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Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

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Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#21

Post by ubernostrum »

idlewords wrote: post #2

I wish there was a transcript to go with these slides, or some context. It looks like an amazing talk. One thing that jumped out at me right away is that the explosives sniffer is also configured to detect narcotics, amphetamine and marijuana. Is this standard procedure at American domestic airports?

TSA has more than a bit of scope creep going on. In theory, all they're supposed to do is a basic administrative search to prevent weapons or explosives from being brought onto a plane. In practice, the perception in the public mind that they are a more general law-enforcement body allows them to easily perform other tasks on behalf of agencies that don't have the same general search powers.

The classic example is searching for large sums of cash. Detecting large quantities of traveling cash and ensuring it's been properly declared is CBP's (Customs and Border Protection) job, not TSA's. But because TSA gets to X-ray and search every bag and body-scan every passenger, they catch that stuff, and then hold the passenger and go get CBP.

The result is that the number of outside-the-mandate things that can end up happening as an "incidental" result of TSA's screening is staggering.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#22

Post by jonlucc »

glenra wrote: post #16
stevefeinstein wrote: post #8

If this isn't the answer, and I'm not asserting it is or isn't. What is, and how do implement it. Or do you suggest if we scrap it all and go back to 1950's like airport security that the few incidents that are inevitable are an acceptable risk? I don't know the answer, but I'd like to have the conversation.

I do suggest we scrap it all and go back to the 1950s. Let people walk right out to the gate to meet arrivals. Let people run through the airport right to the gate without having to stand in a line at all. Even the level of security we had before 9/11 was misguided and caused more deaths than it saved. Here's all we should do: leave security policy up to the airlines themselves. Then there won't be the sort of single…

I'm not sure if it's true, but I've read that the airlines didn't want to have any part in security after 9/11 because of the liability.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#23

Post by rustyfe »

Implicated wrote: post #6
idlewords wrote: post #2

I wish there was a transcript to go with these slides, or some context. It looks like an amazing talk. One thing that jumped out at me right away is that the explosives sniffer is also configured to detect narcotics, amphetamine and marijuana. Is this standard procedure at American domestic airports?

They don't seem to be detecting marijuana in their currently configured state.

This isn't correct. They are checking for THC, tetrahydrocannabinol, the active ingredient in marijuana.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#24

Post by glenra »

jimmaswell wrote: post #17
glenra wrote: post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I do suggest we scrap it all and go back to the 1950s. Let people walk right out to the gate to meet arrivals. Let people run through the airport right to the gate without having to stand in a line at all. Even the level of security we had before 9/11 was misguided and caused more deaths than it saved. Here's all we should do: leave security policy up to the airlines themselves. Then there won't be the sort of single…

How exactly has airport security caused any deaths?

Airport security makes flying much more expensive (both in time and in money) and inconvenient and generally unpleasant than it would otherwise be. So many people who otherwise would take a plane on a short trip choose to drive instead. Some of those people die needlessly in traffic accidents, since driving is orders of magnitude more dangerous than flying. That's the primary mechanism of harm.

A common estimate I've seen is that roughly 500 extra people a year die due just to the added security costs post-9/11.

A little googling finds a few relevant popular-press articles including these:

http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-11-18/how-airport-...

http://www.wired.com/2012/04/is-airport-security-killing-500...

One of the relevant academic papers is by Cornell University researchers Garrick Blalock, Vrinda Kadiyali, and Daniel H. Simon, “The Impact of Post-9/11 Airport Security Measures on the Demand for Air Travel,” published in The Journal of Law and Economics in November 2007. (pdf here: http://dyson.cornell.edu/faculty_sites/gb78/wp/JLE_6301.pdf )

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#26

Post by glenra »

nfoz wrote: post #19
glenra wrote: post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I do suggest we scrap it all and go back to the 1950s. Let people walk right out to the gate to meet arrivals. Let people run through the airport right to the gate without having to stand in a line at all. Even the level of security we had before 9/11 was misguided and caused more deaths than it saved. Here's all we should do: leave security policy up to the airlines themselves. Then there won't be the sort of single…

Why would the airlines have incentive to provide good-quality security? Terrorism events are rare and it seems unlikely that a reasonable amount of security infrastructure that the airline could provide would result in a substantial decrease in the probability that a sufficiently-motivated terrorist would be successful with an attack against that airline. I just can't imagine we would get anything more than the airli…

What airlines are doing now amounts precisely to "a large amount of security theatre to meet appearances for the customers and appease the local regulations."

I want to decentralize for two reasons:

(1) it removes single points of failure. For instance, post-911, airlines needed to GET PERMISSION to make changes such as strengthening the cockpit door or changing the protocol for opening it. Being more flexible means being able to quickly adjust to changing security circumstances.

(2) It gives customers the OPTION of purchasing LESS security. So far as I'm concerned, the airlines I fly are already far more "secure" than they need to be - I would pay extra to fly on a plane with NO security, one where people could just walk on openly carrying a rifle if they so desired.

Were it left up to the airlines, they would have to make tradeoffs between security and every other value customers have including cost and convenience. We then wouldn't get somebody's idea of "the best possible security no matter the cost". Instead we'd get "the best possible security consistent with not spending too much money and not inconveniencing or annoying passengers very much." Which is what we really want.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#27

Post by raldi »

stevefeinstein wrote: post #8

If this isn't the answer, and I'm not asserting it is or isn't. What is, and how do implement it. Or do you suggest if we scrap it all and go back to 1950's like airport security that the few incidents that are inevitable are an acceptable risk? I don't know the answer, but I'd like to have the conversation.

Same plan we use to prevent terrorism at bus stations, beaches, and little league games.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#28

Post by raldi »

cookiecaper wrote: post #10
tehwebguy wrote: post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I vote to drop nearly all of it. The cockpit door is reinforced and locked, without the ability to take over the aircraft there is literally less risk than if someone just drove a bomb into an airport.

There's a risk that an aircraft will be bombed in-flight, which doesn't require access to the cockpit. Before 9/11, such bombings were the primary security concern as hijackings usually resulted in a hostage situation. It'd probably be wise to keep explosives screening.

If you want to kill 300 people, you can just blow up five buses. It's much easier than trying to blow up a plane.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#29

Post by tptacek »

idlewords wrote: post #2

I wish there was a transcript to go with these slides, or some context. It looks like an amazing talk. One thing that jumped out at me right away is that the explosives sniffer is also configured to detect narcotics, amphetamine and marijuana. Is this standard procedure at American domestic airports?

I wonder how the THC thing could possibly work. I opt out at every checkpoint, and each time, they maximize body contact and then generate an input to those machines. Wouldn't it go off for anyone who had smoked up earlier in the day, or the preceding day? It seems like they'd be spending all their time doing drug searches.

(Don't get me wrong: drug searches at TSA checkpoints are extremely alarming, because TSA has been given a near all-access pass to mechanically searching people).

Fun fact: if you do any welding before you get on a flight, there's a good chance you'll set those things off.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#30

Post by iancarroll »

scintill76 wrote: post #18
gsnedders wrote: post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> if someone just drove a bomb into an airport. Which is exactly what the 2007 attack on Glasgow airport was.[1] All major airports in the UK now have limited access to the front of the terminal building (typically, buses and taxis only). Most now have a drop-off zone in the car park. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Glasgow_International_Air...

Does moving the "attack zone" make any sense? What if someone bombs the car park -- will the airport stop allowing personal cars into it? I know I'm not the first to say this sort of thing, and maybe it's cliche, but really, what is there to protect at the front of the terminal, that is not just as vulnerable now in the car park? (Edit: I recognize the poster I'm responding to hasn't necessarily endorsed the authorit…

I assume the theory is that there will be less people in the car park then in the terminal.
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