The Idiot's Guide to High Frequency Trading
81–90 of 99 posts
Re: The Idiot's Guide to High Frequency Trading
#82Earlier quoted context omitted.
So then, it is basically a bait trap to exploit those without the wherewithal. That's a quite different proposition than the standard claim that HFT benefits everybody (even the mediocre participants) by lowering spreads and making the market more "efficient." "Scammy" might be a loaded word. In any case, I'd like to hear a sensible purpose to the inverted fee structure.
Inverted fee structures allow the maker to value fill priority over rebate. In a maker taker structure the net price paid is higher on an inverted venue therefore implicitly allowing them a higher spot in the virtual cross-venue line (although not guaranteed). Takers who get paid at inverted venues understand and are compensated by rebate for the information they provide to the market. Their net price is less than wh…
And if mom's broker doesn't understand that the taker rebate leaks more information than its worth, that's just tough on mom. Mom can't just get a better broker, she's locked into her IRA through the workplace. This is a zero-sum game with some people on the take while mom & pop get the shaft.
Re: The Idiot's Guide to High Frequency Trading
#83Earlier quoted context omitted.
No longer available on lit US equities. A failed experiment by exchanges to compete with internalizers by providing the opportunity for price improvement to those orders who elect to be shown to participants prior to posting or taking. Can you think of one active in today's market?
On which instruments are flash orders still operational?
Re: The Idiot's Guide to High Frequency Trading
#84Earlier quoted context omitted.
Along these lines, a note on so-called latency arbitrage: http://web.eecs.umich.edu/srg/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ec3... But in a study last year, University of Michigan professor Michael Wellman and I developed a model across two exchanges. We examined a strategy called latency arbitrage, which utilizes advantages in access and response time to exploit price disparities caused by fragmentation across those dozens o…
Lets say we go to a call structure. Will there be competitive pressure to go back to a continuous market? For example, lets say you demand all U.S. exchanges go to a call structure. Would there be reason for me to go to London and open up a new continuous market?
But IMHO the issue is not so much here understanding all of the -N- ways to regulate the problem. It's helpful in the first instance to have clear articulations of the problem you need to consider. Market micro-structure is like taxes. It's almost impossible to generalize an answer. An "actual answer" will entail a level of detail and laywers fees that is prohibitive to discuss "for fun" =D. We can apply this critique to all of these academic papers too: they are abstractions and model-markets. The actual particulars of any given order routing...etc.
So what is the purpose of this even being posted? It is simply to illustrate how sub-optimal outcomes are possible on a whiteboard. The general takeaway is there is a problem (worsening equilibrium) and a solution (improving one) that relate to tweeking the variables (timing/trade sequencing) discussed upthread. Those are not purely neutral or unrelated to welfare outcomes.
It helps to have someone else spell it out sometimes. Both to save the brain damage of spelling it out in HN comments, and also to provide some fresh voices to the dialogue.
Re: The Idiot's Guide to High Frequency Trading
#85Earlier quoted context omitted.
Inverted fee structures allow the maker to value fill priority over rebate. In a maker taker structure the net price paid is higher on an inverted venue therefore implicitly allowing them a higher spot in the virtual cross-venue line (although not guaranteed). Takers who get paid at inverted venues understand and are compensated by rebate for the information they provide to the market. Their net price is less than wh…
Well who does want to stand in front of a truck? That's the risk every participant takes, "makers" should have to eat it just like everyone else. Not conspire to invent umpteen different order types and fee structures which enable them to shirk the risk and skim off mom & pop's retirement fund any time the market starts to look shaky. And if mom's broker doesn't understand that the taker rebate leaks more information…
http://insider.thomsonreuters.com/link.html?cn=share&cid=122...
Traders who post orders have no negative obligations in the current market structure. In previous years market makers were given special privileges for negative obligations. The best known example were NYSE specialists. A specialist post at the NYSE was extremely lucrative. If you believe previous short-term intermediaries made no money you should consider that Goldman bought SLK, a large well known specialist, for 6 billion. They recently sold the unit off for 30 million. In 2014 HFT profits IN TOTAL are estimated to be between 1 and 1.5 billion (http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rbc-capital-markets-...).
Market makers with negative objects and special privileges has lost out as a model to non-contracted market makers who post liquidity. The posted liquidity is very real and completely tradeable. RBC's Thor smart order router is proof of this as it achieves 100% fill rates (http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rbc-capital-markets-...)
With respect to Mom & Pop, you should investigate what an internalizer is. Nearly 100% of all retail order flow is sold to a wholesaler. Wholesalers like Knight, UBS, etc trade with that flow and provide payment to the broker to do so. Mom & Pop who submit an order from Fidelity or Ameritrade get amazing execution. If you read about and follow the current debate, you'll find that no one is disputing this. What they are disputing is whether buy-side institutions (for example, Mutual Funds) acting indirectly on behalf of Mom & Pop are being disadvantaged. I argue that these institutions have a responsibility and the capability to select competent brokers to execute their large trades. They ARE professionals, after all. Lest you think ALL buy side firms dislike HFT I refer you to Vanguard's comment letter to the SEC, which you can find here: http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-122.pdf In it you'll find a firm with about 2.5 trillion under management disagreeing to a large extent that HFT is bad. Finally, with respect to retail brokerages, you can read Charles Schwab perplexing condemnation of HFT here: http://pressroom.aboutschwab.com/press-release/corporate-and... This is from a firm that sells nearly all of its order flow to UBS for internalization within its dark pool by HFT and other firms. Go figure.
I recommend educating yourself on this debate. It is highly nuanced and very complex. The US equities markets have many facets that go well beyond the displayed market and HFT. The vast majority of professionals in this business would agree on 90% of the desired regulatory change: faster SIP and allowing locked markets are two large ones. You'll also likely get a large consensus on eliminating all payment for order flow including rebates paid by lit venues as compensation for posting resting orders and absorbing adverse selection risk.
Take care.
Re: The Idiot's Guide to High Frequency Trading
#86Re: The Idiot's Guide to High Frequency Trading
#87How exchanges work for dummies.
All of the modern US stock exchanges work as a limit order book. Orders are filled on a price-time basis. In other words, you put in an order, if it isn't filled immediately it gets put in the limit order book with your order going to the end of the line ( lowest priority ) at that price. That's it, that is how it works. Lets look at an example.
I want to buy 250 shares of ABC. Right now there are orders in the book. 5 orders to buy at 9.95, each one for 100 shares. There are also 5 orders to sell at 9.96 also each order for 100 shares. I have several options.
(1) I can put in a market order to buy 250, when this order gets to the order book sell orders will be filled starting with the oldest ones, the ones that have been in the book longest, first. My order will be matched, this is why they call it a matching engine, with two of the sell orders and then a partial on the third one. As orders are filled in the order book messages are sent out to all subscribers of the data that those orders were filled so everyone can keep track of the state of the book. It is important to note that when my order gets to the matching engine/order book there is no chance for the orders in the order book to get cancelled. Those orders aren't told "you are about to get filled do you want to cancel". (2) I can put in a limit order to buy at 9.96 in which case the order will be filled as described in 1 unless the sell orders at 9.96 are cancelled before my order gets to the matching engine. (3) I can put in a limit order to buy at 9.95 in which case my order goes into the order book at 9.95 and I have to wait for the orders ahead of me to either get filled or cancelled and then I have to wait for someone to send in a sell order, either market or limit, that will get matched with my buy order.
That's it! Repeat, all day, every day. OK, that is a lie, there are special order types and that is one way exchanges try to differentiate themselves but that is a simplified way of how this works.
So where is the problem that Brad Katsuyama saw? I don't know him all I know is what I've seen and read. One thing to note is that he talks about buying large blocks of stock. Very large. From http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/06/magazine/flash-boys-michae... "It used to be that when his trading screens showed 10,000 shares of Intel offered at $22 a share, it meant that he could buy 10,000 shares of Intel for $22 a share." 10k shares at $22k/share, that is $220k in value. So he isn't talking about some small retail order, this is, as he points out, institutional flow.
So lets think about what happens in this kind of case. There are 13 exchanges, all running limit order books. They are geographically disperse and internally they are implemented differently and have different latencies and different message protocols etc. At some instance in time all 13 exchanges have some orders to sell at $22.00. Think about that. In some sense that is awesome. Look how efficient the market is. If you went to 13 gas stations what are the chances that a gallon of regular gas will cost exactly the same at every station? Anyway, back to our problem. You want to buy 10,000 shares. You fire off your order to exchange A to buy 10,000 shares. This hits the matching engine and you get filled on 10,000 shares ( THERE IS NO WAY FOR THOSE SELL ORDERS THAT ARE IN THE BOOK TO BE CANCELLED!!!! The orders in the book aren't sent a message "hey, a 10,000 share order is coming in and about to hit your order do you want to cancel your order first?". THAT DOES NOT HAPPEN!!! ). The thing is that those 10,000 shares that got matched, lets say each order in the book was 200 shares. Your 10,000 share order just took out 50 orders. The fact that these orders were executed is sent out to every data subscriber who is listening for that data. All messages are timestamped, sometimes down to the nanosecond. From that the recipients can tell "wow, all of these 50 orders for 10,000 shares were executed at the same time so that was one order."
Now, if you had orders in at other exchanges to sell at $22 what would your response be? For a second lets think about something more mundane, like TVs. Suppose you work at Target and you have a friend who works at Walmart. You're working one night and a guy shows up driving a semi-trailer. He walks in and says "How many 50 inch flat screens do you have? I'll buy them all, as advertised at $400." You sell all 20 that you have to him. As he's walking out the door he says "Now I'm going to Walmart." Just then your buddy at Walmart texts you and says "what's up? slow night right." and you go "Hell no, just sold 20 50 inch TVs to a guy, he bought everything I had and says he is headed for your Walmart to buy more." Now what does your friend do? In a world where prices are set by supply and demand Walmart could look at that and go "wow, there is a big buyer of 50 inch TVs out there, lets increase our price from $400 to $410." And so that is what Walmart does and sure enough the guy comes in and buys all the TVs from Walmart for $410. Does the TV buyer say the market is "rigged"?
In any case that is very similar to what happens in this case. All of the HFT and market makers see this big order rip through a lot of sell orders at exchange A and they go "wow, there is a big buyer, I better change my sell order from selling at $22.00 to selling at $22.01 or $22.10 or $25 or whatever". Brad Katsuyama looks at that and goes "I've been front run, this market is rigged." And then he has a piece of software written so that all orders arrive at the different markets at the same time, as opposed to leaving his trading workstation at the same time, and suddenly there isn't any front running. There isn't any front running at all, what he is seeing is the reaction to supply and demand.
HFT and market makers live in fear of something called "adverse selection". Market makers are required to post a two sided market, they are supposed to put up a price and quantity that they are willing to both buy and sell at right now. They publish this and they can't back away from it, they have to live up to it if another order shows up to buy or sell at a price that matches they have to execute the trade. The risk to them is that they are trading with someone who has information that they don't have. Just like playing poker or any game, you're going to lose if you play with people who are better than you. In this game though sometimes just having a big order is enough to move the market even if the person behind the order doesn't actually have any new information. Market makers and HFT either want to buy on the bid and sell on the offer and make the spread or they want to do arbitrage. That is how they make money. They lose money if they trade with people who are smarter or faster than they are. As soon as they see big orders come in they get really skittish and so they immediately move their orders to reduce their risk.
I've written a lot and bored almost everyone. Ask away and I'll do my best to answer your questions.
A couple other comments:
1. I'm not saying HFT is good or bad, I don't know. 2. Lots of people mention costs. Just to ballpark the whole thing. For the technology you need to Arista switches, that is $500/port, get a 48 port switch, that is $24k. For servers you need something decent, not crazy, dual CPU, 64 GB, running linux, maybe solarflare for kernel bypass networking, custom software. The hardware will cost you $6k/server. Then you need a connection to an exchange, varies but lets say $10k/month, then you need market data, $5k/month, then you need an order entry port, that is maybe $1k/month. That's it. Well, that is at one exchange, then you need low latency 10 Gbps cross connects between exchanges and you need to do that at each exchange. Then you need to find a clearing firm and you need to become a broker dealer ( exchanges and clearing firms only talk to BDs ). This is a highly regulated environment. You must have a compliance person, you will get audited yearly by SEC, your exchange, FINRA, all kinds of stuff. You will need a serious accountant. You have to have written procedures. 3. And how in the world do you avoid the Knight type of meltdown? Well, when you send in an order the order goes to the exchange. But the exchange also sends the order out via a "drop copy". This might go to your clearing firm so they know you aren't losing tons of money. But you can also get the drop copies and then you can constantly do your own risk checks that your orders you think are open are actually open but the ones you cancelled are actually cancelled. Most exchanges also have "cancel on disconnect" so when you really don't know what is going on you shut off your connection to the exchange and any open orders in the order book are cancelled for you.
Re: The Idiot's Guide to High Frequency Trading
#88Earlier quoted context omitted.
Well who does want to stand in front of a truck? That's the risk every participant takes, "makers" should have to eat it just like everyone else. Not conspire to invent umpteen different order types and fee structures which enable them to shirk the risk and skim off mom & pop's retirement fund any time the market starts to look shaky. And if mom's broker doesn't understand that the taker rebate leaks more information…
I encourage you to watch this conversation between Haim Bodek (HFT whistleblower) and Manoj Narang (CEO of Tradeworx). It should inform your view on this subject and help you understand why many of the order types we have exist. Notably, they are all a result of locked markets and handling orders at level transitions. Vast majority if not all HFT would be happy to see the locked market ban revoked and an elimination…
Re: The Idiot's Guide to High Frequency Trading
#89Re: The Idiot's Guide to High Frequency Trading
#90Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nobody you are talking about in either scenario is doing that.
Explain 'nobody', 'scenario' and 'that'? This sidebar conv. seems to be degrading a bit. General comment: I think you are over simplifying the P&L of a trader. The HFT stuff impacts hedging costs. And the ability to solicit grey/NPI. Note they are not urelated. Also, if you just look at bid/ask and Volume...you never see the $$ value of this. Las comment: the so called: "profit guarantees" just means perfectly hedged…