Earlier quoted context omitted.
Generally, the people doing brain simulations like to claim that they can use a massively reduced representation (little more than a graph model that pushes signals around with some constants) and yet, somehow, the simulation is inherently capable of reproducing something complex about thought. I'm not sure how they get to this conclusion, but it's a massive reductionism. It would be nice if it were true- it would me…
When did reductionism become a dirty word?
From my observation, it appears people assume "reductionist" means "simplistic" as opposed to "representing a complex system as no more than the sum of its components". To be honest, I think it's just an etymological problem: "reduction" sounds bad, so "reductionism" sounds bad.
The grandparent here follows this pattern. Using the actual meaning, it would be paradoxical for an approximation to be reductionist. In fact, it's quite the opposite. A reductionist would hold that the most accurate high-level model of a brain would be the most low-level model of a brain. If we could model each atom precisely then we would, necessarily, model the whole brain precisely.
The whole thing is pretty amusing when you take into account that anyone who manipulates software or systems in any serious way needs to engage in reductionism to be able to work. It's not as if "first, we write module A, then module B, then a system magically appears from the ether" is a viable architecture. At least, not since we stopped taking neural nets seriously.