Earlier quoted context omitted.
Chrome does do pinning, but ignores pins when the cert parent is a privately installed cert (because this is a "feature" used by many enterprises). """ Chrome does not perform pin validation when the certificate chain chains up to a private trust anchor. A key result of this policy is that private trust anchors can be used to proxy (or MITM) connections, even to pinned sites. 'Data loss prevention' appliances, firewa…
And the rationale: "We deem this acceptable because the proxy or MITM can only be effective if the client machine has already been configured to trust the proxy’s issuing certificate" I think that's fair, or at least it has traditionally been a fair assumption for most users. The issue here is that your hardware vendor has compromised your machine, so that is no longer a fair assumption.
On Mozilla, you can configure it to never bypass pining (security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level set to 2, see https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/Public_Key_Pinn... ); I don't know how to do it on Chrome.