You can send encrypted emails to non-protonmail users, but they have to click a link and enter passphrases, and not to mention that the emails will expires?
Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland
31–40 of 71 posts
Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland
#32Earlier quoted context omitted.
I knew this is the first thing I would read. We are becoming pretty predictable. I tire of hearing this repetitively, every time somebody attempts to take this path, but I recognize you are doing it for anybody that is new and didn't hear the other warnings. Isn't the perfect the enemy of the good? Can we recognize that this is a good first step, and definitely constitutes a huge improvement over gmail/yahoo type web…
I don't know about the "perfect" and the "good", but the "trivially breakable" is definitely the enemy of "keeping secrets from governments".
You choose to ignore my point. Obviously you know about "perfect" and "better than gmail", right?
Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland
#33Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't know about the "perfect" and the "good", but the "trivially breakable" is definitely the enemy of "keeping secrets from governments".
You choose to ignore my point. Obviously you know about "perfect" and "better than gmail", right?
Then Gmail is more secure than this service, because Google's servers are pinned in browsers, so you can't compromise them by compromising any CA in the CA hierarchy.
Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland
#34Earlier quoted context omitted.
I knew this is the first thing I would read. We are becoming pretty predictable. I tire of hearing this repetitively, every time somebody attempts to take this path, but I recognize you are doing it for anybody that is new and didn't hear the other warnings. Isn't the perfect the enemy of the good? Can we recognize that this is a good first step, and definitely constitutes a huge improvement over gmail/yahoo type web…
Not in this case, I don't think. If there's a way to break encryption, even in the smallest way, then it's not really encrypted, and calling it "good enough" does a disservice to people who actually expect it to be flawless. Look at Lavabit, which was good but not perfect ... everyone thought they were protected enough , and then the government came knocking and all of a sudden the little gotcha of "Well, Lavabit did…
That's fair, and I do not want him to stop warning us. I recognize his expertise.
I just feel that these sorts of criticisms, that are not sandwiched with at least a little positive message, are keeping people paralyzed in gmail and yahoo and msn while they wait for perfection.
Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland
#35This appears to be a PHP wrapper around OpenPGP.js. If the encryption comes from Javascript loaded by browsers from the servers every time they visit the site, the encryption isn't "end to end". It's controlled by the server and can be broken by the server. Also: the RSA Security logo isn't the logo of the RSA algorithm; it's the logo of the company that sells RSA tokens.
I knew this is the first thing I would read. We are becoming pretty predictable. I tire of hearing this repetitively, every time somebody attempts to take this path, but I recognize you are doing it for anybody that is new and didn't hear the other warnings. Isn't the perfect the enemy of the good? Can we recognize that this is a good first step, and definitely constitutes a huge improvement over gmail/yahoo type web…
> Can we recognize that this is a good first step, and definitely constitutes a huge improvement over gmail/yahoo type webmail solutions?
No its not. "Browser crypto" in the form of JS is broken. There are many different possible attacks. So a false sense of security is actually worse then no security at all.
Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland
#36Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not in this case, I don't think. If there's a way to break encryption, even in the smallest way, then it's not really encrypted, and calling it "good enough" does a disservice to people who actually expect it to be flawless. Look at Lavabit, which was good but not perfect ... everyone thought they were protected enough , and then the government came knocking and all of a sudden the little gotcha of "Well, Lavabit did…
That's fair, and I do not want him to stop warning us. I recognize his expertise. I just feel that these sorts of criticisms, that are not sandwiched with at least a little positive message, are keeping people paralyzed in gmail and yahoo and msn while they wait for perfection.
What positive message are you looking for here? Are you just glad people are trying to protect people, even if they're failing?
Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland
#37Earlier quoted context omitted.
You choose to ignore my point. Obviously you know about "perfect" and "better than gmail", right?
Then Gmail is more secure than this service, because Google's servers are pinned in browsers, so you can't compromise them by compromising any CA in the CA hierarchy.
I don't really agree with this. Gmail is compromised by the NSA sending one email to Google.
Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland
#38Earlier quoted context omitted.
The JS doesn't appear to be compressed so it's possible to view source and see what exactly it's doing. So if it was actually backdoored, somebody will actually find out.
You can't just review "openpgp.min.js". You have to review every single Javascript input and every single DOM node , and any of them can alter the behavior of any other element of the Javascript runtime in subtle ways to subvert cryptography. And you have to do this every time you load any page on the site, and any time any of those pages asynchronously load any content. So, no, contrary to popular belief, this doesn…
Why can't browsers just build crypto primitives in that can be called from js?
I don't understand what people's obsession with browser crypto is...but I don't know enough about browser's to think of a reason this solution is bad. Any guidance?
edit: I understand that this won't solve all the problems...but at least the problem that you are constantly being served this chunk of potentially unsafe code.
edit2: I've been doing some thinking. Even though I didn't really get a response I think the reason is that it doesn't buy you the ability to do anything new safely. You still have the old problems of other dom elements mucking with your dom elements that control the code, or whatever the site does...so it doesn't really buy you anything...it's just work for nothing.
I still think it would be a useful start to one day having safe browser crypto
Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland
#39This appears to be a PHP wrapper around OpenPGP.js. If the encryption comes from Javascript loaded by browsers from the servers every time they visit the site, the encryption isn't "end to end". It's controlled by the server and can be broken by the server. Also: the RSA Security logo isn't the logo of the RSA algorithm; it's the logo of the company that sells RSA tokens.
I knew this is the first thing I would read. We are becoming pretty predictable. I tire of hearing this repetitively, every time somebody attempts to take this path, but I recognize you are doing it for anybody that is new and didn't hear the other warnings. Isn't the perfect the enemy of the good? Can we recognize that this is a good first step, and definitely constitutes a huge improvement over gmail/yahoo type web…
> Isn't the perfect the enemy of the good?
Yes, but neither of those descriptors apply to this product.
Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland
#40Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can't just review "openpgp.min.js". You have to review every single Javascript input and every single DOM node , and any of them can alter the behavior of any other element of the Javascript runtime in subtle ways to subvert cryptography. And you have to do this every time you load any page on the site, and any time any of those pages asynchronously load any content. So, no, contrary to popular belief, this doesn…
Why can't browsers just build crypto primitives in that can be called from js? I don't understand what people's obsession with browser crypto is...but I don't know enough about browser's to think of a reason this solution is bad. Any guidance? edit: I understand that this won't solve all the problems...but at least the problem that you are constantly being served this chunk of potentially unsafe code. edit2: I've bee…
It is a long story and has been discussed one million times on here at least. Google the answer or just trust that crypto in JS cannot be not because the implementation is hard but because it is not possible in principle.