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Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years

etherealmind.com

21–30 of 139 posts

Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years

#21
post #17

Firewalls are just some stupid crap industry made up and went with. We've known since the Orange Book days that security had to be done holistically involving every endpoint and network. Their standard for security was a strong TCB on endpoint with trusted path (see EROS or Dresden's Nitpicker); a network card with onboard security kernel, firewall, and crypto (see GNTP + GEMSOS); connections between networks through…

> AV How does Anti-Virus play into this as a counter to "minor tactics?" Are you expecting all end-users to personally verify all of their software? No matter how secure the network connection is, end-users need software to use their computers to do work/have fun/etc. Unless you have a completely closed system of 100% trusted software. If you're part of an organization like the NSA, that might be doable, but home use…

re antivirus. It doesn't work: they dodge it constantly. They can also use it to improve their odds of beating it by tuning the malware against it. Need I say more about why its barely a defense?

Back in 1961, Burroughs designed a mainframe [1] that anticipated all these problems. They tagged their memory with bits to protect pointers or differentiate code vs data. That's two bits per word of data with almost no performance overhead if it's all you use. That system was immune to almost every attack modern malware uses for code injection. It was very successful for a while but the market eventually chose against it in favor of IBM et al's systems that did dumb, fast, data crunching with hardly any security. Market as a whole went that way.

So, the problem is code can be injected, the isolation mechanisms don't work, and the toolsets are insecure by design. Fix these to make security the easy default with attackers working in a straight-jacket. The CHERI [2] team and others are doing exactly that. Investments in such systems will increase their functionality. I've seen architectures that even do it with 2 bits like Burroughs did albeit with a different model. It's compatible with Windows architecture. What's lacking isn't technology or knowhow: it's willingness of industry and FOSS to adopt methods that work instead of mainstream methods that don't. Always been the problem. Putting backward compatibility and no rewrites ahead of everything else is the other huge contributor to insecurity.

[1] http://www.smecc.org/The%20Architecture%20%20of%20the%20Burr...

[2] http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/ctsrd/cheri/

Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years

#22
post #17

Firewalls are just some stupid crap industry made up and went with. We've known since the Orange Book days that security had to be done holistically involving every endpoint and network. Their standard for security was a strong TCB on endpoint with trusted path (see EROS or Dresden's Nitpicker); a network card with onboard security kernel, firewall, and crypto (see GNTP + GEMSOS); connections between networks through…

> AV How does Anti-Virus play into this as a counter to "minor tactics?" Are you expecting all end-users to personally verify all of their software? No matter how secure the network connection is, end-users need software to use their computers to do work/have fun/etc. Unless you have a completely closed system of 100% trusted software. If you're part of an organization like the NSA, that might be doable, but home use…

I would argue a publicly auditable software stack would be a strong alternative to the self audited stack. I run a completely open source OS and run all non open software on a machine I don't trust.

If someone can't have that then surely it would at least be good to a system that doesn't autorun things automatically, and stops common attacks like bootloader virus, email virus, etc...

I think AV is meant to deal with "minor tactics" like stopping things from autorunning or blocking common kinds of self replicating code and perhaps stopping known bad things.

That blacklist approach most AV takes can never guarantee security, but maybe some of the time it helps.

Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years

#23
post #17

Firewalls are just some stupid crap industry made up and went with. We've known since the Orange Book days that security had to be done holistically involving every endpoint and network. Their standard for security was a strong TCB on endpoint with trusted path (see EROS or Dresden's Nitpicker); a network card with onboard security kernel, firewall, and crypto (see GNTP + GEMSOS); connections between networks through…

> AV How does Anti-Virus play into this as a counter to "minor tactics?" Are you expecting all end-users to personally verify all of their software? No matter how secure the network connection is, end-users need software to use their computers to do work/have fun/etc. Unless you have a completely closed system of 100% trusted software. If you're part of an organization like the NSA, that might be doable, but home use…

I would argue a publicly auditable software stack would be a strong alternative to the self audited stack. I run a completely open source OS and run all non open software on a machine I don't trust.

If someone can't have that then surely it would at least be good to a system that doesn't autorun things automatically, and stops common attacks like bootloader virus, email virus, etc...

I think AV is meant to deal with "minor tactics" like stopping things from autorunning or blocking common kinds of self replicating code and perhaps stopping known bad things.

That blacklist approach most AV takes can never guarantee security, but maybe some of the time it helps.

Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years

#24
Passwords are unsafe

Passwords are unsafe for the same reason that roads are unsafe: human beings. Things work well enough for most people, most of the time. However, during certain situations, most people aren't trained correctly and often do the wrong thing. What's more, there's even an accepted culture of doing the wrong thing.

Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years

#25

Note that there is a difference between isolating devices and firewalling in the sense of packet inspection. You're still going to want selective routing and packet forwarding (like port forwarding). Firewalls will continue to be useful for complex devices that connect directly to the internet (like laptops on public wifi), where all sorts of things you wouldn't want others accessing are exposed by default.

What most consumers and sysadmins think of "Firewalls" and what the presentation are talking about are two different things. Simple packet filters like "don't allow communication on port 123 unless it's from IP a.b.c.d)" will always be part of a defense in depth strategy, but things like stateful packed inspection tools from big-name firewall vendors do not scale when the number of cycles they have to inspect a packet keeps getting lower, especially when they have fewer cycles to actually do basic I/O to get the packet through to the destination.

High performance networking means networking hardware has to get the packets moved faster, so there's less time to do processing on them.

Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years

#26
Firewalls fall into a dark category for IT -- cover-your-ass implementations done without questioning the problem-solution dynamic. For years, the cloud applications I work with have been slowed or made glitchy due to company firewall interference. I will not miss them when my users' experience improves by leaps.

Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years

#27
Thanks for sharing. Very interesting presentation. As soon as he said the browser is the new OS he lost me, but I understand he's coming from the Internet Industry. I completely agree that we need to design secure application architecture though, and that's why I am excited about languages like Go which facilitate a new client server model that doesn't involve the browser.

Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years

#29

> In the questions at the end, he points out the bug bounties are a PR Problem. When you pay a bug bounty and fix, the researcher needs to shutup instead of going public about the vulnerability. Of course, the researcher needs the publicity to build a business & credibility. So bug bounties are likely to die. Because security researchers need to build their business, they will find vulnerabilties and disclose them, n…

Bug bounty programs do not in general involve "shutting up the researcher". See the HackerOne disclosure page, for instance: https://hackerone.com/disclosure-guidelines

The "Disclosure Process" doesn't explicitly spell it out, because I think it's just the mental baseline assumption all the authors were operating under, but everything ends up disclosed in the end. It's just a matter of timing.

Perhaps sometimes things are hidden and never disclosed, but it is at least not the general policy.

(Disclaimer: I work for a company that is a bugcrowd customer; I chose HackerOne's policies as my point to avoid any entanglement. I'm not aware of anything we've ever permanently hidden, either.)

Re: Why firewalls won’t matter in a few years

#30
post #27

Thanks for sharing. Very interesting presentation. As soon as he said the browser is the new OS he lost me, but I understand he's coming from the Internet Industry. I completely agree that we need to design secure application architecture though, and that's why I am excited about languages like Go which facilitate a new client server model that doesn't involve the browser.

The browser took over that throne 10 or 15 years ago, with the rise of web 2.0. We make and download way, way more applications that run in web browsers (aka every web site) than applications that run on Windows, OSX, or any other OS.
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