Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland • Hacker News Board

Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland

#21

Post by fareastcoast » Fri, May 16, 2014, 8:36 PM UTC

rdl wrote: post #14

fareastcoast wrote: post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The JS doesn't appear to be compressed so it's possible to view source and see what exactly it's doing. So if it was actually backdoored, somebody will actually find out.

You can serve different JS to "special" users once. If you're smart, you run checks "for the security of the browser environment" first to make sure it's something unlikely to contain debugging capabilities, e.g. an unmodified iOS device. The site even helpfully asks you to identify yourself with ANOTHER username and passphrase first, making it even safer for the attacker.

An attacker would have to (1) Gain access to the server in Switzerland (without the admins noticing) or (2) Break the SSL and execute a MITM attack.

It seems ProtonMail actively scans the code on the backend for unauthorized changes. It's not 100% secure against a very determined attacker (NSA), but for the citizen that wants more privacy without the hassle of PGP, it's pretty good until we can replace SMTP.

Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland

#22

Post by cmpb » Fri, May 16, 2014, 8:38 PM UTC

Can I view the source of the actual program? If not, it doesn't serve much purpose to say that all the cryptographic libraries you use are open-source. Let me see the source and then I'll see about trying your product.

As an aside, I see other people on this thread talking about the well-documented problems of in-browser encryption/decryption. Could someone point me to a list?

Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland

#23

Post by sp332 » Fri, May 16, 2014, 8:38 PM UTC

fareastcoast wrote: post #21

rdl wrote: post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can serve different JS to "special" users once. If you're smart, you run checks "for the security of the browser environment" first to make sure it's something unlikely to contain debugging capabilities, e.g. an unmodified iOS device. The site even helpfully asks you to identify yourself with ANOTHER username and passphrase first, making it even safer for the attacker.

An attacker would have to (1) Gain access to the server in Switzerland (without the admins noticing) or (2) Break the SSL and execute a MITM attack. It seems ProtonMail actively scans the code on the backend for unauthorized changes. It's not 100% secure against a very determined attacker (NSA), but for the citizen that wants more privacy without the hassle of PGP, it's pretty good until we can replace SMTP.

Or (0) Be an admin.

Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland

#24

Post by sp332 » Fri, May 16, 2014, 8:40 PM UTC

pdx wrote: post #20

tptacek wrote: post #7

This appears to be a PHP wrapper around OpenPGP.js. If the encryption comes from Javascript loaded by browsers from the servers every time they visit the site, the encryption isn't "end to end". It's controlled by the server and can be broken by the server. Also: the RSA Security logo isn't the logo of the RSA algorithm; it's the logo of the company that sells RSA tokens.

I knew this is the first thing I would read. We are becoming pretty predictable. I tire of hearing this repetitively, every time somebody attempts to take this path, but I recognize you are doing it for anybody that is new and didn't hear the other warnings. Isn't the perfect the enemy of the good? Can we recognize that this is a good first step, and definitely constitutes a huge improvement over gmail/yahoo type web…

tptacek doesn't seem to be "spitting". He just pointed out that the crypto can be broken by the server so this doesn't count as end-to-end crypto.

Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland

#25

Post by tptacek » Fri, May 16, 2014, 8:43 PM UTC

pdx wrote: post #20

tptacek wrote: post #7

This appears to be a PHP wrapper around OpenPGP.js. If the encryption comes from Javascript loaded by browsers from the servers every time they visit the site, the encryption isn't "end to end". It's controlled by the server and can be broken by the server. Also: the RSA Security logo isn't the logo of the RSA algorithm; it's the logo of the company that sells RSA tokens.

I knew this is the first thing I would read. We are becoming pretty predictable. I tire of hearing this repetitively, every time somebody attempts to take this path, but I recognize you are doing it for anybody that is new and didn't hear the other warnings. Isn't the perfect the enemy of the good? Can we recognize that this is a good first step, and definitely constitutes a huge improvement over gmail/yahoo type web…

I don't know about the "perfect" and the "good", but the "trivially breakable" is definitely the enemy of "keeping secrets from governments".

Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland

#26

Post by bjoernw » Fri, May 16, 2014, 8:43 PM UTC

hglaser wrote: post #19

Is "Based in Switzerland" relevant in this case? I know their government is historically neutral in major wars. Are they also a good place to base security-minded companies?

And whose banks are currently releasing the names of tax evaders to every country that wants to know... Not saying that's in any way unjust but it does hurt Switzerland's reputation for being that anonymous safe haven.

Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland

#27

Post by tptacek » Fri, May 16, 2014, 8:43 PM UTC

fareastcoast wrote: post #21

rdl wrote: post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can serve different JS to "special" users once. If you're smart, you run checks "for the security of the browser environment" first to make sure it's something unlikely to contain debugging capabilities, e.g. an unmodified iOS device. The site even helpfully asks you to identify yourself with ANOTHER username and passphrase first, making it even safer for the attacker.

An attacker would have to (1) Gain access to the server in Switzerland (without the admins noticing) or (2) Break the SSL and execute a MITM attack. It seems ProtonMail actively scans the code on the backend for unauthorized changes. It's not 100% secure against a very determined attacker (NSA), but for the citizen that wants more privacy without the hassle of PGP, it's pretty good until we can replace SMTP.

The same thing is true of a mail server in Switzerland that uses TLS and doesn't use clientside encryption.

Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland

#28

Post by acabal » Fri, May 16, 2014, 8:46 PM UTC

pdx wrote: post #20

tptacek wrote: post #7

This appears to be a PHP wrapper around OpenPGP.js. If the encryption comes from Javascript loaded by browsers from the servers every time they visit the site, the encryption isn't "end to end". It's controlled by the server and can be broken by the server. Also: the RSA Security logo isn't the logo of the RSA algorithm; it's the logo of the company that sells RSA tokens.

I knew this is the first thing I would read. We are becoming pretty predictable. I tire of hearing this repetitively, every time somebody attempts to take this path, but I recognize you are doing it for anybody that is new and didn't hear the other warnings. Isn't the perfect the enemy of the good? Can we recognize that this is a good first step, and definitely constitutes a huge improvement over gmail/yahoo type web…

Not in this case, I don't think. If there's a way to break encryption, even in the smallest way, then it's not really encrypted, and calling it "good enough" does a disservice to people who actually expect it to be flawless.

Look at Lavabit, which was good but not perfect... everyone thought they were protected enough, and then the government came knocking and all of a sudden the little gotcha of "Well, Lavabit did have access to your data after all, even though they promised not to look and also be really careful about their encryption keys" is the crack they use to blow the entire thing open. (Though that was a pretty damn big crack, admittedly.)

If there's a way to break in, then it will be broken in to--and then "good enough" all of a sudden becomes "tragically and dangerously broken" for the kinds of people who trusted it the most: activists, whistleblowers, informants, political radicals, etc.

Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland

#29

Post by yuhong » Fri, May 16, 2014, 8:47 PM UTC

tptacek wrote: post #15

fareastcoast wrote: post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The JS doesn't appear to be compressed so it's possible to view source and see what exactly it's doing. So if it was actually backdoored, somebody will actually find out.

You can't just review "openpgp.min.js". You have to review every single Javascript input and every single DOM node , and any of them can alter the behavior of any other element of the Javascript runtime in subtle ways to subvert cryptography. And you have to do this every time you load any page on the site, and any time any of those pages asynchronously load any content. So, no, contrary to popular belief, this doesn…

I wonder if XHTML would make sense here, to make XSS attacks more difficult.

Re: Show HN: End-to-end encrypted email, based in Switzerland

#30

Post by brute » Fri, May 16, 2014, 8:48 PM UTC

cmpb wrote: post #22

Can I view the source of the actual program? If not, it doesn't serve much purpose to say that all the cryptographic libraries you use are open-source. Let me see the source and then I'll see about trying your product. As an aside, I see other people on this thread talking about the well-documented problems of in-browser encryption/decryption. Could someone point me to a list?

http://www.wired.com/2012/08/wired_opinion_patrick_ball/all/ It's about cryptocat (secure chat) but the same principles apply. Note that cryptocat has switched to a browser addon-based design afterwards.