The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf] • Hacker News Board

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#101

Post by jancsika » Thu, Nov 08, 2018, 1:02 AM UTC

whack wrote: post #82

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

> If my decisions are not a product of my prior state, then they are not my decisions. The definition of 'me' is my prior state. There are two problems with this definition of free will. First, it implies that your present self (and future selves) are all entirely subservient to your prior state, and surrounding environment. Ie, the present you has no way of overcoming your past self or your environment. This means t…

> But your present and future self are all helpless from that point on.

To me, "helpless" in the context of metaphysical free will means that an agent's actions are deterministic from the view of an outside observer. That is all it can ever mean AFAICT. Any sadness/frustration we may feel about this is equivalent to the sadness/frustration one feels for Heidegger's cat. That is to say, it's there, but it's philosophically incidental.

"Helpless" in the context of physical free will means the normal meaning of helpless in all its glorious ambiguity. It can mean something close to "deterministic" in certain catastrophic situations. But more often it means something like "under the rule of a tyrant," "enslaved," or even "trapped" for whatever reason. In all those cases the sadness/frustration/etc. one feels is part and parcel of the outcome-- it affects whether one decides to fight, acquiesce, cope, etc. Since nobody within physical reality has sufficient knowledge to predict the future, the problem of metaphysical free will doesn't pop up.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#102

Post by sooheon » Thu, Nov 08, 2018, 1:14 AM UTC

tylerjwilk00 wrote: post #73

sooheon wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> You are, at your basest existence, the ability to choose. A choice engine with a physical layer; a physical memory, physical emotion, the ability to think. But at your foundation, you choose. I don't see how this is at odds with the prior state view. You are a state machine. As time moves, you have no choice but to choose, and this is entirely dependent on your previous state and your current environment. The physi…

Even if it is correct to say that, "You are a state machine." and "prior state" is an input to the state generation function of the machine, this is _not_ incompatible with free will, and does _not_ require a pre-determined universe. Simply put, current state as an input does not necessitate pre-determination. I think the point user all2 was making is that if we remove the prior state modifier from the generate state…

I agree pre-determination is orthogonal to the question. If the state machine has a truly random component, pre-determination goes out the window.

> [...] if we remove the prior state modifier from the generate state function then the core piece that is left over is "your basest existence".

I think removing the prior state modifier leaves you with nothing. A brain with no prior state is a brain with absolutely no memories, knowledge, or stored procedures. Even if such a brain were possible to construct, plasticity would ensure that unless it was dead, it would immediately begin accumulating prior state with which to make subsequent choices.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#103

Post by vbuwivbiu » Thu, Nov 08, 2018, 2:05 AM UTC

starbeast wrote: post #87

mreome wrote: post #85

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think simonh was not arguing against the chain of causation, but rather agreeing with it, and arguing against "If the future can be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" and in favor of "If the future can not be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" If an entity's decision process is is not not dependent and repeatable based entirely on it's internal state and per…

Gödel had an interesting argument that I encountered via Rudy Rucker's blog; “There is no contradiction between free will and knowing in advance precisely what one will do. If one knows oneself completely then this is the situation. One does not deliberately do the opposite of what one wants.” http://www.rudyrucker.com/blog/2012/08/01/memories-of-kurt-g...

this quote has stayed with me ever since I first read it and I catch myself at points where I think I've just made a free decision thinking "I should try to overcome my will now and do the opposite", which I can never do, but wouldn't overcoming one's will do something be even more free will ?

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#104

Post by wonthegame » Thu, Nov 08, 2018, 3:44 AM UTC

simonh wrote: post #59

fjuerfilis wrote: post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, I agree that is one model, but what I wrestle with ultimately I suppose is whether indeterminism per se is what defines free will, in part or whole. If you have a prior state that is in part systematic, and part random, is the randomness per se free will? Does that encapsulate the notion of free will? Maybe? But both of those are still causally deterministic in a sense, in that even with randomness, there's some…

I think randomness really is a red herring. To the extent that a decision of ours is random, it is not ours. That doesn't necessarily absolve us of responsibility. In No Country for Old Men a guy flips a coin to decide if he will kill someone. He chose to flip the coin though - delegating a choice to randomness does not abrogate us of responsibility. By doing so he created the framework in which the outcome arrises,…

A bit of a tangent but, you’ll notice he also becomes agitated when the coin doesn’t “allow” him to kill (I think, it’s been awhile) the shopkeeper. This implies he was looking for reasons to kill people. The coin flipping was his way of shifting the blame of his true desires - to kill people.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#105

Post by simonh » Thu, Nov 08, 2018, 8:27 AM UTC

vbuwivbiu wrote: post #103

starbeast wrote: post #87

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Gödel had an interesting argument that I encountered via Rudy Rucker's blog; “There is no contradiction between free will and knowing in advance precisely what one will do. If one knows oneself completely then this is the situation. One does not deliberately do the opposite of what one wants.” http://www.rudyrucker.com/blog/2012/08/01/memories-of-kurt-g...

this quote has stayed with me ever since I first read it and I catch myself at points where I think I've just made a free decision thinking "I should try to overcome my will now and do the opposite", which I can never do, but wouldn't overcoming one's will do something be even more free will ?

My brother has a great anecdote. He was at work talking to some colleagues and one of them said free will was all about freely choosing what you believe. Everyone else agreed. My brother argued you can't necessarily choose what you believe, to much derision from his colleagues. So he challenged them.

"OK, pick something you absolutely believe, that you have believed as long as you can remember and you are absolutely sure about. It doesn't matter what it is and it can be as trivial as you like and change your belief about it."

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#106

Post by simonh » Thu, Nov 08, 2018, 8:48 AM UTC

whack wrote: post #99

rocqua wrote: post #91

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> even if the future can be perfectly predicted, people can still have free will? Not OP, but essentially yes. Things get weird if you use your predictions to influence what I do. But I'd say that takes away my agency, whilst keeping my free-will intact. In general, those who claim determinism and free-will do not clash are called 'compatibilists'. Often, the argument is kind-of semantic. It starts with the idea that…

That's an interesting perspective. I don't agree with it myself, but I agree that it's impossible to resolve this discussion without a clear definition. Personally, I define free will as having the ability to "change" . To overcome your both your past self, and your environment. Ie, a billiards ball has no free will, because its motion is compelled by its past state, and by the environment around it. Similarly for ca…

When we take this argument out of imagined philosophical universes with perfectly deterministic Newtonian-like rules, we find that in fact randomness is everywhere. Quantum mechanics tells us that the behaviour of every particle and photon in our bodies behaves under some level of random influence. Perfect predictability is a fantasy. However conceptually we can simplify this and just imagine that my sate, the definition of how I am as a being, includes a source of randomness.

My argument then is that sure some of my choices are random, mainly because I choose to not use my memories and skills I have learned and hand over the choice to the RNG. That's also often a choice though. See my comment elsewhere on this page on No Country for Old Men.

You talk about unexpectedness. How do you define unexpected in such a way that it is distinguished from random? That's crucial. Truly random behaviour is not intentional and not 'ours'.

One way in which people change their minds is though the assimilation of new information. That's fully compatible with my take on free will. Our prior state includes the decision making apparatus that evaluates and incorporates the new information. Our consistency as a persistent self has not been compromised, it's just been transformed by new information or a new way of thinking about things. We have changed, but in a way that we are 'built' to do. Given omniscience (which is impossible, but for the sake of argument), that transformation would have been predictable in principle and again for me that's not a problem. Someone who knew me well might have predicted that I would change my mind.

That is not a problem. There's a quote in a comment nearby from Godel that addresses this very well.

I suppose I am a compatibilist, but I object to the use of the term 'compatible'. I think some degree of determinism is _required_ in order to have free will. It's essential. Without it, 'I' am taken out of the chain of responsibility for my actions. If they do not flow from me, from my state, my memories, my decision making processes and if those things are not to some extent consistent, then those actions are not mine.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#107

Post by simonh » Thu, Nov 08, 2018, 9:10 AM UTC

fjuerfilis wrote: post #92

tylerjwilk00 wrote: post #63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There is a lot to respond to here (and I think you're looking for responses) so I am just gonna stick with what I think are the key points and be brief. > If you have a prior state that is in part systematic, and part random, is the randomness per se free will? Let's please replace random with uncertain. If _part_ of an entangled system is uncertain the _whole_ system is uncertain [1]. > Does that encapsulate the not…

The idea of free will sort of deriving from some properties of particles is interesting. I admit there's a lot to our understanding of things from a fundamental physical perspective that is lacking, so although I doubt it's the case I don't think it can be ruled out on a logical basis. I know I'm in the minority, but I object to the idea of responsibility actually, and prefer to think of change in a kind of "neurobeh…

>...I think the notion of responsibility (outside of a very strict causal sense, as in "this geological formation is responsible for this waterfall") is misguided, and also shifts focus away from change efforts, toward retribution.

My belief in determinism as a driver of free will is predicated entirely on the principle that without that there is no responsibility. Taking out determinism breaks the connection between my self, my persistent state, and my decisions. My choices have to come from me in a deterministic way, or they are not mine. I want to be responsible for my choices.

This is of course a mechanistic interpretation in the sense you describe, so it also leads me away from a retributive justice stance towards a rehabilitative stance even though I strongly believe in responsibility.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#108

Post by Doxin » Thu, Nov 08, 2018, 9:24 AM UTC

jatsign wrote: post #53

dmreedy wrote: post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'd say dualism absolutely solves this problem, or at least can provide the tools to do so. (I say all of this as a devil's advocate, and nothing more) Imagine that heaven exists, and is a kind of meta-universe that our reality is a subset of. It has access to a higher order of systems than those within its subset, and they can say things about truth that the reality subset cannot (because of incompleteness; a system…

Similar to your idea is Kant's "thing-in-itself", which is just a way of saying that for any given object, there are attributes to it we're not able to observe - indeed, attributes we can't even imagine. We're trapped in our brain, behind a wall of sensory apparatus. There's no reason to assume that our senses provide the complete totality of reality. And if there are aspects of reality we cannot sense, then there is…

Isn't that ignoring the fact that we can build tools to translate unsensable things into sensable ones? E.g. infrared cameras allow us to sense infrared which we normally aren't able to. Theoretically we should be able to build tools to sense anything which has an effect on the world. If it has no effect on the world then does it even exist?

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#109

Post by simonh » Thu, Nov 08, 2018, 9:25 AM UTC

intralizee wrote: post #69

simonh wrote: post #59

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think randomness really is a red herring. To the extent that a decision of ours is random, it is not ours. That doesn't necessarily absolve us of responsibility. In No Country for Old Men a guy flips a coin to decide if he will kill someone. He chose to flip the coin though - delegating a choice to randomness does not abrogate us of responsibility. By doing so he created the framework in which the outcome arrises,…

He did not make the choice to murder if all the previous states, linked together to the outcome and thus it couldn’t have been different. If I’m a product of every moment, where the previous moments factor into my current moment.. I would only consider myself free if I had full control before birth into how my life plays out. Nobody is making choices is what I observe everyday, only forces are occurring and under the…

>He did not make the choice to murder if all the previous states, linked together to the outcome and thus it couldn’t have been different.

To some extent yes, our choices and scope of action is constrained by our essential nature, some of which is determined before we are even born. However this doesn't absolve us of all accountability. It simply sets up a framework within which we can discuss what accountability is and how we want to manage it.

This is a difficult issue and I don't have all the answers about accountability, I see my take on it as my starting point for the discussion about it not the end. I believe in rehabilitative rather than retributive justice because of this. Also see my reply to fjuerfilis.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#110

Post by criddell » Thu, Nov 08, 2018, 12:33 PM UTC

cryptonector wrote: post #80

criddell wrote: post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Is that basically saying that at some level, we should be able to see effects that have no cause? Is that what freewill boils down to?

More like effects whose cause we can't ascribe... would have a free will component to their cause. It seems a bit silly because wherever you can ascribe a cause, there's no free will, so when is there free will?

> so when is there free will?

I open to the possibility that the answer is never.