be done.

Source? The Mac only has the ability to prevent unsigned apps from being installed which is easily disabled. There's no killswitch for unsigned apps.
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