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Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

reuters.com

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Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#531

Post by pizlonator »

munk-a wrote: post #233
pizlonator wrote: post #215

So I read somewhere than Muilenburg was the only engineer in the Boeing C suite. There were no pilots in the C suite. And this was part of the problem. The new CEO has a degree in accounting. I bet he’ll do great.

At some point we (society at large) are going to realize these fluffy c-level people are toxic and remove value from companies - then, ideally, we'll move back to a default of promoting internally.

Yeah. Domain specialists with leadership qualities are better at leading companies than ridiculously good looking (and very white and very male) accountants.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#532

Post by Rebelgecko »

bkor wrote: post #397
Rebelgecko wrote: post #248

Earlier quoted context omitted.

After SpaceX's failures, lots of people were saying things like "This is why they test— if you're not occassionally failing, you're not pushing the limits enough". I would guess that at least in part the difference in attitudes is because SpaceX is considered more startup-y and Boeing is more associated with the "failure is not an option" ethos.

SpaceX still put satellites in orbit. From what I understood, SpaceX tests the entire software where they simulate launches. Something such as different timers should've been caught already. Anyway, I do not care too much about pointing fingers elsewhere. The parachute thing was quite embarrassing and IMO this problem should have been prevented as well.

Boeing still put a capsule in orbit too. And I actually saw those excuses I'm referring to when the BFR prototype blew its lid, which didn't involved even a partially successful mission. Similar things were also said when the Crew Dragon blew up on the ground.

Regardless, testing all of the flight software is certainly not exclusive to SpaceX. I would bet any amount of money that Boeing also tested their software and performed simulated launches, moreover that testing is probably mandated by their contract with NASA. My uninformed guess is that one of two things happened:

1. Their tests were incomplete. e.g. they didn't find some edge case that would cause problems when the T-0 changed.

2. Someone goofed the procedures on the day of launch and didn't update their configuration properly.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#533

Post by ThinkBeat »

gomijacogeo wrote: post #529
ThinkBeat wrote: post #525

Something I have been wondering about since this all started. Where did all the airplanes now being leased to fill the holes left by taking the 738Max8 out of the shedules come from? It is amazing to me that there was that much available capacity? Are those airplanes in general older and possibly less safe?

Older, yes. Generally not less safe (and certainly safer than the Max8 right now). Usually more expensive - less fuel-efficient engines, maybe up against C/D maintenance checks, maybe less efficient cabin layout, etc.

but what do all these airplanes do most of the time?

I would think right now a lot more airlines and leasing than usual. (I could be wrong).

that would mean that a lot of the airplanes are standing still most of the time. (I realize they would rotate, so a single plane was not being unsued for very long)

Whoever usually leases them are they out of luck now?

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#534

Post by geekamongus »

megablast wrote: post #480
geekamongus wrote: post #319

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Tall person here. Flights longer than 90 minutes really, really suck unless I've saved up enough miles to upgrade my seat something with more leg room.

I’m 6’4. I’ve flown journeys of adding up to 24 hours in 30 hours before. Never had a problem.

Consider yourself lucky. I'm sure it's highly subjective, whatever the case. If I can't stretch or have enough room to adjust my legs, my knees hurt, my lower back hurts, and it makes me miserable.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#535

Post by LaserToy »

api wrote: post #408
wpietri wrote: post #402

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I've lately been reading about the notion of "managerialism". The book Confronting Managerialism defines it as "What occurs when a special group, called management, ensconces itself systemically in an organization and deprives owners and employees of their decision-making power (including distribution of emoluments) and justifies that takeover on the grounds of the managing group's education and exclusive possession…

An interesting thing about managetialism is that it's basically what made the USSR fail. The MBA is our exact equivalent of the Soviet "apparatchik." We postured ourselves as the opposite of the USSR but in reality US business culture aped a lot of its bureaucratic structure. I've called it Soviet capitalism for some time now.

So, I’m not the only person who sees the similarity. I was born in USSR and later moved to USA. Some (many) approaches to management in some very famous and rich companies constantly remind me of Soviet’s approach to management. It does not mean it is bad, but USSR fell apart...

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#536

Post by asperous »

pytester wrote: post #477
ativzzz wrote: post #336

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The current hacker news meme is that bad management of any kind is due to MBAs, where in reality a bad manager is a bad manager and an MBA has nothing to do with it.

MBA culture introduced us to the meme of "management is a generic function" meaning accountants with an MBA degree could manage engineers, software developers, doctors or teachers using the same tools (e.g. performance metrics).

Yeah the degree never tries to cover the specifics of every industry and job. It doesn't even specialize in people management (MIM is that degree). MBA tries to help build the mindset to begin your learning off of (assuming you have an openness to learn). CS is similar (CS graduates are not advanced programmers). Of course it's nothing special, you could self teach that like most degrees.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#537

Post by gomijacogeo »

yason wrote: post #459

The only credible way from here is to: - remove the hack that is MCAS for the purpose of being able to piggyback on the old 737 type certificate; - start the process of type-certifying 737-MAX as the individual design that it is without MCAS instead of trying to make it behave like the old 737 just to keep things on the cheap side; - and offer free type certification for existing 737 pilots to obtain their certificat…

Not quite. I don't think you all realize how stupendously expensive certifying a new type is. Boeing and the airlines wouldn't be prepared to absorb the extra costs just to have a slightly more efficient 737 at the other end of it.

- MCAS needs to die. I doubt I could have written a subsystem that tries harder to kill you if I tried. Everything about that hack is grossly negligent and possibly criminal.

- Both AoA sensors need to go to both computers.

- All planes get AoA indicators.

- All planes get pitch trim indicators.

- Any kind of MCAS2 should just be an alarm rather than moving control surfaces on its own. If the Max8 diverges too quickly for a human to handle, then Boeing is (and should be) well and truly fucked.

- Regulatory agencies need to have a streamlined 'subtype' certification that recognizes when 99% of the plane is the same and only review the differences. All this MCAS bullshit was to sneak in under a too-strict type certification system in the first place.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#538

Post by WalterBright »

WalterBright wrote: post #504
jonplackett wrote: post #236

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Reminds me of the news coverage of SpaceX’s first landing attempts, where they crashed into the barge and exploded and everyone was like “it’s a failure, it will never work”. Yeah but so much went right. I think it’s just the (well deserved) media narrative Boeing is in now. When you kill hundreds of people and then pretend it wasn’t your fault, you get what’s coming to you.

A significant share of the blame for the crashes accrues to the pilots who did not remember/follow emergency procedures for runaway trim. There was also the LA problem of putting an airplane back into service despite the critical malfunction on the earlier flight. To reiterate, the procedure is: 1. restore trim to normal with the electric thumb switches 2. throw the stab trim cutoff switches

I know, sounds too simple to be true. But it is:

Boeing Emergency Airworthiness Directive

"Initially, higher control forces may be needed to overcome any stabilizer nose down trim already applied. Electric stabilizer trim can be used to neutralize control column pitch forces before moving the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT. Manual stabilizer trim can be used before and after the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to CUTOUT."

https://theaircurrent.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MA...

This AD was sent to all MAX flight crews. It works because the first incident of MCAS failure (Lion Air) was safely dealt with by doing just this.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#539

Post by bumby »

frostburg wrote: post #528
remarkEon wrote: post #318

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes it does? These are known engineering problems with known engineering solutions. The explanation from Boeing was that a timer was set incorrectly. This sounds like a trivial error to me (though I'm not a "rocket scientist" just a "kerbal scientist", I guess, but we've been using timers for a long time afaik to properly manage burns to orbit).

Let's take a moment to consider the fact that apparently the MCAS uses input from only one of the two AoA sensors on a 737 MAX and swaps which one it takes the data from after each flight. I can't grasp how everyone involved could fail to realize that this statistically makes it less safe than only having one sensor. I don't know how much the systemic issues that clearly compromised the design of the plane extend to…

Of course they realize it makes it statistically less reliable. I think the gap is it becomes much more difficult to assess the probability of failure between different systems. In the case of MCAS, they already had the ability to override it. In complex systems one domain may think a simple mitigation is sufficient (e.g., the pilot can override MCAS) without understanding the layering of other issues (e.g., human factors like complex controls, lack of training etc.) Meaning from the standpoint of a single domain, that simple mitigation maybe incorrectly be assumed to bring the risk probability into a reasonable range.

I think it’s important to acknowledge the process failures like lack of communication between domains rather than acquiesce to simple conclusions that are more clear only in hindsight.

Re: Boeing CEO ousted as 737 Max crisis deepens

#540

Post by bumby »

WalterBright wrote: post #538
WalterBright wrote: post #504

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A significant share of the blame for the crashes accrues to the pilots who did not remember/follow emergency procedures for runaway trim. There was also the LA problem of putting an airplane back into service despite the critical malfunction on the earlier flight. To reiterate, the procedure is: 1. restore trim to normal with the electric thumb switches 2. throw the stab trim cutoff switches

I know, sounds too simple to be true. But it is: Boeing Emergency Airworthiness Directive "Initially, higher control forces may be needed to overcome any stabilizer nose down trim already applied. Electric stabilizer trim can be used to neutralize control column pitch forces before moving the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT. Manual stabilizer trim can be used before and after the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are mov…

The problem with this standpoint is that procedural fixes are the least preferable way of managing a hazardous condition. Engineering the hazard away is almost always the better option with procedural mitigation’s being a last resort. If engineering fixes were available and unused its indicative of poor safety engineering practices
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