LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back • Hacker News Board

Re: LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back

#61

Post by protomyth » Wed, Apr 23, 2014, 9:03 PM UTC

mburns wrote: post #56

protomyth wrote: post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What isn't simple about Red Hat paying a third-party to write some software and get it certified? Other companies are doing it for themselves, surely Red Hat can find someone qualified.

Just "write some software and get it certified"? Sounds so simple, why doesn't everyone do it? Because it isn't just getting a body of code certified once. Someone has to maintain that specific code and either upstream or backport important changes which require a re-certification, neither of which LibreSSL is interested in helping with.

"Sounds so simple, why doesn't everyone do it?"

Well, need & money, both of which Red Hat has. I am unclear how a company that maintains an enterprise distribution and writes a lot of code cannot find the folks needed to do FIPS if it is that important for their government contracts.

Re: LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back

#62

Post by personZ » Wed, Apr 23, 2014, 9:15 PM UTC

andrewvc wrote: post #3

The OpenBSD people sure are abrasive, but they deserve a ton of praise for taking on a tough task that no one else was willing to do, and for fixing the damn mess. Between FIPS, the NIST and the OpenSSL foundation it's amazing that crypto even works.

but they deserve a ton of praise for taking on a tough task that no one else was willing to do

There seemed to be some serious momentum behind getting proper resources and financing in place for a real effort that the project deserves, but all of that dissolved when this team started making a lot of sound and fury about their fork of something purportedly "beyond fixing".

Aside from several incidents of spite-driven commits that were simply wrong (and dangerous), it is unfortunate that so many people who worked so hard on such an important project are treated so poorly, everyone rushing to condemn the code as was.

Re: LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back

#63

Post by cptskippy » Wed, Apr 23, 2014, 9:49 PM UTC

Spooky23 wrote: post #29

andrewvc wrote: post #3

The OpenBSD people sure are abrasive, but they deserve a ton of praise for taking on a tough task that no one else was willing to do, and for fixing the damn mess. Between FIPS, the NIST and the OpenSSL foundation it's amazing that crypto even works.

This stance is counterproductive in my eyes. Lots of security standards, including state/local government and some healthcare environments require FIPS compliance. FIPS isn't perfect, but screens out low-quality crypto implementations that most organizations lack the expertise to evaluate. Dual_EC and that ilk is obviously a serious problem, but FIPS validation addresses other pertinent problems -- like my doctor's o…

They point they were making that wasn't clearly elaborated upon is that the code in OpenSSL for FIPS compliance is a charade and is only there to satisfy FIPS requirements. The presence of that code doesn't guarantee or ensure the anything.

These compliance standards generally exist to deflect liability in the event of a breech and aren't necessarily there to protect anything. Take PCI for example, much of the DSS requirements are verified by audit and if you've ever gone through the audit, it's mostly certification without verification. The auditor usually trusts that things like segmentation diagrams are accurate. There's a level of accountability but it's primarily about deflecting liability.

Re: LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back

#64

Post by [deleted] » Wed, Apr 23, 2014, 10:21 PM UTC

andrewvc wrote: post #3

The OpenBSD people sure are abrasive, but they deserve a ton of praise for taking on a tough task that no one else was willing to do, and for fixing the damn mess. Between FIPS, the NIST and the OpenSSL foundation it's amazing that crypto even works.

[deleted]

Re: LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back

#65

Post by Spooky23 » Wed, Apr 23, 2014, 11:30 PM UTC

x0x0 wrote: post #39

Spooky23 wrote: post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This stance is counterproductive in my eyes. Lots of security standards, including state/local government and some healthcare environments require FIPS compliance. FIPS isn't perfect, but screens out low-quality crypto implementations that most organizations lack the expertise to evaluate. Dual_EC and that ilk is obviously a serious problem, but FIPS validation addresses other pertinent problems -- like my doctor's o…

Nonsense. What would you do if you where the NSA and you've now been repeatedly caught lying, bribing (RSA dual ec), and backdooring (dual ec) security software? At this point, you have a problem: working for the nsa probably taints you in the eyes of many, and nobody (rightly) trust you. But what nation states do have is money and bribery. So you do two things: you attempt to subvert (oh, your brother got busted for…

You're conflating two issues.

FIPS validation means that you're using a reasonable set of algorithms. Like any standard they are imperfect and their development lags the state of the art in some cases. In my daily business, I worry more about casual incompetence, as it has a more direct affect on my boring daily life.

Re: Your rant about the NSA bribing people, etc.

Why do you magically trust OpenBSD? Much of the projects early funding was via DARPA. Whose to say the project leaders aren't NSA plants?

Re: LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back

#66

Post by mpyne » Wed, Apr 23, 2014, 11:30 PM UTC

bradleyjg wrote: post #10

SEJeff wrote: post #5

This basically means libressl can not be used by the US Govt or any contractor working with the US Govt, which is a HUGE number of companies. By proxy, it means that libressl will not make its way into Fedora or RHEL, which also limits the adoption of it a fair bit. Perhaps the solution is to fix FIPS instead of berating the people forced to use it.

I don't think lobbying the US Federal government is in OpenBSD developers' wheelhouse. Contractors working with the US government on the other hand have a long, distinguished history of successfully doing just that. In fact, that's largely the entire business model. So it makes a lot of sense for each party to do what they are good at: OpenBSD developers write a clean, secure library, and contractors lobby to be allo…

I think OpenBSD has actually done contracted work for various U.S. government agencies. But on the other hand, I'm pretty sure that's the reason they've already ripped FIPS out and washed their hands of it... working on government projects is not fun and it's exactly the kind of thing they should outsource if they can.

Re: LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back

#67

Post by dfc » Wed, Apr 23, 2014, 11:48 PM UTC

newman314 wrote: post #45

Spooky23 wrote: post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This stance is counterproductive in my eyes. Lots of security standards, including state/local government and some healthcare environments require FIPS compliance. FIPS isn't perfect, but screens out low-quality crypto implementations that most organizations lack the expertise to evaluate. Dual_EC and that ilk is obviously a serious problem, but FIPS validation addresses other pertinent problems -- like my doctor's o…

Compliance is needed just so that you can get it checked off on a list. It does not necessarily mean that you are safer. It could mean better safety but does not guarantee it. What it does provide is that in the wake of an incident, the ability to say: "Hey! But I was PCI, FIPS, HIPAA, FedRamp etc. compliant!"

It Provides: significant mitigation of civil liability

I realize it does not mesh well with the narrative you are trying to advance but take a look at the difference in HIPAA fines for an individual/organization that demonstrated reasonable diligence and another that willfully neglected HIPAA:

                        Per violation  Annual Maximum
  Reasonable Diligence  $100           $25,000
  Willful Neglect       $50,000        $1,500,000

http://www.ama-assn.org//ama/pub/physician-resources/solutio...

Re: LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back

#68

Post by sjwright » Wed, Apr 23, 2014, 11:50 PM UTC

newman314 wrote: post #45

Spooky23 wrote: post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This stance is counterproductive in my eyes. Lots of security standards, including state/local government and some healthcare environments require FIPS compliance. FIPS isn't perfect, but screens out low-quality crypto implementations that most organizations lack the expertise to evaluate. Dual_EC and that ilk is obviously a serious problem, but FIPS validation addresses other pertinent problems -- like my doctor's o…

Compliance is needed just so that you can get it checked off on a list. It does not necessarily mean that you are safer. It could mean better safety but does not guarantee it. What it does provide is that in the wake of an incident, the ability to say: "Hey! But I was PCI, FIPS, HIPAA, FedRamp etc. compliant!"

It means that senior executives can wash their hands of the matter. They did their job correctly, they'll argue.

Re: LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back

#69

Post by ballard » Wed, Apr 23, 2014, 11:52 PM UTC

FIPS mode is as my grandfather would say: "eyewash." Something that appears to address something by doesn't. (FIPS mode is a "clipboard audit.")

Re: LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back

#70

Post by ballard » Wed, Apr 23, 2014, 11:54 PM UTC

This is great news.

FIPS mode is as my grandfather would say: "eyewash." Something that appears to address something by checking boxes on a clipboard audit but doesn't provide anything but security theater.