261–270 of 296 posts
Here is a slide from the PRISM leaks: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-... #neverforget
The mention that is varies by provider is notable. Apple encrypts End-to-end all iMessage chats, as well as FaceTime (VoIP) calls. None of the other providers on that list do that, so at least there's that. Also, people here act like Apple jumped willingly onboard the PRISM program. You can bet your ass their arm was twisted by the government or they were taken into the program unknowingly (datacenter ISP taps, etc).
End-to-end encryption does not guarantee that Apple keeps your data encrypted, or that they don't process it for 3rd parties (NSA would fit as a 3rd party, where Apple would be for them a content provider, as the slide shows).
"You can bet your ass their arm was twisted by the government or they were taken into the program unknowingly (datacenter ISP taps, etc)."
Can you back that up ? How can you be so sure ?
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The mention that is varies by provider is notable. Apple encrypts End-to-end all iMessage chats, as well as FaceTime (VoIP) calls. None of the other providers on that list do that, so at least there's that. Also, people here act like Apple jumped willingly onboard the PRISM program. You can bet your ass their arm was twisted by the government or they were taken into the program unknowingly (datacenter ISP taps, etc).
"Apple encrypts End-to-end all iMessage chats, as well as FaceTime (VoIP) calls." End-to-end encryption does not guarantee that Apple keeps your data encrypted, or that they don't process it for 3rd parties (NSA would fit as a 3rd party, where Apple would be for them a content provider, as the slide shows). "You can bet your ass their arm was twisted by the government or they were taken into the program unknowingly (…
I'm probably misunderstanding something here but doesn't "end-to-end encryption" mean that A encrypts it with B's key and [whoever is in the middle passing it along] can't decrypt it because they don't have B's key?
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The Google device is NOT truly yours because you have to look for cracks if you want to root it or remove the Google stuff. The law may also be against you if you crack it. You are just a guest on your device...you are "licensed" to use it just like you get license to play music on spotify, watch movies on netflix etc...nothing is owned anymore and very few people care.
Many Android devices, including all the ones that Google make and sell themselves, Sony devices, Motorola devices, have an officially supported path to running any code you want on YOUR own device. Usually that path is: boot the phone into bootloader mode, plug it into a computer, run `fastboot oem unlock`, accept the warning that this will void your warranty, then `fastboot flash `. An officially documented and supp…
Please. Actions speak louder than words, I am sure you would agree with that.
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Many Android devices, including all the ones that Google make and sell themselves, Sony devices, Motorola devices, have an officially supported path to running any code you want on YOUR own device. Usually that path is: boot the phone into bootloader mode, plug it into a computer, run `fastboot oem unlock`, accept the warning that this will void your warranty, then `fastboot flash `. An officially documented and supp…
Sure. That's why Magisk exists, right? Because OEMs have nothing against you rooting your device. At all. They are perfectly okay with it. Please. Actions speak louder than words, I am sure you would agree with that.
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All of a user's device data is encrypted by default on Android as well. In this respect, they are no different.
The difference is that Google owns the keys that encrypt your files. Services like GDrive, GMail, Google Photos, Assistant, all depend on processing your data in the cloud. Apple does all of that locally (because they can't access any of it otherwise), trading some scalability and sophistication for privacy.
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iOS devices have always required the device to "trust" the computer before allowing the backup. Looking at the article, the only real difference now appears to be that you can't just use TouchID, you're forced to use the passcode.
> Looking at the article, the only real difference now appears to be that you can't just use TouchID, you're forced to use the passcode. That's part of it. Another part is that the passcode has to be entered after the device has been connected to the computer, as opposed to starting with an unlocked phone (maybe you took it while it was in use, maybe you forced the user to unlock it) and connecting it to a computer l…
Once the device is unlocked, what is the obstacle to change the passcode?
Needing the old one?
Or - if you prefer - what happens if you have a TouchID and forget the passcode?
Do you need to reset the phone?
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How hard is it to jailbreak with ADB shell and get root on a random phone? Does that always require a code?
It depends on the device, but at least on Nexus/Pixel devices you can just plug the phone in and `fastboot oem unlock` and it will unlock the bootloader, i.e. allow you to flash anything onto it that you want.
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It's more than just sandboxing: Apps going through the App Store have to meet a stringent set of requirements, chiefly being no private API usage, no circumvention of features intended to give the user control/privacy, and no third party web engines (and all the performance and security implications that come with those). Apple regularly rejects apps that violate the first two, and while I'm sure some get through the…
Apple's checks are not very deep. They suffice to keep honest people honest but do little against an actual adversary.