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Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

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Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#51

Post by nitrogen »

lawnchair_larry wrote: post #42
sjwright wrote: post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Even a custom-written third party client still doesn't eliminate the requirement to trust Apple. They're delivering your closed source operating system, which could very easily include hostile behaviors like key logging and screen recording. At least with iMessage, the entire ecosystem is managed by one company, so you only have to trust one company.

> Even a custom-written third party client still doesn't eliminate the requirement to trust Apple. They're delivering your closed source operating system, which could very easily include hostile behaviors like key logging and screen recording. It does eliminate the requirement to trust Apple actually. That's the point of (real) end to end encryption. With a custom client, you could use them as a conduit to deliver yo…

>> Even a custom-written third party client still doesn't eliminate the requirement to trust Apple. They're delivering your closed source operating system, which could very easily include hostile behaviors like key logging and screen recording.

> It does eliminate the requirement to trust Apple actually.

As the parent comment indicated (emphasis added), in an extreme hypothetical scenario, Apple could (be compelled to) write a backdoor specifically for your device that captures all text and touch input events, or periodically takes screenshots and sends them somewhere.

Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#52

Post by tlrobinson »

Spooky23 wrote: post #14
X-Istence wrote: post #5

The way Apple could "read" the messages is by sending a keybag down to the person sending the messages with another public key, one that Apple holds the private key for. For example if you have 3 devices (iPhone, iPad, MBP) and someone goes to send you a message, they have to re-encrypt the message three times because Apple would have sent them three public keys. Now if Apple were evil because of a government order,…

Lawful intercept isn't evil.

Says spooky23.

Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#53

Post by lawnchair_larry »

nitrogen wrote: post #51
lawnchair_larry wrote: post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Even a custom-written third party client still doesn't eliminate the requirement to trust Apple. They're delivering your closed source operating system, which could very easily include hostile behaviors like key logging and screen recording. It does eliminate the requirement to trust Apple actually. That's the point of (real) end to end encryption. With a custom client, you could use them as a conduit to deliver yo…

>> Even a custom-written third party client still doesn't eliminate the requirement to trust Apple. They're delivering your closed source operating system, which could very easily include hostile behaviors like key logging and screen recording . > It does eliminate the requirement to trust Apple actually. As the parent comment indicated (emphasis added), in an extreme hypothetical scenario, Apple could (be compelled…

You're missing the part where "custom client" means you aren't using an Apple device at all, if you don't want to be.

This is like sending a PGP message over gmail using mutt on linux via IMAP. Google owns gmail, but they can't backdoor you or read your message in this scenario. Any non-broken secure messaging protocol should have this property, regardless of if people use it that way. This is what end-to-end encryption means.

Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#55

Post by anfedorov »

na85 wrote: post #10
Osiris wrote: post #3

Unless Apple is omitting something or there’s some backdoor tucked into their many-layers-deep encryption (which, while unlikely, isn’t inconceivable) they really can’t read your iMessages without a fairly insane amount of effort. That is, assuming, that there isn't some code in the app that allows Apple to request that the app send your private key up to the server. It's conceivable that in order to comply with law…

> (which, while unlikely, isn’t inconceivable) Not only do I think it's not unlikely, I actually think it's pretty much a certainty that Apple has a backdoor in their code. After the slides detailing how easy it is for NSA to break into Apple phones I'd be simply shocked if they hadn't inserted such a vulnerability. Sounds to me like the author is applying a nice coat of white wash.

After the slides detailing how easy it is for NSA to break into Apple phones I'd be simply shocked if they hadn't inserted such a vulnerability.

The slides pertained to physical access to an iOS 6 device, which was publicly known as insecure before the NSA revelations:

http://apple.slashdot.org/story/13/08/01/2024212/iphone-hack...

Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#56

Post by shiven »

Spooky23 wrote: post #14
X-Istence wrote: post #5

The way Apple could "read" the messages is by sending a keybag down to the person sending the messages with another public key, one that Apple holds the private key for. For example if you have 3 devices (iPhone, iPad, MBP) and someone goes to send you a message, they have to re-encrypt the message three times because Apple would have sent them three public keys. Now if Apple were evil because of a government order,…

Lawful intercept isn't evil.

And I have bridge in Brooklyn I'd like to sell you.

Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#57

Post by redthrowaway »

lawnchair_larry wrote: post #8

Author isn't very clever about crypto attacks. Sending device grabs all of the recipients public keys (as well as all of their own keys for other devices, which allows the conversation to be replicated on all of their own devices as well) hosted by Apple. Sending device has no way to verify those keys belong to the intended recipient . User has no way to verify which, or how many devices they are sending to. User doe…

>Apple wants to read your messages? They drop one of their public keys in the list. Apple gets a warrant? They drop the FBI's key in the list.

If they were doing this, it would come out real quick. You'd just send a message to a different account you control then see how many keys you're getting/encrypted messages you're sending. Someone like Applebaum, who knows he's under surveillance and has the crypto/networking chops to dig into it, could verify it quite quickly.

Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#59

Post by MacsHeadroom »

nitrogen wrote: post #50
siglesias wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Pardon my ignorance not being a security expert, but given that all endpoints here (software and hardware) are Apple-controlled, just how trivial is spoofing a keyserver? Genuinely curious.

Assuming (perhaps incorrectly) that Apple does not use certificate pinning for their iMessage servers, and the adversary controls a trusted CA (likely for secretive government agencies), and the adversary controls a router somewhere between the device and Apple (also likely for government agencies), it's very trivial. It's a simple matter of redirecting traffic using something like iptables.

Even more trivial if the iOS device is managed. by an Enterprise Admin, who can tell the device to trust any arbitrary certs without the user ever knowing.

Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is

#60

Post by scythe »

Spooky23 wrote: post #14
X-Istence wrote: post #5

The way Apple could "read" the messages is by sending a keybag down to the person sending the messages with another public key, one that Apple holds the private key for. For example if you have 3 devices (iPhone, iPad, MBP) and someone goes to send you a message, they have to re-encrypt the message three times because Apple would have sent them three public keys. Now if Apple were evil because of a government order,…

Lawful intercept isn't evil.

Security is not a subset of morality.
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