We work a 4-day week and just raised $4.75m (2012)

When I worked on political campaigns it was summer (anywhere from May to August) until election day (first week of November) for 90+ hours a week. I joke around about my very first job where I worked 96 hours in the first 6 days, and since it was July it only got busier from there. It gets to the point where you would much rather do 10+ hours of work every day of the week than take that Sunday off but have to sacrifice sleep for the next week because of it.

Particularly for statewide and national elections, the last 2-4 weeks before a campaign there is nothing else. No downtime, no family, no hobbies, nothing. Just the candidate, the message, the voters, the outreach. It’s rare in those major elections to get more than 2-3 hours of sleep (or sleep at all) in the last 72 hour push. Again these are elections for POTUS, Senator or Governor in contested states. A state rep race is going to be much more low key but still easily 60-80+ hours for the final month or two.

Things may have lightened up some since I moved to programming, but I doubt it.

> I'm beginning to think the business is marketing, not technology.

Correct.

Serious question: why does Treehouse need 45 employees? What's the division of labor? Are most of them required for content creation, or engineering, or what?

I've been thinking a lot about company size lately, and was always impressed that not long before acquisition time Instagram had a team of just six (which quickly expanded to twelve prior to acquisition).

Is such a small team size really only achievable by user generated content companies?

This sounds awesome. It reminds me of Henry Ford's Five Dollar Workday: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Ford#The_five-dollar_work...

> Ford astonished the world in 1914 by offering a $5 per day wage ($120 today), which more than doubled the rate of most of his workers. A Cleveland, Ohio newspaper editorialized that the announcement "shot like a blinding rocket through the dark clouds of the present industrial depression." The move proved extremely profitable; instead of constant turnover of employees, the best mechanics in Detroit flocked to Ford, bringing their human capital and expertise, raising productivity, and lowering training costs. Ford announced his $5-per-day program on January 5, 1914, raising the minimum daily pay from $2.34 to $5 for qualifying workers. It also set a new, reduced workweek, although the details vary in different accounts. Ford and Crowther in 1922 described it as six 8-hour days, giving a 48-hour week, while in 1926 they described it as five 8-hour days, giving a 40-hour week. (Apparently the program started with Saturday being a workday and sometime later it was changed to a day off.)

> Detroit was already a high-wage city, but competitors were forced to raise wages or lose their best workers. Ford's policy proved, however, that paying people more would enable Ford workers to afford the cars they were producing and be good for the economy. Ford explained the policy as profit-sharing rather than wages. It may have been Couzens who convinced Ford to adopt the $5 day.

At least according to author Matthew B. Crawford, Henry Ford did not raise wages out of the goodness of his heart, so his workers could afford to buy cars themselves.

From his original Shop Class as Soulcraft essay: http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/shop-class-as-sou... "Given their likely acquaintance with such a cognitively rich world of work, it is hardly surprising that when Henry Ford introduced the assembly line in 1913, workers simply walked out. One of Ford’s biographers wrote, “So great was labor’s distaste for the new machine system that toward the close of 1913 every time the company wanted to add 100 men to its factory personnel, it was necessary to hire 963.”

This would seem to be a crucial moment in the history of political economy. Evidently, the new system provoked natural revulsion. Yet, at some point, workers became habituated to it. How did this happen? One might be tempted to inquire in a typological mode: What sort of men were these first, the 100 out of 963 who stuck it out on the new assembly line? Perhaps it was the men who felt less revulsion because they had less pride in their own powers, and were therefore more tractable. Less republican, we might say. But if there was initially such a self-selection process, it quickly gave way to something less deliberate, more systemic.

In a temporary suspension of the Taylorist logic, Ford was forced to double the daily wage of his workers to keep the line staffed. As Braverman writes, this “opened up new possibilities for the intensification of labor within the plants, where workers were now anxious to keep their jobs.” These anxious workers were more productive. Indeed, Ford himself later recognized his wage increase as “one of the finest cost-cutting moves we ever made,” as he was able to double, and then triple, the rate at which cars were assembled by simply speeding up the conveyors. By doing so he destroyed his competitors, and thereby destroyed the possibility of an alternative way of working. (It also removed the wage pressure that comes from the existence of more enjoyable jobs.) At the Columbian World Expo held in Chicago in 1893, no fewer than seven large-scale carriage builders from Cincinnati alone presented their wares. Adopting Ford’s methods, the industry would soon be reduced to the Big Three. So workers eventually became habituated to the abstraction of the assembly line. Evidently, it inspires revulsion only if one is acquainted with more satisfying modes of work."

I think every worker in America should read Crawford's superb book, btw.