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The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

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Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#91

Post by rocqua »

whack wrote: post #89
mreome wrote: post #85

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think simonh was not arguing against the chain of causation, but rather agreeing with it, and arguing against "If the future can be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" and in favor of "If the future can not be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" If an entity's decision process is is not not dependent and repeatable based entirely on it's internal state and per…

> I think simonh was ... arguing against "If the future can be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" Just so I'm understanding you correctly: Are you claiming that even if the future can be perfectly predicted, people can still have free will? At the moment of your conception, if I were to predict with 100% accuracy and confidence, every decision you will ever make in your life, would you st…

> even if the future can be perfectly predicted, people can still have free will?

Not OP, but essentially yes.

Things get weird if you use your predictions to influence what I do. But I'd say that takes away my agency, whilst keeping my free-will intact.

In general, those who claim determinism and free-will do not clash are called 'compatibilists'. Often, the argument is kind-of semantic. It starts with the idea that what most people consider 'free-will' is so ill defined we ought to work on the definition. It then follows that most definitions are very clear on whether we have free-will. Then, since most people feel like we have free-will, the definition that fits with that is chosen.

At least, that is the case for me. Personally, I think the real difficult discussion lies with the concept of 'x is possible' in a deterministic world. Here, I grasp for bayesian statistics.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#92

Post by fjuerfilis »

tylerjwilk00 wrote: post #63
fjuerfilis wrote: post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, I agree that is one model, but what I wrestle with ultimately I suppose is whether indeterminism per se is what defines free will, in part or whole. If you have a prior state that is in part systematic, and part random, is the randomness per se free will? Does that encapsulate the notion of free will? Maybe? But both of those are still causally deterministic in a sense, in that even with randomness, there's some…

There is a lot to respond to here (and I think you're looking for responses) so I am just gonna stick with what I think are the key points and be brief. > If you have a prior state that is in part systematic, and part random, is the randomness per se free will? Let's please replace random with uncertain. If _part_ of an entangled system is uncertain the _whole_ system is uncertain [1]. > Does that encapsulate the not…

The idea of free will sort of deriving from some properties of particles is interesting. I admit there's a lot to our understanding of things from a fundamental physical perspective that is lacking, so although I doubt it's the case I don't think it can be ruled out on a logical basis.

I know I'm in the minority, but I object to the idea of responsibility actually, and prefer to think of change in a kind of "neurobehavioral engineering" or transformative justice sense. That might seem pathological or even psychopathic (which is ironic because I'm anything but); I just mean that I think responsibility (like randomness maybe, at least with reference to free will) is sort of a red herring. It's one of the reasons I'm interested in free will issues, because I think the notion of responsibility (outside of a very strict causal sense, as in "this geological formation is responsible for this waterfall") is misguided, and also shifts focus away from change efforts, toward retribution. To me, punishing an individual for a crime out of retribution makes as much sense as punishing a car for breaking down; I'd prefer to see the individual "fixed" in the same way I'd prefer to see my car fixed. The primary obstacle to the former from my perspective is lack of knowledge, which will diminish rapidly with time whether we as a society want it or not. I think one of the biggest challenges we will face as a society in the next 200 years (assuming we don't disappear or devolve into a dark age) is how to integrate advances in neuroscience and psychology into our sense of justice and responsibility. E.g., if you could change a person completely for the better, is withholding that change unethical? What's the point of retributional justice then? Aren't you just shooting yourself in the foot, societally speaking?

This is all tangential to the paper, but I think issues of free will become critical when you are faced with the possibility of total change in an individual.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#93

Post by EamonnMR »

I've honestly had trouble understanding how one would go about defining free will in a way that it could be observed. I can explain how I made my decisions and non-decisions, I know the difference between freedom and duress, but I have yet to see a definition of what free will is meant to mean, and why I am supposed to have it, while dice, my phone, and a plant growing towards the sun are not. It probably also requires a strong definition of consciousness, right?

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#94

Post by TheOtherHobbes »

This is a subtle version of the Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc fallacy.

Assumption: free will is defined by unpredictability and indeterminacy. (Actually not a given. This is hotly debated, to put it mildly.)

Therefore if a physical system behaves in an intrinsically unpredictable way (quantum systems do...) it is showing evidence of free will.

If you start from the premise that the universe and everything in it is sentient (etc, etc) this makes perfect sense. Of a sort.

But it's not in any way a proof of that premise.

In fact it doesn't even come close to being a proof. All it does is take the long way around proving that constrained unpredictable systems are in fact unpredictable but constrained - something that's proven by Kochen-Sprecker anyway.

Then it pulls the free will rabbit out of the hat and says "Of course! This is just like human free will!"

I'm going to go with "no" on this one.

The irony is that KS is usually taken as a proof that quantum systems aren't just indeterminate, they're essentially partially unknowable. There is no possible one-to-one mapping between states and observables.

If particle free will existed there would either be a tighter constraint on the possible mappings, which would disprove KS, or the free will would be indistinguishable from quantum randomness, which makes it an untestable metaphysical epiphenomenon.

Either way it doesn't add anything to our understanding.

Of course if someone designs an experiment where particles use observables to signal their consciousness to human experimenters, I'll change my mind about that.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#95

Post by antidesitter »

fjuerfilis wrote: post #13
simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

I had a similar reaction. Nondeterministic conceptions of free will similar to that of this paper are really more like an intoxicated state or something, where behavioral outcomes are totally unpredictable. It's the absence of free will, but due to complete randomness rather than complete control. The prior state idea seems more accurate, but even that (at least in its extreme state) doesn't seem to me to encapsulate…

> a decision being undetermined

If a decision is undetermined, i.e. not determined, how can it be called a decision?

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#96

Post by antidesitter »

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

Also known as Free Will Requires Determinism [0]. There's an Existential Comic about it [1].

[0] http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/978...

[1] http://existentialcomics.com/comic/70

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#97

Post by waynecochran »

lastofus wrote: post #77
waynecochran wrote: post #72

Although, as we show in [1], determinism may formally be shown to be consistent, there is no longer any evidence that supports it, in view of the fact that classical physics has been superseded by quantum mechanics, a non-deterministic theory. I am surprised at the number of folks who still try to argue that science (particularly physics) has "proved" that these is no free will. This may in fact be true, but you can'…

The followup argument is usually something along the lines of quantum mechanics is just probabilistic as far as we know. Quantum physics doesn't allow for free will in an otherwise deterministic universe, any more than hooking up a RNG to a computer allows for the computer to have free will.

Not in my understanding. The probabilities are only involved when a quantum superposition collapses to a classic state. Note that the paper makes it clear that probabilities are not used anywhere in their argument.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#98

Post by [deleted] »

EamonnMR wrote: post #93

I've honestly had trouble understanding how one would go about defining free will in a way that it could be observed. I can explain how I made my decisions and non-decisions, I know the difference between freedom and duress, but I have yet to see a definition of what free will is meant to mean, and why I am supposed to have it, while dice, my phone, and a plant growing towards the sun are not. It probably also requir…

[deleted]

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#99

Post by whack »

rocqua wrote: post #91
whack wrote: post #89

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I think simonh was ... arguing against "If the future can be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" Just so I'm understanding you correctly: Are you claiming that even if the future can be perfectly predicted, people can still have free will? At the moment of your conception, if I were to predict with 100% accuracy and confidence, every decision you will ever make in your life, would you st…

> even if the future can be perfectly predicted, people can still have free will? Not OP, but essentially yes. Things get weird if you use your predictions to influence what I do. But I'd say that takes away my agency, whilst keeping my free-will intact. In general, those who claim determinism and free-will do not clash are called 'compatibilists'. Often, the argument is kind-of semantic. It starts with the idea that…

That's an interesting perspective. I don't agree with it myself, but I agree that it's impossible to resolve this discussion without a clear definition.

Personally, I define free will as having the ability to "change". To overcome your both your past self, and your environment. Ie, a billiards ball has no free will, because its motion is compelled by its past state, and by the environment around it. Similarly for cars, computers and every other inanimate object. Whereas a human can be said to have free will, because regardless of his past nature, and regardless of the environment around him, he still has the free will to transcend all that and do something wholly "unexpected". To me, that's what separates free will from an automaton. Hence why my definition of free will isn't compatible with determinism.

I appreciate your point though that others might define free will in a wholly different manner.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#100

Post by sooheon »

all2 wrote: post #38
sooheon wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> You are, at your basest existence, the ability to choose. A choice engine with a physical layer; a physical memory, physical emotion, the ability to think. But at your foundation, you choose. I don't see how this is at odds with the prior state view. You are a state machine. As time moves, you have no choice but to choose, and this is entirely dependent on your previous state and your current environment. The physi…

> You are a state machine. As time moves, you have no choice but to choose, and this is entirely dependent on your previous state and your current environment. This makes sense. There's no choice unless there's a dimension (some state variable) that can we can move in. We have stuff that can be state (matter and energy) and dimension (time) to move in. In terms of state, my argument is that choice is a core piece of…

I think we're in agreement, except that I believe that whatever capacity you have for choice is also stored as state. What you call state and choice, I might call state and procedures. Both are stored in the substrate of the brain as state, just like data structures and the code that operates on them are both stored as data.
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