Earlier quoted context omitted.
My understanding is the FIPS requires that the SSL library implements a certain suite of protocols (including the Dual EC DRBG discussed in the linked mailing list post) which have known cryptographic weaknesses.
This is not true. FIPS requires that any 'approved' included crypto algorithm implementations are self-tested, and pass a verification program (just a big bunch of somewhat poorly conceived known answer tests). It also has a list of 'allowed' algorithms, which don't need to be tested but can be offered by a FIPS crypto module. The CSPRNG used for key generation must be of an approved construction, but there are a num…
If I understand you correctly, the issue with FIPS is that you would have to be able to disable all but a subset of the features, regardless of these feature being worse or better than what is defined in the FIPS documents?
That's a bit more that one question, but I would like to know. Thanks.