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Secure yourself, Part 1: Air-gapped computer, GPG and smartcards

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41–50 of 62 posts

Re: Secure yourself, Part 1: Air-gapped computer, GPG and smartcards

#41
post #17

"quite possible that this kind of device will be the norm in 10 years" I want to believe this, but I just can't see people caring, ever. The worst has already happened. Edward Snowdon has exposed that government can, and does, look at you penis and we still don't care.

i dunno. you should be asking US companies are they feeling any impact in sales to non US companies, before drawing any conclusions.

Re: Secure yourself, Part 1: Air-gapped computer, GPG and smartcards

#42

I've read so many different multi-factor authentication schemes, and they're often brilliant, but I've yet to come across one that would pass the "my grandpa could use it" usability test. The holy grail for security, to me, will be something (an OS with it elegantly integrated for example) that the user has to try hard not to use, but doesn't feel like they're having an O'Reilly encryption book rammed down their gull…

I've only recently starting looking at this, but I think the Fido Alliance is doing good work in this direction:

https://fidoalliance.org/

Re: Secure yourself, Part 1: Air-gapped computer, GPG and smartcards

#44
post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't know how difficult it would be to obtain the key from the device. However, if you have a strong passphrase on the key itself, then even if an attacker obtained the key, there would not be a lot to worry about. Just revoke it and move on. They'll likely never guess the passphrase.

The passphrase you set on a GPG private key only applies to keys stored on-disk in the keychain or exported from the keychain. Once you import one into a Yubikey or other OpenPGPCard device, there is no passphrase anymore, you're relying on the card itself to protect it against side-channel attacks, prevent unauthorized or insecure export of the key (Yubikeys don't allow this at all though), and authorize the use of…

Thanks for that explanation. I've never placed any of my GPG keys on a Yubikey. I just assumed that the key password remained.

Re: Secure yourself, Part 1: Air-gapped computer, GPG and smartcards

#45
post #9
post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

For a little while, I used a YubiKey NEO-n as an OpenPGP smartcard, with gpg-agent running as an ssh-agent (so that my SSH key was only present on my smartcard). While great in theory, the authentication time made it totally impractical to connect to multiple servers at once. I know this doesn't invalidate the general idea of using gpg-agent as ssh-agent -- just an anecdote.

Can you elaborate on 'authentication time made it totally impractical' ? Does this mean it was slow? I'm using gpg-agent on osx with a neo-n to ssh into boxes and it's not noticeably slow.

Thinking on this again now, perhaps using a shorter key (I'm sure I would have chosen 4k RSA) would have helped. Regardless, I did find that connecting to 50+ hosts at the same time, most of them would hit my 3 second connect timeout with the neo-n and gpg-agent.

This is a somewhat unusual use-case, I will grant, but I also found a somewhat-noticeable delay in connecting to a single server, on the order of several hundred milliseconds.

I wonder if it would all be fine with a 2k key.

Re: Secure yourself, Part 1: Air-gapped computer, GPG and smartcards

#46

The airgapped computer loads propriety Chinese blobs to boot and is pulling it's encryption software over the network via HTTP.

Those instructions don't load any proprietary binary blobs - the boot loader is an unmodified official release of u-boot that you can compile yourself. The only things you need blobs for on this era of Allwinner hardware are 3D acceleration and hardware video decode/encode.

Re: Secure yourself, Part 1: Air-gapped computer, GPG and smartcards

#48

The airgapped computer loads propriety Chinese blobs to boot and is pulling it's encryption software over the network via HTTP.

Sure, but what code is the sd card running? All sd cards have drm protection (which interestingly, hasn't been cracked) and memory that isn't user accessible (see wikipedia), as part of the standard. And they are riddled with security vulnerabilities that allow remote code execution on them ( see http://www.bunniestudios.com/blog/?p=3554).

I mean that's a level of paranoia I usually don't hold to, but if you are going to go all out, I have to wonder if there is a more secure form of non volatile memory.

Re: Secure yourself, Part 1: Air-gapped computer, GPG and smartcards

#49
post #11
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Can you elaborate on 'authentication time made it totally impractical' ? Does this mean it was slow? I'm using gpg-agent on osx with a neo-n to ssh into boxes and it's not noticeably slow.

I got this just this second on my debian8 system. :~$ time ssh an6n@mybox exit real 0m1.910s user 0m0.024s sys 0m0.000s

Could you also list timings with just regular ssh-agent?

Re: Secure yourself, Part 1: Air-gapped computer, GPG and smartcards

#50
post #17

"quite possible that this kind of device will be the norm in 10 years" I want to believe this, but I just can't see people caring, ever. The worst has already happened. Edward Snowdon has exposed that government can, and does, look at you penis and we still don't care.

Looking at your penis is hardly the worst that can happen. People will really start to care when the data is used for a violent crackdown of a popular domestic political movement. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palmer_Raids

Or you know, maybe they'll care about the violent crackdown part?

What is it about technology where people think the failure was information, not the bunch of dudes cracking you in the head with rifle butts, the legislators who approved the action and the public which votes them into office (including all the people who say they're so outraged with everything they'll just refuse to vote or engage with the political process - because yeah, that's sure showing them).

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