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Housing markets: The spectre haunting San Francisco

economist.com

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Re: Housing markets: The spectre haunting San Francisco

#2
> "If local regulations did not do much to discourage creation of new housing supply [...] Costs would rise [...] And the value to the marginal resident would fall for two reasons. First, the marginal resident will definitionally be someone who is relatively indifferent between living in San Francisco and living somewhere else. Everyone more eager to live there would already have moved in."

That seems wrong. How much someone is willing to pay to live in San Fransisco isn't a measure of their "eagerness", but also a function of wealth. Marginal people in San Fransisco are also poor people who love the city, and are barely able to live there because they spend such a high proportion of their income on costs of living. Relative to their household income, they spend _more_ than someone not marginal to live in the city, but that wouldn't be reflected by their migration patterns. They're not less eager, just less rich.

Re: Housing markets: The spectre haunting San Francisco

#3

> "If local regulations did not do much to discourage creation of new housing supply [...] Costs would rise [...] And the value to the marginal resident would fall for two reasons. First, the marginal resident will definitionally be someone who is relatively indifferent between living in San Francisco and living somewhere else. Everyone more eager to live there would already have moved in." That seems wrong. How much…

Are you reading "marginal" in the sense of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marginal_concepts or in the popular sense of someone on the verge of poverty?

Re: Housing markets: The spectre haunting San Francisco

#4
post #3

> "If local regulations did not do much to discourage creation of new housing supply [...] Costs would rise [...] And the value to the marginal resident would fall for two reasons. First, the marginal resident will definitionally be someone who is relatively indifferent between living in San Francisco and living somewhere else. Everyone more eager to live there would already have moved in." That seems wrong. How much…

Are you reading "marginal" in the sense of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marginal_concepts or in the popular sense of someone on the verge of poverty?

In this case, those on the verge of poverty would also be marginal in the technical sense because a given price rise would cause them to choose to leave whereas those with more money might choose to stay because it's an easier choice.

The GP make simple and correct point - those with more money can wind-up choosing to buy something they "don't want that much" while those with less money overall money forgone things they very much want since they also need to eat.

Re: Housing markets: The spectre haunting San Francisco

#5
post #3

> "If local regulations did not do much to discourage creation of new housing supply [...] Costs would rise [...] And the value to the marginal resident would fall for two reasons. First, the marginal resident will definitionally be someone who is relatively indifferent between living in San Francisco and living somewhere else. Everyone more eager to live there would already have moved in." That seems wrong. How much…

Are you reading "marginal" in the sense of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marginal_concepts or in the popular sense of someone on the verge of poverty?

In this particular case, the word play (intentional or not) might actually be useful in explaining the problem. The idea is that, yes, for people who make the same amount of money, a completely free market distributes housing according to their desire to live in San Francisco versus some other place. But for people who don't make the same money, desire might not even factor in the equation. For a lot of people, being displaced from their homes because they can't afford it doesn't look like a cost-benefit analysis, it looks like well... being displaced. More crudely: as being thrown into the street and told to emigrate from a place where they have lived their entire life. While some software developer who could, theoretically, work from anywhere in the world, moves to the same apartment after deciding that "well, it's pricey, but nothing I can't afford, and the weather is nice". Economically, it might be efficient, in terms of say philosophical utilitarianism, it is inefficient (more overall misery than happiness is created, the developer didn't care about living in S.F. quite as much as the previous tenant cared about not being kicked out).

Not saying current rent control policies and development policies in S.F. are optimal (in the colloquial sense, economic sense or utilitarian sense), or that more housing in general should not be encouraged somehow. But the option of having zero rent control and letting the invisible hand of the market shove tens of thousands of people into the streets seems like a pretty bad solution, in addition to being a particularly callous one.

Re: Housing markets: The spectre haunting San Francisco

#6
>> "Maybe we simply come up with better ways to build and design cities..."

Reading that, I can't help but think that the canonically best methods for how to "build and design cities" have been pretty well understood for decades [0], if not much longer [1]. We in America have just been doing it wrong on purpose for quite a while (perhaps in order to goose suburban construction and automobile sales?) So the problem isn't lack of knowledge-how, but rather one of political organization to wrest control of the built environment from the groups and organizations that presently control it.

[0] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Death_and_Life_of_Great_Ame... [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8090190

Re: Housing markets: The spectre haunting San Francisco

#7

> "If local regulations did not do much to discourage creation of new housing supply [...] Costs would rise [...] And the value to the marginal resident would fall for two reasons. First, the marginal resident will definitionally be someone who is relatively indifferent between living in San Francisco and living somewhere else. Everyone more eager to live there would already have moved in." That seems wrong. How much…

I understand your point. I think in this case, the author is talking about a scenario where the price of rent in San Francisco drops dramatically to where it is no more expensive than anywhere else relative to the opportunities.

At which point, even people who would find themselves priced out of SF in today's market would already have moved to the city if they wanted to.

Re: Housing markets: The spectre haunting San Francisco

#8
The top-voted comment for the same piece in the Economist explores the rent-seeking behavior of SF landlords, the origins and the conditions that gave rise to Prop 13 in the first place and proposes a set of (albeit, I admit, a bit far-fetched) solutions:

  I am one of these SF oligarchs, and I benefit from high rents of 
  both types. Nevertheless, I have long called for an end to the 
  rent-seeking. To me, the problem started when the boomers of 
  old voted themselves two enormous market distortions over 30 years ago.

  Proposition 13 was sold as a means of keeping granny in her home, 
  but it does not particularly benefit the elderly, the sick, or the 
  needy. It benefits land owning incumbents (like me) at the expense 
  of everyone else. Kill it. Start with the grotesque subsidy for 
  commercial property, and then phase out the residential subsidy.

  Not to be outdone, SF renters voted themselves a rent control 
  ordinance. This also does not particularly benefit the elderly, the
  sick, or the needy. Like Prop 13, it benefits one thing only - 
  incumbency. I know fairly wealthy 50-somethings who have rented 
  apartments for decades, and now pay a third or a quarter of market 
  rates thanks to rent control. They keep these now as pied-a-terres, 
  while they own comfortable homes in Marin or the wine country. For 
  each one of these old renters, there are ten smart ambitious young 
  people desperate to contribute new creativity and energy into the 
  community if they could just find a room. Only the wealthiest of 
  these can compete for the few remaining market rate units, and they 
  must pay plenty of both kinds of rent, to people like me.

  This may be seem like daydreaming, but I hope Governor Brown and SF
  can someday create a grand bargain. Kill Prop 13 AND rent control 
  with the stroke of a pen.

  As for overall supply and demand, I would support a state law that creates
  1 - an estimate of statewide population growth
  2 - a requirement that every municipality periodically rezone to 
      accommodate a   portion of that growth proportional to its current 
       size; or
  3 - pay another municipality to take its share

  This would create something like a reverse cap and trade system to 
  manage the   supposed externalities of growth. This way, NIMBY cities 
  would have to pay growth-friendly cities, and NIMBY voters would have to 
  pay for their selfish rent-seeking behavior. Who knows? There might even 
  be less of it. [1]
[1] http://www.economist.com/comment/2358176#comment-2358176

Re: Housing markets: The spectre haunting San Francisco

#10

The top-voted comment for the same piece in the Economist explores the rent-seeking behavior of SF landlords, the origins and the conditions that gave rise to Prop 13 in the first place and proposes a set of (albeit, I admit, a bit far-fetched) solutions: I am one of these SF oligarchs, and I benefit from high rents of both types. Nevertheless, I have long called for an end to the rent-seeking. To me, the problem sta…

Something I'm coming to learn: for any bureaucratic system, those who are most capable of taking advantage of the system are the privileged. Every time we try to arrange a benefit for the poor, infirmed, disadvantaged, disabled, we create a tool for the more privileged to advance themselves. The poor hit a rough spot and they can't hold onto their homes – only the well off can hold their property for decades. Even rent control: who is most able to ward off an eviction? Who can access the legal system? Who can mount their own defense? Who can see the machinations of their own landlord and work in advance to counter? At every turn, when we make a rule, we give a tool to those who can work with rules; if those people were at one time not privileged, they are privileged now, and have been for some time.
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