101–110 of 144 posts
The title is wrong (the article isn't, necessarily). The license, https://github.com/vvk-ehk/evalimine/blob/master/LICENSE , is non-free/open source.
The source is clearly open. I'm looking at it right now. That it doesn't match Stallmans definition of "free" doesn't mean that it's not open source.
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So why can't you be an observer of the sys admin when they install the software. Witness some chain of command that the software has come from an authorized source, meets a digital check-sum and is installed properly. It can then be secured by another party with a two password "lock box" type approach kind of like we use with our crypto system at work that guards our CC processing. There are systems invented and impl…
You don't seem to understand, so heres a whitepaper [1] from Rop Gonggrijp on how to play chess on a Nedap voting computer. And the Nedap machines are special-built and programmed to ensure the authenticity of the votes, using anything from printers to read only memory. Not fucking Python running on a loosely secured Linux box. [1]: http://wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/images/9/91/Es3b-en...
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All voting systems that I know of require trust, with or without machines. Do you trust the person counting your ballot to count correctly? There's a district in the UK that prides itself on always being the first to return results. I would be fairly worried about the ballot counters there. Eventually someone has to trust someone to execute correctly. Unless there's some voting system I'm not aware of that doesn't re…
There usually are representatives of various political parties at each polling station during elections in my country. How do you watch electroing vote counting? How do you recount in case of doubt?
This seems like a good contract to the typical (american-inspired) secrecy around governmental systems. I would also like to believe open source makes software more secure, but I'm not sure if there is any research that confirms it. Oh, and cool its made in python and not some enterprise java or .NET :)
We're getting off topic, but you do know that it's perfectly possible to write decent Java or C# without it being "enterprise", right? (whatever that means) I'm starting to get sick of this "ruby/python/nodejs = cool, java/.net = slow bloated enterprise crap for men with suits" attitude that keeps reappearing here on HN. Whether your work environment is cool, whether your code is decent and snappy, all that has very…
EDIT: new Java, for example, looks about like this [1] and that's not all that complicated, even though I would like it more with webflow (technology for describing webpage in term of flows -- each flow is basically FSM with method calls specified on transitions and FMS-wide persistent storage).
[1]: https://github.com/heroku/devcenter-spring-mvc-hibernate
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You don't seem to understand, so heres a whitepaper [1] from Rop Gonggrijp on how to play chess on a Nedap voting computer. And the Nedap machines are special-built and programmed to ensure the authenticity of the votes, using anything from printers to read only memory. Not fucking Python running on a loosely secured Linux box. [1]: http://wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/images/9/91/Es3b-en...
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So the idea of using Python for an electric voting machine is dead from the onset, a complete no-starter.
(And yes, of course computer languages are inherently more or less secure by themselves, through the simple proxy of allowing programmers to make (or prevent) severe errors. Think C and fixed-size buffers on the stack.)
This seems like a good contract to the typical (american-inspired) secrecy around governmental systems. I would also like to believe open source makes software more secure, but I'm not sure if there is any research that confirms it. Oh, and cool its made in python and not some enterprise java or .NET :)
http://www.onlineaspect.com/2010/01/19/openness-and-security...
Common, not a single positive comment ? Things in the administration always take time. At least it's a move in the right direction. Next add a build CI to produce signed images. Then propose USB keys for people to boot their own system on the voting booth. At least it's better than the Diebold debacle in the states.
IMHO internet voting falls under "because you can does not mean you should".
Could it be, that secret ballots are insecure? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_ballot In the US, we officially supported secret ballots in 1892. Still, I wonder if we all found the strength to open up the ballot, if that wouldn't eliminate some of the viability of voting fraud? I'll start, I voted for Obama in 2008 & 2012.
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All voting systems that I know of require trust, with or without machines. Do you trust the person counting your ballot to count correctly? There's a district in the UK that prides itself on always being the first to return results. I would be fairly worried about the ballot counters there. Eventually someone has to trust someone to execute correctly. Unless there's some voting system I'm not aware of that doesn't re…
There are theoretical cryptographic systems where each voter can verify that his vote was counted properly, without revealing his vote to anyone. I don't think any have been implemented in practice.
[2] http://documentation.heliosvoting.org/verification-specs/hel...
[3] http://www.iacr.org/elections/eVoting/finalReportHelios_2010...
[4] http://www.iacr.org/elections/eVoting/heliosDemo.pdf
[5] https://vote.heliosvoting.org/helios/elections/1df69264-0a48...
I would expect in my country anyways that any online voting would be DDOS'd by idiots looking for a soap box the media will pay attention to and create a huge debacle resulting in them scrapping it and forcing a regular ol' paper vote.