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The dangerous delusion of modern warfare

economist.com

71–80 of 85 posts

Re: The dangerous delusion of modern warfare

#71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So hes partly right. The reason why drones are _so_ devastating in ukraine is that there is no air superiority. that standard "modern" way is bomb the living shit out of anything armoured, and then push forward with your own armour. Hence why ukraine needed so many javelins to stop armour and helicopters. Its also why despite the sheer amount of stuff that Iran et al threw at Isreal, it hardly got through. unlike Oma…

> the standard "modern" war For the US and friends is terrorizing the enemy, his forces, his civilian population into giving up. Is feeding a civil war until he crumbles. > bomb the living shit out of anything armoured That’s absolutely not what’s missing in Ukraine. > and then push forward with your own armour. And then, as soon as you assemble let alone move in the open , you get wrecked. No one has an easy answer…

> For the US and friends is terrorizing the enemy, his forces, his civilian population into giving up

The US has tried to do it a few times (most notably Vietnam), but it isn't the strategy in the slightest. The goal is always an Iraq style campaign with heavy air attacks to destroy/confuse most enemy capabilities before a swift invasion.

Terrorising the population in submission has never worked. The US Air Force's own study of strategic air power after WW2 concluded so.

> That’s absolutely not what’s missing in Ukraine

> and then push forward with your own armour

If you rule the skies, you shoot down most attacking drones / it becomes too dangerous to launch drones from short to medium distances (because you'd be found out and destroyed ASAP). It's important to remember that not all wars are the same, and a competent army from a strong military power wouldn't have gotten bogged down to trenches in the first place. Mobile warfare is all about speed and unpredictability and the enemy being unable to react in time

Re: The dangerous delusion of modern warfare

#72
post #31
post #8

"There are other similarities between Ukraine and Iran. Both are wars instigated by the leaders of great powers in the apparent belief of easy victory. Both have developed in ways those leaders did not anticipate into something like a stalemate—stalemates in which, for Russia and America alike, a lack of victory looks increasingly like defeat. Are technological changes making the role of the defender easier? Or syste…

"Putin was advised that Russian disinfo had worked and Ukrainians would welcome Russian troops as liberators" And where does your inside info from the Kremlin and Putin's head is coming from? Putin was raised in the KGB, I think he knows a bit how to get intel. And with secret war style he was very successful in 2014 seizing the Krim and some areas. It was likely just overconfidence in the ability of the russian army…

Nope. Even if you don't trust the reporting and information coming out of Russia, it's pretty self-evident that Russia thought they won't have much of a war to fight. Half of the attack on Kyiv was done by Rosgvardia (riot police), with parade gear and musical instruments in their logistics.

You don't do that if you think you'll have a quick victory, you do that if you're certain there will barely be any war.

Re: The dangerous delusion of modern warfare

#73

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So hes partly right. The reason why drones are _so_ devastating in ukraine is that there is no air superiority. that standard "modern" way is bomb the living shit out of anything armoured, and then push forward with your own armour. Hence why ukraine needed so many javelins to stop armour and helicopters. Its also why despite the sheer amount of stuff that Iran et al threw at Isreal, it hardly got through. unlike Oma…

"Air superiority" wouldn't do anything in 2026 unless you're fighting an African tribe with ak47s in a fullscale war and even then your enemies would probably supply the tribe with some air defense systems that would cause trouble for the pilots.

> "Air superiority" wouldn't do anything in 2026 unless you're fighting an African tribe with ak47s

It means that the side without superiority has no ability to do proper logistics.

Want to move artillery? its going to get blown up.

Want to move troops? can't, because the transport is going to get blown up.

You want to supply food to 10k plus fighters? can't because it's going to get blown up.

Now, it doesn't matter what provides the air superiority, be it missiles, planes or drones.

Its not without precedent, in recent times. If we look at battleships, they went from being the thing that projected power, to a liability when air carriers dominated. the effect is the same, you drive up with your battleship/carrier group and dominated the area for 300miles radius.

Re: The dangerous delusion of modern warfare

#74
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> and Ukrainians would welcome Russian troops as liberators while Zelensky's government would fold immediately. It is wild how many conflicts involve this blunder. I can’t think of a single major example where the advisors were right. It’s such a great example of believing your own propaganda and/or being too afraid to actually look under the hood of your claims to your leader. Autocracy tends to breed lying yes men…

There are many ethnic Russians in Eastern Ukraine that really welcomed the Russian army. The problem is that the rest of the country is not that happy about this.

This has always been overblown and clearly that “many” was an insignificantly small portion of the population once the rubber met the road. Just because you have a favorable opinion of the Russian government doesn’t mean you’re going to suddenly start singing the anthem when their tanks cross the border as they bomb you/your friends (who according to Putin are all probably Nazis) out of nowhere.

So many left after all this so Ukraine’s sympathetic-to-Russia population will no longer be significant by any metric. Putin knows this. He’s lost Ukraine forever if he doesn’t make them surrender.

Re: The dangerous delusion of modern warfare

#75
post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"Air superiority" wouldn't do anything in 2026 unless you're fighting an African tribe with ak47s in a fullscale war and even then your enemies would probably supply the tribe with some air defense systems that would cause trouble for the pilots.

You establish air superiority first by doing supression of enemy air defences, then destroying any offensive capabilities they might have (air bases, fighters), and then you rule the skies.

This didn't work with Vietnam nor Afghanistan.. and US had 100% superiority.

Re: The dangerous delusion of modern warfare

#76
post #75
post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You establish air superiority first by doing supression of enemy air defences, then destroying any offensive capabilities they might have (air bases, fighters), and then you rule the skies.

This didn't work with Vietnam nor Afghanistan.. and US had 100% superiority.

Yes, it did. Over both of those the US had, mostly, control of the skies.

Hanoi had extremely heavy air defences and was left mostly alone (both because of that and because it wasn't considered a politically appropriate target).

Re: The dangerous delusion of modern warfare

#77
post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't disagree with this, it's just that there's no reason to assume Israel simply wants the least hostile Iranian government. We never saw a real effort to replace the Islamic Republic, not even now. Likewise there was never an attempt to replace Hamas in the Palestinian territories. Well also, about Pahlavi being deposed by his own people, who really knows.

What do you think Israel’s objective is then? It seems rather clear to me that they have expansionist ambitions which necessitate defeating their neighboring foes, who are backed by Iran. A non-hostile Iran is an Iran that does not back these foes. There has been no attempt to replace Hamas because Israel’s goal is the ethnic cleansing of Gaza.

They want to expand into the Palestinian territories and also want to not be existentially threatened, both of which require weakening their enemies. They aren't going to get a friendly Iran no matter what, but they can get a weak one.

They also need to maintain Western support. That's billions in both military aid and payoffs to neutral countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, plus diplomatic ties. Netanyahu's administration wants to maintain support from its own people too. Having enemies isn't a completely bad thing for those reasons.

Re: The dangerous delusion of modern warfare

#78
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"Putin was advised that Russian disinfo had worked and Ukrainians would welcome Russian troops as liberators" And where does your inside info from the Kremlin and Putin's head is coming from? Putin was raised in the KGB, I think he knows a bit how to get intel. And with secret war style he was very successful in 2014 seizing the Krim and some areas. It was likely just overconfidence in the ability of the russian army…

> And where does your inside info from the Kremlin and Putin's head is coming from? It's coming from the fact that troops approaching Kyiv were supplied with 3 day rations and full dress uniforms, ready to hold a parade in Kyiv. It's also coming from US intelligence ( https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia... ). And on top of that, russian propaganda literally repeated times and times again that…

I debated the claim that Putin believed he will be cheered on by majority of Ukrainians after conquering their army quickly.

I don't believe he had much illusions there, but he surely believed he will win in 3 days.

Re: The dangerous delusion of modern warfare

#79
post #57
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"Putin was advised that Russian disinfo had worked and Ukrainians would welcome Russian troops as liberators" And where does your inside info from the Kremlin and Putin's head is coming from? Putin was raised in the KGB, I think he knows a bit how to get intel. And with secret war style he was very successful in 2014 seizing the Krim and some areas. It was likely just overconfidence in the ability of the russian army…

Sergei Beseda chief of the FSB "fifth service" was arrested after the start of the war. https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/06/20/no-infighting-here is a story I found around it. I guess we can't be definite, but that journalist in Russia was citing sources saying that the service had essentially embezzled money and made up the data about their resources on the ground in Ukraine, and misrepresented polling data they ha…

"Soldatov argued that decision makers in Moscow had approached the invasion as a police operation, not a military campaign, because they believed the Ukrainians would actually welcome Russian forces."

" a Moscow FSB agent once tried to convince him not to investigate the October 2002 Moscow theater hostage siege"

Ok, so the source is one russian journalist who was known at least since 2002 to the FSB as someone to keep away from inner sanctum information. It is something, but I doubt he got really access.

Re: The dangerous delusion of modern warfare

#80
post #79
post #57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sergei Beseda chief of the FSB "fifth service" was arrested after the start of the war. https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/06/20/no-infighting-here is a story I found around it. I guess we can't be definite, but that journalist in Russia was citing sources saying that the service had essentially embezzled money and made up the data about their resources on the ground in Ukraine, and misrepresented polling data they ha…

"Soldatov argued that decision makers in Moscow had approached the invasion as a police operation, not a military campaign, because they believed the Ukrainians would actually welcome Russian forces." " a Moscow FSB agent once tried to convince him not to investigate the October 2002 Moscow theater hostage siege" Ok, so the source is one russian journalist who was known at least since 2002 to the FSB as someone to ke…

Andrei Soldatov is not merely "one russian journalist". Since 2000, he has been operating agentura.ru, which publishes information about Russian security services. He is well-connected and widely considered one of the most serious independent experts on the Russian security apparatus.
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