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Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

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Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#11

If this isn't the answer, and I'm not asserting it is or isn't. What is, and how do implement it. Or do you suggest if we scrap it all and go back to 1950's like airport security that the few incidents that are inevitable are an acceptable risk? I don't know the answer, but I'd like to have the conversation.

I vote to drop nearly all of it. The cockpit door is reinforced and locked, without the ability to take over the aircraft there is literally less risk than if someone just drove a bomb into an airport.

> if someone just drove a bomb into an airport.

Which is exactly what the 2007 attack on Glasgow airport was.[1]

All major airports in the UK now have limited access to the front of the terminal building (typically, buses and taxis only). Most now have a drop-off zone in the car park.

[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Glasgow_International_Air...

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#12

If this isn't the answer, and I'm not asserting it is or isn't. What is, and how do implement it. Or do you suggest if we scrap it all and go back to 1950's like airport security that the few incidents that are inevitable are an acceptable risk? I don't know the answer, but I'd like to have the conversation.

I vote to drop nearly all of it. The cockpit door is reinforced and locked, without the ability to take over the aircraft there is literally less risk than if someone just drove a bomb into an airport.

I vote to go back to the way it was pre-9/11. The 9/11 hijackings were a one time play, that is, they changed the rules by which the terrorists play by, and therefore the passengers have changed the way that they will react to a terroristic threat aboard a plane. We have seen passengers are more than willing to stand up to those that pose a threat on plane in post-9/11 air travel.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I vote to drop nearly all of it. The cockpit door is reinforced and locked, without the ability to take over the aircraft there is literally less risk than if someone just drove a bomb into an airport.

There's a risk that an aircraft will be bombed in-flight, which doesn't require access to the cockpit. Before 9/11, such bombings were the primary security concern as hijackings usually resulted in a hostage situation. It'd probably be wise to keep explosives screening.

An in-flight bomb, though tragic, is much less of a threat, economic, social or otherwise, than an 'airplane-as-missile' into a populated area. So long as there is no access to the cockpit, the maximum effect of a terrorist's explosion is the downing of a plane, not the downing of a $1B 110 story building.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#15

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I vote to drop nearly all of it. The cockpit door is reinforced and locked, without the ability to take over the aircraft there is literally less risk than if someone just drove a bomb into an airport.

There's a risk that an aircraft will be bombed in-flight, which doesn't require access to the cockpit. Before 9/11, such bombings were the primary security concern as hijackings usually resulted in a hostage situation. It'd probably be wise to keep explosives screening.

Sure, but without taking over the craft and turning into a significantly more dangerous missile (a la 9/11) there is only as much risk as bombing a parking garage, mall, school or any other place with hundreds of people and virtually no security.

Not sure how much that logic actually applies to anyone trying to bomb stuff, though.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#16

If this isn't the answer, and I'm not asserting it is or isn't. What is, and how do implement it. Or do you suggest if we scrap it all and go back to 1950's like airport security that the few incidents that are inevitable are an acceptable risk? I don't know the answer, but I'd like to have the conversation.

I do suggest we scrap it all and go back to the 1950s. Let people walk right out to the gate to meet arrivals. Let people run through the airport right to the gate without having to stand in a line at all. Even the level of security we had before 9/11 was misguided and caused more deaths than it saved.

Here's all we should do: leave security policy up to the airlines themselves. Then there won't be the sort of single points of failure we have now. If one airline wants to reinforce the cockpit doors or arm the pilots they can just do that without getting permission from a central authority and making that the new mandated standard. Get rid of one-size-fits-all security. Let "convenient security" be just one more attribute that airline companies compete to provide, along with "comfortable seating" and "frequent flights".

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#17
post #16

If this isn't the answer, and I'm not asserting it is or isn't. What is, and how do implement it. Or do you suggest if we scrap it all and go back to 1950's like airport security that the few incidents that are inevitable are an acceptable risk? I don't know the answer, but I'd like to have the conversation.

I do suggest we scrap it all and go back to the 1950s. Let people walk right out to the gate to meet arrivals. Let people run through the airport right to the gate without having to stand in a line at all. Even the level of security we had before 9/11 was misguided and caused more deaths than it saved. Here's all we should do: leave security policy up to the airlines themselves. Then there won't be the sort of single…

How exactly has airport security caused any deaths?

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I vote to drop nearly all of it. The cockpit door is reinforced and locked, without the ability to take over the aircraft there is literally less risk than if someone just drove a bomb into an airport.

> if someone just drove a bomb into an airport. Which is exactly what the 2007 attack on Glasgow airport was.[1] All major airports in the UK now have limited access to the front of the terminal building (typically, buses and taxis only). Most now have a drop-off zone in the car park. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Glasgow_International_Air...

Does moving the "attack zone" make any sense? What if someone bombs the car park -- will the airport stop allowing personal cars into it?

I know I'm not the first to say this sort of thing, and maybe it's cliche, but really, what is there to protect at the front of the terminal, that is not just as vulnerable now in the car park? (Edit: I recognize the poster I'm responding to hasn't necessarily endorsed the authorities' action in this case.)

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#19
post #16

If this isn't the answer, and I'm not asserting it is or isn't. What is, and how do implement it. Or do you suggest if we scrap it all and go back to 1950's like airport security that the few incidents that are inevitable are an acceptable risk? I don't know the answer, but I'd like to have the conversation.

I do suggest we scrap it all and go back to the 1950s. Let people walk right out to the gate to meet arrivals. Let people run through the airport right to the gate without having to stand in a line at all. Even the level of security we had before 9/11 was misguided and caused more deaths than it saved. Here's all we should do: leave security policy up to the airlines themselves. Then there won't be the sort of single…

Why would the airlines have incentive to provide good-quality security? Terrorism events are rare and it seems unlikely that a reasonable amount of security infrastructure that the airline could provide would result in a substantial decrease in the probability that a sufficiently-motivated terrorist would be successful with an attack against that airline.

I just can't imagine we would get anything more than the airlines putting in a minumum amount of security theatre to meet appearances for the customers and appease the local regulations.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#20

I wish there was a transcript to go with these slides, or some context. It looks like an amazing talk. One thing that jumped out at me right away is that the explosives sniffer is also configured to detect narcotics, amphetamine and marijuana. Is this standard procedure at American domestic airports?

It's from blackhat USA 2014 (Aug 6/7), when the video is uploaded it should be posted here: https://www.youtube.com/user/BlackHatOfficialYT/videos
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