Earlier quoted context omitted.
"Apple encrypts End-to-end all iMessage chats, as well as FaceTime (VoIP) calls." End-to-end encryption does not guarantee that Apple keeps your data encrypted, or that they don't process it for 3rd parties (NSA would fit as a 3rd party, where Apple would be for them a content provider, as the slide shows). "You can bet your ass their arm was twisted by the government or they were taken into the program unknowingly (…
> End-to-end encryption does not guarantee that Apple keeps your data encrypted I'm probably misunderstanding something here but doesn't "end-to-end encryption" mean that A encrypts it with B's key and [whoever is in the middle passing it along] can't decrypt it because they don't have B's key?
Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode
271–280 of 296 posts
Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode
#272With it being such a closed platform, what are the odds this is actually true? There's no way to verify that they don't have a skeleton key.
Starting at iOS 10, firmware components have not been encrypted (obfuscated), so you or anyone else can also reverse engineer it.
Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode
#273Earlier quoted context omitted.
Sure. That's why Magisk exists, right? Because OEMs have nothing against you rooting your device. At all. They are perfectly okay with it. Please. Actions speak louder than words, I am sure you would agree with that.
We were discussing Google devices and Apple devices. All Google phones have an unlockable bootloader.
Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode
#274Earlier quoted context omitted.
> What data does Google collect that Apple doesn't collect? I don't know what Google collects, but the simple answer to this is "virtually everything". Apple collects very little data from their users and does everything they possibly can on-device (and the stuff that requires the cloud is either encrypted or heavily anonymized). Nearly all data that Google collects, Apple doesn't.
On the other hand, Android services everyone, whereas Apple tells the developing world to fuck off. Apple's privacy is only for the social elite who can afford their expensive toys, and they're not interested in providing service on a global scale. Let's not get too hippy-feelgood about Apple's intentions regarding its users here.
Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode
#275Earlier quoted context omitted.
Apple's checks are not very deep. They suffice to keep honest people honest but do little against an actual adversary.
The number of safeguards they have in place make that a moot point. If it's not discovered in testing, it's sandboxed. If it gets past the sandbox, they have a killswitch that's registered to the app's specific ID. There's very little damage that an app can do if it's gone through the App Store proper.
Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode
#276Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not being able to unlock your phone or sideload programs. I don't accept the "we know what's best for you" argument. They could have allowed jailbreaking and added huge warnings.
Apple allows you to 'sideload' apps as long as you get a (free) developer account.
Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode
#277Earlier quoted context omitted.
"Every society that has been allowed to drive cars has had car accidents." I know the risks, I want to do it anyway. I don't want a nanny over my head.
That may be a better analogy than you intend. The problem with cars is that everyone suffers the consequences of your driving. In fact, you may have the least exposure to the carbon monoxide, pollution, or even accident risk. Pedestrians, cyclists, property owners, and other drivers are all at risk of your driving. For that reason, societies tightly regulate car ownership and driving. More so than phones: I don’t nee…
Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode
#278Earlier quoted context omitted.
Safe Browsing and Crash Reporting can be turned off with no repercussions. You can turn off location altogether, though I'm not sure if you can turn off aGPS only. That leaves app installs (Android allows side loading) and push messaging (I'm not sure about this one) as the ones that you can't disable on iOS.
But please think twice before turning off safe browsing! Contrary to what some seem to believe, it doesn't send your entire browsing history to Google. See https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9779990 for an explanation.
Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode
#279Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode
#280Earlier quoted context omitted.
"Apple encrypts End-to-end all iMessage chats, as well as FaceTime (VoIP) calls." End-to-end encryption does not guarantee that Apple keeps your data encrypted, or that they don't process it for 3rd parties (NSA would fit as a 3rd party, where Apple would be for them a content provider, as the slide shows). "You can bet your ass their arm was twisted by the government or they were taken into the program unknowingly (…
> End-to-end encryption does not guarantee that Apple keeps your data encrypted I'm probably misunderstanding something here but doesn't "end-to-end encryption" mean that A encrypts it with B's key and [whoever is in the middle passing it along] can't decrypt it because they don't have B's key?
And according to that slide they are a "provider" for NSA.
End-to-end encryption at least maybe guarantees that it is not your ISP that is selling you out to NSA (making it harder for Apple to explain why they are on that list).