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Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

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Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#61

Post by xcrunner529 »

jostmey wrote: post #34

More so that its rivals, Apple has consistently put forth a greater effort to explain their technology to its customers. Apple has remained keen to point out the difficulties of hardware and software development. Perhaps this is one reason why people outside of the technology sector perceive Apple products as superior. People think Apple has gone the extra mile.

Perhaps not how I'd phrase it, but I do love reading Apple's documents and whitepapers. They're all designed and laid out so well for reading the information. It's amazingly rare for that kind of stuff. I read the entire document and found it fascinating.

Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#62

Post by andy9775 »

Excuse me if this sounds ignorant as I am not a security expert, but isn't there a flaw in using a public key for continuous messaging? Shouldn't public-private key crypto be used only to generate a symmetrical key? The system was originally designed for symmetrical key exchange no? Using it this way presents some flaw?

Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#63

Post by dfc »

Rhapso wrote: post #37
sokrates wrote: post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well, classic key distribution problem is classic. You have to anchor your trust somewhere. And whatever you choose, somebody will complain. Cue web of trust PSA.

Well, maybe not. Web of Trust has serious scaling issues. https://bitcointalk.org/oldSiteFiles/byzantine.html Blockchain based key distribution may let you anchor trust to a decentralized process.

I am really curious why/how you think the byzantine link relates to key distribution and the web of trust?

Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#64

Post by sjwright »

lawnchair_larry wrote: post #53
nitrogen wrote: post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>> Even a custom-written third party client still doesn't eliminate the requirement to trust Apple. They're delivering your closed source operating system, which could very easily include hostile behaviors like key logging and screen recording . > It does eliminate the requirement to trust Apple actually. As the parent comment indicated (emphasis added), in an extreme hypothetical scenario, Apple could (be compelled…

You're missing the part where "custom client" means you aren't using an Apple device at all, if you don't want to be. This is like sending a PGP message over gmail using mutt on linux via IMAP. Google owns gmail, but they can't backdoor you or read your message in this scenario. Any non-broken secure messaging protocol should have this property, regardless of if people use it that way. This is what end-to-end encrypt…

> Any non-broken secure messaging protocol should have this property

Okay then, tell me how you could build a system that

* Guarantees secure transmission of public keys

* Can be installed safely on a closed-source operating system

* Is impervious to the whims of the hardware vendor or the operating system vendor

* Is sufficiently straightforward that mums everywhere will happily use it

* Doesn't require users to become security experts

Given the practical realities Apple has to contend with, I think they've done a pretty good job -- certainly a lot better than what anyone could have expected, arguably a lot better than anything comparable that has come before it.

Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#65

Post by ninkendo »

declan wrote: post #19
Spooky23 wrote: post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Lawful intercept isn't evil.

Are the NSA's intercepts lawful?

The NSA's intercepts are a lot different from this. The problem with PRISM and the FISA courts that the NSA is intercepting all the data they think they'll ever need, then they need a warrant to query it. It inverts the intention of what warrants are for, which is to require just cause before any surveillance happens.

With iMessage, if the FBI gives apple a warrant to include their snooping pubkey as an additional encryption endpoint for all messages for a user, by definition it only gives access to messages made from then on, which is in keeping with how I would expect a search warrant to work.

Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#66

Post by fpgeek »

nitrogen wrote: post #50
siglesias wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Pardon my ignorance not being a security expert, but given that all endpoints here (software and hardware) are Apple-controlled, just how trivial is spoofing a keyserver? Genuinely curious.

Assuming (perhaps incorrectly) that Apple does not use certificate pinning for their iMessage servers, and the adversary controls a trusted CA (likely for secretive government agencies), and the adversary controls a router somewhere between the device and Apple (also likely for government agencies), it's very trivial. It's a simple matter of redirecting traffic using something like iptables.

Based on the quarkslab link upthread, Apple wasn't using certificate pinning for iMessage at least as recently as October 2013. Even worse, also as of that article, Apple was sending the AppleID and cleartext password over this MITM-vulnerable SSL connection as part of iMessage login.

Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#67

Post by Geee »

jjarmoc wrote: post #48
iratedev wrote: post #7

This is great security for what it is. Probably enough to keep you 98% secure. Which is still exactly 0% secure as far as I'm concerned. All in all though - in general - I'll be more than happy to continue using iMessage and feel at peace. As a general rule, however, never send anything electronically that may screw you over later.

If you see security as boolean, you're going to have a rough time...

Security is as strong as the weakest link. If there is a weak link there's no security. So, it is boolean.

Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#68

Post by Geee »

jostmey wrote: post #34

More so that its rivals, Apple has consistently put forth a greater effort to explain their technology to its customers. Apple has remained keen to point out the difficulties of hardware and software development. Perhaps this is one reason why people outside of the technology sector perceive Apple products as superior. People think Apple has gone the extra mile.

And they usually go the extra mile. Have you got examples where someone else 'went the extra mile' where Apple didn't? Most other companies just like to talk big, like Google with their fantasy projects, but most of their actual released products are mediocre.

Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#69

Post by Zigurd »

karunr wrote: post #44

Apple is able to do this today because instant message services not (yet) covered under CALEA. ( Carrier assistance for Law enforcement agencies.) If CALEA is updated to include instant messaging services, Apple would be legally obligated to have a method of intercepting these messages, possibly with a separate public key as discussed in other comments.

CALEA can't compel you to hand over anything you do not have access to. If cleartext in your chat system can't be accessed because you don't have access to customer private keys, that's not illegal.

Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#70

Post by tethis »

ninkendo wrote: post #65
declan wrote: post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Are the NSA's intercepts lawful?

The NSA's intercepts are a lot different from this. The problem with PRISM and the FISA courts that the NSA is intercepting all the data they think they'll ever need, then they need a warrant to query it. It inverts the intention of what warrants are for, which is to require just cause before any surveillance happens. With iMessage, if the FBI gives apple a warrant to include their snooping pubkey as an additional en…

And it would also only be for a specific user, rather than the dragnet surveillance (biggest fishing trip in history) that the NSA, et al, are conducting.
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