This one sentence sums up what I think is the fundamental problem: "An insolvency problem was thus dealt with as if it were a case of illiquidity." That is, the problem isn't some ephemeral panic where people are temporarily unwilling to lend. The problem is there are massive capital losses that have yet to be acknowledged. The problem is that Euro politicians believe that by continuing to bankroll Greece they will s…
I disagree. The solvency problem is ongoing, even regardless of current debts. Greece cannot raise more taxes. It's trying, but taxes are declining. A government system can't be reformed in a few years and achieve 40% savings without (a) causing mass unemployment and knock on effects, further reduction in tax base, etc and (b) massive reduction in government services, including those necessary for economic activity t…
As a service provider, the state has 2 sources of revenue, primarily: private customers i.e. people, and corporate customers i.e. companies. Both those customer groups pay for services in the form of taxes. Now, those customer groups must be, by and large, wealth creators for there to be any wealth that can be taxed or even redistributed (if that is your political inclination).
So, it simply won't do to just reform the state, to spend less, etc. A system has to be put in place rapidly that boosts wealth creation. This includes: minimal bureaucratic lag in the creation of new companies (Chile, for example, enables new company creation within 2 days), very low taxes, easy interaction with regulation bodies, a business-friendly environment, etc.
If the state is too sclerotic to reform, it can be set up through free-trade zones in isolated parts of the country. This was China's route, when they essentially replicated Hong Kong in Shanghai, Shengzen, and all the other FTZs. It allows to you to be ultra-reformist in small experimental areas without putting at risk the power structures that exist in the state at large.