11–20 of 98 posts
For those who don't know what FIPS mode is (like me): https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NS...
Thank you for the primer. Can anybody comment as to why FIPS mode in OpenSSL is considered harmful?
For those who don't know what FIPS mode is (like me): https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NS...
Thank you for the primer. Can anybody comment as to why FIPS mode in OpenSSL is considered harmful?
"FIPS support" also demands configurations that rule out some cryptography, some of it bad, some of it reasonable. FIPS support doesn't require OpenSSL not to implement those algorithms, but it does require a mode of operation that does.
Against that complexity, the only win is the ability to deploy the FIPS-compliant code in FedGov settings, which is something that an OpenBSD fork of OpenSSL doesn't need to do to be successful.
For those who don't know what FIPS mode is (like me): https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NS...
Thank you for the primer. Can anybody comment as to why FIPS mode in OpenSSL is considered harmful?
Here's the bug I submitted to the chromium project while I beta tested the Cr-48, requesting FIPS support. The closeout comments cite excellent sources. Interesting that this was done right about the time the Heartbleed bug was probably being found as well.
This basically means libressl can not be used by the US Govt or any contractor working with the US Govt, which is a HUGE number of companies. By proxy, it means that libressl will not make its way into Fedora or RHEL, which also limits the adoption of it a fair bit. Perhaps the solution is to fix FIPS instead of berating the people forced to use it.
Yes, and the way to fix FIPS is to refuse to support it until it gets fixed.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Thank you for the primer. Can anybody comment as to why FIPS mode in OpenSSL is considered harmful?
My understanding is the FIPS requires that the SSL library implements a certain suite of protocols (including the Dual EC DRBG discussed in the linked mailing list post) which have known cryptographic weaknesses.
This basically means libressl can not be used by the US Govt or any contractor working with the US Govt, which is a HUGE number of companies. By proxy, it means that libressl will not make its way into Fedora or RHEL, which also limits the adoption of it a fair bit. Perhaps the solution is to fix FIPS instead of berating the people forced to use it.
That's also a huge number of people (and companies).
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Thank you for the primer. Can anybody comment as to why FIPS mode in OpenSSL is considered harmful?
My understanding is the FIPS requires that the SSL library implements a certain suite of protocols (including the Dual EC DRBG discussed in the linked mailing list post) which have known cryptographic weaknesses.
[seems like an aweful lot of people, including me, trust it regardless]
I did some consulting once for a government lab. FIPS is idiotic. It's primarily protectionism for commercial software vendors from OSS competition, and it does not improve security. If anything it hurts-- it mandates closed-source options that cannot easily be audited, and it slows down the upgrade cycle thus preventing bugs that emerge from being quickly patched.
This. It's also protectionism for government IA managers. And it stymies the hell out of anyone trying to do research on a budget, which often depends on open source (for both review, quality and cost reasons).
The OpenBSD people sure are abrasive, but they deserve a ton of praise for taking on a tough task that no one else was willing to do, and for fixing the damn mess. Between FIPS, the NIST and the OpenSSL foundation it's amazing that crypto even works.
Abrasiveness and a willingness to ruffle the feathers of purveyors of bogus security is a public service.