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AI

blog.samaltman.com

271–280 of 317 posts

Re: AI

#271

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And then the question is - if the AI is more intelligent than us humans, it must surely be able to figure out itself, and it improve itself, includings its own goals, too?

Why would it change it's own goals? That would violate it's current goals, and therefore try to avoid that action. Can you change yourself to be a sociopath? Would you? Would you make yourself a perfect nihilist?

i think an intelligent system would be able to think critically, think ethically, and re-evaluate it's beliefs.

what kind of intelligence wouldn't question it's own understanding?

Re: AI

#272
post #145
post #128

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I've felt this way about every Sam Altman piece that's been posted in the past week (and possibly every one I've ever read). And I feel guilty because PG speaks so highly of him. And then I feel guilty for feeling guilty.

don't feel guilty. I'm blogging to practice writing. It surprises me at least as much as you when articles like this do well on HN and makes me feel embarrassed I didn't make them better (there are some posts I work really hard on and hope people like, but this was not one of them)

I think you are an excellent blogger and glad that you are posting to HN.

That said, I hope that you will think more critically and clearly before publishing vague, fuzzy, uninformed, and unlogical thoughts (not illogical, but unlogical) like the following:

>The biggest question for me is not about artificial intelligence, but instead about artificial consciousness, or creativity, or desire, or whatever you want to call it. I am quite confident that we’ll be able to make computer programs that perform specific complex tasks very well. But how do we make a computer program that decides what it wants to do? How do we make a computer decide to care on its own about learning to drive a car? Or write a novel?

Consciousness, creativity, and desire are all quite distinct things. It is very important for people who are attempting to approach the coming reality of artificial intelligence to be able to distinguish between different things like that.

There have been computer programs that decide what they want to do for decades. Perhaps you were thinking of a specific human-like type of decision process, but if so, you must say so and reason that way. Otherwise you are just conveying some fuzzy thoughts. And the problem is that you are doing so in the context of real scientific undertakings with results directly applicable to your thoughts.

A computer deciding what to care about or learn or what behavior to engage in "on its own" is related to the previous topic you mention, and in and of itself, does not require artificial general intelligence.

How do we make a computer program write a novel? I think that is a good question and an effective answer to it I believe _might_ be in the category of 'real' artificial general intelligence. However, I think that it will probably soon be possible to create 'narrow' AIs that can generate novels without being generally intelligent. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/business/computer-generate...

Re: AI

#273
post #86

If anyone is interested in AI, I highly recommend joining Less Wrong, a community started by AI researcher Eliezer Yudkowsky. He started the community to convince people to focus on the "friendly AI problem". [1] I actually recommend that everyone read LW, but especially if you're interested in AI. [1] In a nutshell, the friendly AI problem is: assume we create an AI. It may rapidly become more intelligent than us, i…

> we'd better figure THAT out before building AI. Why don't we just give that task to the AI? It'll be smarter than us... Maybe the problem is that people are too easy to understand: We want "Brave New World", but we don't want to know about it, or that we want it.

http://lesswrong.com/lw/ld/the_hidden_complexity_of_wishes/

> To be a safe fulfiller of a wish, a genie must share the same values that led you to make the wish. Otherwise the genie may not choose a path through time which leads to the destination you had in mind, or it may fail to exclude horrible side effects that would lead you to not even consider a plan in the first place. Wishes are leaky generalizations, derived from the huge but finite structure that is your entire morality; only by including this entire structure can you plug all the leaks.

Humans can mostly differentiate between good and bad (ethics), but we don't know how we arrive at those conclusions (metaethics) because humans are terrible at introspection. Also, there's a ton of gray areas (e.g. the trolley problem). So rather than define all possible edge cases, it's probably less difficult to understand human decision-making from first principles and model our FAI accordingly.

Re: AI

#274
The easiest way to create AI would be to make a model our own brain's neural pathways. With a computer model we could analyze and break down what makes consciousness/intelligence, etc.

Re: AI

#275

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why would it change it's own goals? That would violate it's current goals, and therefore try to avoid that action. Can you change yourself to be a sociopath? Would you? Would you make yourself a perfect nihilist?

i think an intelligent system would be able to think critically, think ethically, and re-evaluate it's beliefs. what kind of intelligence wouldn't question it's own understanding?

Thank you! I was going to write something similar. I think a real 'superior' AI must be able to follow all the various philosophical ideas we had and 'understand' them at a deeper level than we do. Things such as 'there is no purpose'/nihilism, extreme critical thinking about itself etc. If it doesn't, if it can't, it can't be superior to us by definition.

I think, given these philosophical ideas, we anthropomorphize if we even think in terms of good/evil about any AI. I believe if there is ever any abrupt change due to vastly better AI, it is more of the _weird_ kind than the good or evil kind. But weird might be very scary indeed, because at some level we humans tend to like that things are somewhat predictable.

I believe the whole discussion about AI is a bit artificial (no pun). Various kinds of AI are already deeply embedded in some parts of society and causes real changes - such as airplane planning systems, trading on the stock market etc. Those cause very real world effects and affect very realy people. And they tend to be already pretty weird. We don't really see it all the time, but it acts, and its 'will', so to speak, is a weird product of our own desires.

Also, I wonder whether and how societies would compare to AIs. We have mass psychological phenomena in societies that even the brightest persons only become aware of some time after 'they have fulfilled their purpose'. Are societies self-ware as a higher level of intelligence? And have they always been?

Are we, maybe simply the substrate, for evolution of technology, much as biology is the substrate for the evolution of us? Are societies, algorithms, AI, ideas & memes simply different forms of 'higher beings' on 'top' of us? Does it even make sense that there is a hierarchy and to think hierarchically at all about these things?

I have the impression our technology makes us, apart from other things, a lot more conscious. But that is not a painless process at all, quite the contrary. But so far, we seem to have decided to go this route? Will we, as humans, eventually become mad in some way from this?

There are mad people. Can we build superior AI if we do not understand madness? Will AI understand madness?

Re: AI

#276
post #236

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Any suggestions for getting started in the LW community? Its barrier to entry means I can't seem to vote on anything, etc. It's quite intimidating really.

I'll reiterate something another poster said, since it isnt' getting enough credit: Read HP:MoR. It's a fanfic of Harry Potter, written by the same Eliezer Yudkowsky who wrote much of Less Wrong. It was specifically written to convey the feeling of "what it means to be a rationalist". For those who aren't into Harry Potter or into Fanfiction (like me), I can tell you this: Suprisingly, it is one of the best stories I…

I want to emphasize just how good this book is. It may very well be my favorite thing I've read and I was also initially skeptical when it was presented as fan fiction.

I think I might restart reading it.

Re: AI

#277
post #201

Earlier quoted context omitted.

One of the major realisations from reading Less Wrong is taht Intelligence and Goals/Desires have nothing to do with each other. An AI might be much more intelligent, but it has a goal system that basically says: "Make as many paperclips as you can". Everything it does will be with the singular purpose of making more paperclips. Not music, math, sport, culture or anything else that we think of as good. Not "help save…

If our approach to AI is to model the human brain (i.e. passing the Turing test), this probably won't happen. Friendly AI is a silly research project at this stage of AI research. It's like trying to figure out how to make horseless carriages safe before you have an internal combustion engine, or even know what one is.

What makes you say it probably won't happen if we model the human brain?

Re: AI

#278
post #266

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's no such data, because the zombie problem is complete nonsense. Well, actually, it is complete nonsense precisely because empirical data can't say anything about it.

By that argument, there is no moral argument against inflicting pain on others, because the pain of another is not something we can empirically observe, except by analogy of how we react to the pain we ourselves experience.

First, the moral argument against inflicting pain on others doesn't depend on existence of pain. The moral dilemma is: is it acceptable to inflict pain on others or not. This is different, and to a large extend independent, from the question if pain exists in experience of others. In other words, if pain exists in others, it doesn't follow that you have to, by mere logical reasoning, make a moral conclusion that inflicting pain is wrong. There is an uncrossable ontological abyss between the empirical what is and the moral what should be.

Second, the case of pain from an empirical side is not at all like what we have in the philosophical zombie "problem". We can empirically observe pain. There are all sorts of physiological and neural manifestations of pain. Of course, now you may say "ah, but how can we know that these empirical manifestations mean the person is experiencing the sensation of pain". Scientifically that dilemma makes little sense, it's simply unproductive, it's scientifically useless. If we were to go by that route, we could inject a similar dilemma into every scientific problem, which inevitably would lead to the problem of solipsism. How can we really, really be certain that anything at all exists? Well, I suppose we can't, but this is a question that science has long ago abandoned because it doesn't get you anywhere, it doesn't yield any useful results.

Do note that unlike the question of pain, the zombie problem is defined so that there is in principle absolutely no way to detect, to measure, if someone is a zombie or not. On the other hand, we can in principle measure and detect events correlated with introspective reports on sensations. If we couldn't do that for some phenomenon it would be wise to consider that the phenomenon doesn't exist for the purpose of empirical scientific examination.

Frankly, I'm surprised that my previous post (where I say the zombie problem is nonsense) got downvoted because this is the foundation of scientific methodology. If you can not, even in principle, measure/detect something then it makes no sense to discuss it. Of course, you can amuse yourself and speculate on it, but that falls outside of boundaries of scientific inquiry and I hope that's what we're discussing here.

Re: AI

#279
post #203

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But how would you recognize those bytes?

How do you define intelligence?

Optimization power, possibly divided by available resources.

In a game of Chess, only a narrow set of moves will let me steer the future into a winning state. Well, the same is true for the Game of Life (the real one, not Conway's): we humans are intelligent because we're able to steer the future through probability to a-priori incredibly unlikely outcomes. Compare walking vs moving your limbs randomly.

Re: AI

#280

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Here's the terrifying thing; it probably wouldn't take a hundred years or our trust for this to happen. This is making some strong assumptions, but the first AI could probably improve itself. Making better AIs that make better AIs and so on. Very rapidly (possibly only hours, days, weeks) it could become much much smarter than humans. If that happens, than we don't know what's possible, but it could probably do a lot…

It would be interesting to see exactly how intelligent and thought out an AI system could be at destroying us. Would it be barbaric? Would we end up with robots clubbing people and dropping bombs? Would it engineer some type of infectious disease that takes us out? Would it develop a fake shot for immunity, so those people locked away hiding from the disease take the shot, and then all die months later? Does it manip…

> Even if it decides to be our friend and to help our species, someone will of course fork that AI and give it a negative personality and goals.

No: the first AI won't let them. See, we're talking a rapidly improving super-intelligence. Whatever is contrary to its goals, it will squash like a bug. A mad scientist forking the code of the AI with a different goal structure is definitely contrary to the goals of that first super-intelligence, and will be shut down before it grows into a sizeable competitor.

The result of intelligence explosion is a Singleton: the AI will be a perfectly efficient dictator. It may even shield us from the laws of physics until we graduate to adulthood.

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