Note that there is a difference between isolating devices and firewalling in the sense of packet inspection. You're still going to want selective routing and packet forwarding (like port forwarding). Firewalls will continue to be useful for complex devices that connect directly to the internet (like laptops on public wifi), where all sorts of things you wouldn't want others accessing are exposed by default.
What most consumers and sysadmins think of "Firewalls" and what the presentation are talking about are two different things. Simple packet filters like "don't allow communication on port 123 unless it's from IP a.b.c.d)" will always be part of a defense in depth strategy, but things like stateful packed inspection tools from big-name firewall vendors do not scale when the number of cycles they have to inspect a packe…
Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years
31–40 of 139 posts
Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years
#32Earlier quoted context omitted.
> AV How does Anti-Virus play into this as a counter to "minor tactics?" Are you expecting all end-users to personally verify all of their software? No matter how secure the network connection is, end-users need software to use their computers to do work/have fun/etc. Unless you have a completely closed system of 100% trusted software. If you're part of an organization like the NSA, that might be doable, but home use…
I would argue a publicly auditable software stack would be a strong alternative to the self audited stack. I run a completely open source OS and run all non open software on a machine I don't trust. If someone can't have that then surely it would at least be good to a system that doesn't autorun things automatically, and stops common attacks like bootloader virus, email virus, etc... I think AV is meant to deal with…
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/05/friday_squid_...
Here's what it takes to assure systems at every layer (skip to "the essence of security" para):
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/01/essay_on_fbi-...
That's what secure takes against even black hats these days. It can be simplified with a strong TCB, better hardware, and better languages + toolchains. The problem is that only a tiny few projects in FOSS are doing that and not many more in commercial. Whitelisting, stack canaries, AV, firewalls... this is all just added complexity around the root problem that hackers bypass regularly. It isn't security except against the incompetent.
Getting the real thing might require throwing away a lot of code or apps. Or virtualizing it on secure architectures with crazy good interface protections. That's why market as a whole won't do it. Good news is there's small players making such things: eg Turaya Desktop, GenodeOS, CheriBSD, Secure64 SourceT. We'll get more over time but it would help if waves of FOSS coders invested in stuff that provably works instead of what holds them back. GenodeOS, L4, and MirageOS communities are only ones I know doing it at endpoint these days.
Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years
#33Passwords are unsafe Passwords are unsafe for the same reason that roads are unsafe: human beings. Things work well enough for most people, most of the time. However, during certain situations, most people aren't trained correctly and often do the wrong thing. What's more, there's even an accepted culture of doing the wrong thing.
It still doesn't prevent users from being stupid w.r.t. writing down passwords, but it at least presents users with reasonably secure logins that are relatively easy to remember.
Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years
#34Passwords are unsafe Passwords are unsafe for the same reason that roads are unsafe: human beings. Things work well enough for most people, most of the time. However, during certain situations, most people aren't trained correctly and often do the wrong thing. What's more, there's even an accepted culture of doing the wrong thing.
Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years
#35Earlier quoted context omitted.
What most consumers and sysadmins think of "Firewalls" and what the presentation are talking about are two different things. Simple packet filters like "don't allow communication on port 123 unless it's from IP a.b.c.d)" will always be part of a defense in depth strategy, but things like stateful packed inspection tools from big-name firewall vendors do not scale when the number of cycles they have to inspect a packe…
[deleted]
Incorrect on both counts.
A) it's not a tiny latency, not compared to the overall system latency in many cases. This is explained in the article. The speed of light isn't getting any faster, whereas communication rates continue to increase. Which means you have more data on the line at once, which brings me to:
B) most data flows are finite - any reliable communications (such as, for instance, anything over TCP, and a good chunk of things over UDP as well), take a certain number of round trips to come up to speed. Which brings me to:
As such, the overall bandwidth of a TCP (or ghetto TCP via any other means - pretty much any reliable protocol suffers from this) connection is held up more by a fixed delay the faster the link is.
Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years
#36Earlier quoted context omitted.
> AV How does Anti-Virus play into this as a counter to "minor tactics?" Are you expecting all end-users to personally verify all of their software? No matter how secure the network connection is, end-users need software to use their computers to do work/have fun/etc. Unless you have a completely closed system of 100% trusted software. If you're part of an organization like the NSA, that might be doable, but home use…
I would argue a publicly auditable software stack would be a strong alternative to the self audited stack. I run a completely open source OS and run all non open software on a machine I don't trust. If someone can't have that then surely it would at least be good to a system that doesn't autorun things automatically, and stops common attacks like bootloader virus, email virus, etc... I think AV is meant to deal with…
One word: Heartbleed.
Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years
#37Thanks for sharing. Very interesting presentation. As soon as he said the browser is the new OS he lost me, but I understand he's coming from the Internet Industry. I completely agree that we need to design secure application architecture though, and that's why I am excited about languages like Go which facilitate a new client server model that doesn't involve the browser.
The browser took over that throne 10 or 15 years ago, with the rise of web 2.0. We make and download way, way more applications that run in web browsers (aka every web site) than applications that run on Windows, OSX, or any other OS.
Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years
#38"You can’t use firewalls to secure East/West data flows in the network." What does that mean?
If blade1 needs to talk to blade2, running it through a firewall means that the communications needs to flow out of the blade back to the datacenter network (ie. flowing north to the top of the rack switch). That adds latency and requires more network and firewall capacity, as all traffic needs to leave the chassis.
If there is no firewall requirement, traffic flows east/west within the chassis on the blade backplane. Security can be layered with host firewall or similar technology. (ie. IPSec, proprietary solutions like Unisys Stealth)
Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years
#39Thanks for sharing. Very interesting presentation. As soon as he said the browser is the new OS he lost me, but I understand he's coming from the Internet Industry. I completely agree that we need to design secure application architecture though, and that's why I am excited about languages like Go which facilitate a new client server model that doesn't involve the browser.
Today, I'm not on that team, but the number is something like 50-75. I cannot remember the last time I saw a new bespoke client/server app.
Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years
#40Firewalls are just some stupid crap industry made up and went with. We've known since the Orange Book days that security had to be done holistically involving every endpoint and network. Their standard for security was a strong TCB on endpoint with trusted path (see EROS or Dresden's Nitpicker); a network card with onboard security kernel, firewall, and crypto (see GNTP + GEMSOS); connections between networks through…
Because: that seems intuitively not to be the case.
To wit: on an annual site-wide pentest of any major enterprise network (this is a project every security firm does for a couple clients a year), the moment the pentester gets "behind the firewall" (ie: code execution on any application server) is invariably game-over.
If firewalls were just some stupid crap the industry made up, shouldn't they make no difference at all? Shouldn't attackers just make a beeline for wherever the high-value information is, rather than scanning the perimeter and looking for some chink to use to get behind the firewall?
My argument would be: whether firewalls are "stupid crap" or not, they certainly do seem to matter right now.