I enumerated all IPv4 PTR records a few years back, and I saw a couple XSS things there as well. If anyone wants to host that data set somewhere, let me know, would be interesting to see what others do with it. Edit: I found my data and have a grep running on it, will share what turns up. Edit2: Somewhat less exciting than I remember: $ fgrep -- '>' * x.x.101.130.csv:1298607746,155.92.101.130, .nebula.msoe.edu. x.x.1…
TXT Record XSS
111–120 of 236 posts
Re: TXT Record XSS
#112Earlier quoted context omitted.
Use the Kitchen Sink[1] record type. It's more appropriated than TXT. [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsind-kitchen-sink-0...
I saw "ASN.1" in the draft and immediately thought "over-engineered".
Re: TXT Record XSS
#113What's up with the search box?
Cleverness aside, it is practical when looking for XSS vulnerabilities because it's very obvious when you've succeeded in injecting your code.
Re: TXT Record XSS
#114The point here is that:
1. DNS TXT records can contain HTML, including scripts and whatever.
2. Domain registrants can publish arbitrary TXT records.
3. TXT records can appear in pages generated by web sites which serve, for instance, as portals for viewing domain registration information, including DNS records such as TXT records.
4. Thus, such sites are vulnerable to perpetrating cross-site-script attacks (XSS) on their visitors if they naively paste the TXT record contents into the surrounding HTML.
5. The victim is the user who executes a query which finds the malicious domain which serves up the malicious TXT record that is interpolated into the displayed results. The user's browser executes the malicious code.
Thus, when you are generating UI markup from pieces, do not trust any data that is pulled from any third-party untrusted sources, including seemingly harmless TXT records.
Re: TXT Record XSS
#115Earlier quoted context omitted.
Meh, interesting thought, but a few things come to mind: - It could take multiple days to update the website for the entire world - It would be very easy to spoof the entire site - It would probably slow down the rest of the queries the DNS server would be responding to at the time. Also, updating DNS can be a pain for sites that aren't managing their own records.
Used to work in the DNS business. "It will take up to 24 hours to propagate" is a way to manage expectations and prevent support calls from coming in within the first 24 hours after a DNS change, not a reflection of actual DNS propagation times.
Re: TXT Record XSS
#116So uh. This works on a few websites. A couple I've found http://dig.whois.com.au/dig.php?dom=jamiehankins.co.uk&type=... http://mxtoolbox.com/SuperTool.aspx?action=txt:jamiehankins....
I'm guessing nobody else noticed the Rick Roll in there too?
Re: TXT Record XSS
#117Wasn't expecting that at all! Had several tabs opened and was really confused for a few seconds while I tried to find the tab with 'youtube on autoplay'. Firefox needs to show the 'play' icon for the audio tag.
For what it's worth, Chrome tells you which tab audio is playing from, it's nice.
Re: TXT Record XSS
#118Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's really a hell. Average website over there is using at least 3 - 4 external domains for css, js, fonts and so. Getting a working website without nearly whitelisting many of them is highly improbable right now.
Yes but you gain a lot of interesting information about what's going on, plus you are back in control. Whitelist places you trust. Keep things blocked that you don't like. If that breaks the experience, walk.
Therefore I treat my desktop as a security research one. Of course I would not do that on my desktop I were really working with crackme binaries ;)
Re: TXT Record XSS
#119So uh. This works on a few websites. A couple I've found http://dig.whois.com.au/dig.php?dom=jamiehankins.co.uk&type=... http://mxtoolbox.com/SuperTool.aspx?action=txt:jamiehankins....
I'm guessing nobody else noticed the Rick Roll in there too?
The rickroll was the first bit I noticed o_0
Re: TXT Record XSS
#120Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's the point--who.is won't play music by itself. Its lookup of the DNS records of jaimehawkins.co.uk injected the music into the page.
Oh I see. This makes sense. This doesn't seem challenging to prevent. A simple replacement of characters on the HTML entity table would have prevented this instead of putting arbitrary text onto standard output.