> The mental leap here is subtle, but substantial. Since I have been told I can't use US selectors , I assume the system enforces this. As such, US citizens have nothing to worry about.
For the life of me I cannot figure out why people refuse to accept the concept of training and policy as being relevant to proper civil liberties safeguards in addition to technical ones.
Imagine applying that idea to any other field, and keep in mind the unintended consequences.
For instance consider from a soldier's perspective "Since I've been told I can't shoot citizens or non-combatants, I assume the system enforces this. As such, US citizens and non-combatants have nothing to worry about." And yet our troops do have issued firearms (at least during things like field exercises and training), and the republic has not fallen to a coup. There are missile siloes dotted throughout the Midwest, yet no rogue junior officers or missileers have launched ICBMs at people.
You're missing his greater point, which seems to be that it didn't even occur to him to "test the interlock" since he knew that by law and by policy, it was wrong to even try. He also made quite clear (if you'd bother to read to the end instead of cherry-picking quotes to declaim) that this doesn't mean such technical controls can't or shouldn't be strengthed, merely that there is indeed a "culture of compliance" among the analysts instead of a bunch of voyeurs.
> > one employee spied on a spouse
> So much for automated analysis, besides not being able to filter out US citizens' data it can't even filter out an employee's direct family. But there's no need to worry citizen, the NSA has a very high-quality workforce.
Is it really your claim that a workforce must be 100% perfect in every way for an organization to be legitimate? Even the anarchists don't try to claim that there won't eventually be murderers amongst them, nor is there anywhere else in the real world where spouses are always exceptionally nice to each other in everything they do. Just ask Ashley Madison.
> The most technologically advanced intelligence agency in the history of the world and they have no idea what files were electronically taken by one of their own.
They also haven't solved the Halting Problem.
But anyways I know I'm going to be speaking to an uncooperative crowd but perhaps you all should consider the high-level points of his "peek inside" and then discuss the ramifications of that, instead of always drilling down into the weeds. Many of the same arguments used here could be used with equal logic toward every large civilian IT concern, which would tend to devastate the need for things like YC capital. :P